Vladimir Putin has been the president or the prime minister of Russia for over 12 years. By now, many would think they are familiar with who this person is and yet he's still a mystery. This is appropriate for a man who observers variously have said has no face, no substance, and no soul. He is, they say, "a man from nowhere" - a man who can appear to be anybody to anyone.
Mr. Putin's penchant for dramatic public appearances is well known. The images that Putin's public relations team has orchestrated range from big game hunter to scuba diver to biker, even night club crooner. It is reminiscent of the old British children's book and cartoon character, Mr. Benn, who magically takes on different disguises, has an adventure and then returns to reality.
The smoke and mirrors aside, there are, in fact, several real Putins. Understanding his multidimensional nature is and should be important for U.S. and other policymakers trying to decide how to approach and interact with him. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin divides Putin's personality into six facets. Click around each segment to learn more about the many dimensions of Putin.
An Operative in the Kremlin
Vladimir Putin has been the president or the prime minister of Russia for over 12 years. By now, many would think they are familiar with who this person is and yet he's still a mystery. This is appropriate for a man who observers variously have said has no face, no substance, and no soul. He is, they say, "a man from nowhere" - a man who can appear to be anybody to anyone.
Mr. Putin's penchant for dramatic public appearances is well known. The images that Putin's public relations team has orchestrated range from big game hunter to scuba diver to biker, even night club crooner. It is reminiscent of the old British children's book and cartoon character, Mr. Benn, who magically takes on different disguises, has an adventure and then returns to reality.
The smoke and mirrors aside, there are, in fact, several real Putins. Understanding his multidimensional nature is and should be important for U.S. and other policymakers trying to decide how to approach and interact with him. Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin divides Putin's personality into six facets. Click around each segment to learn more about the many dimensions of Putin.
Case Officer
Much like his main function in the KGB, Putin is a collector of compromising information and keeper of secrets. Though his tough guy image claims otherwise, Putin wasn't a hard-nosed KGB thug. He was a case officer, and his skill was "rabota s lyud'mi" (working with people).
In the chaos that reigned after the fall of the USSR, Putin saw the rise of the oligarchs and rapacious governors as catastrophic and destructive to the State - they were dismantling it for their own gain. To Putin, these men and women were like enemy agents operating on your territory. How did he deal with them? He recruited them. He understood the principle of John Masterman's "Double-Cross System": don't destroy your enemies; harness them, control them, manipulate them, and use them for your own goals.
While Putin worked in St. Petersburg, he amassed a vast wealth of information on who was doing what, with whom, and to whom and was very successful in using that knowledge to further his and his friends' causes. When he came to Moscow in 1996, he was brought in precisely to keep tabs on who was getting what from the vast assets of the Kremlin. Information about misdeeds or information about crimes that may have been committed is the most powerful tool one could have.
Statist
Putin is a gosudarstvennik, a man who believes that Russia must be a strong state and have a strong state apparatus. In December 1999, then-Prime Minister Putin wrote and published what came to be known as the Millennium Message, his personal mission statement for saving the Russian State, the gosudarstvo.
In the manifesto, Putin wrote that, since the fall of communism, more Russians exercised individual rights like freedom of expression and freedom to travel. These rights were fine, but they weren't "Russian" and they wouldn't be enough to ensure Russia's survival. It is, he argued, the Russian values of patriotism, solidarity, and the belief that Russia's destiny is to be a great global power that would protect and ensure the state's prosperous future. The individual and society are, and must be, subordinate to the State and its interests. The State does not serve the individual, but the individual serves the State. Many of Putin's actions and decisions taken as leader support his personal mission to strengthen the State.
Free Marketeer
Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of Mr. Putin is that he is an advocate and strong supporter of capitalism -- but with his own interpretation. Unlike many men of his generation, he does not strive for a return to the Soviet system of central planning and state ownership or some form of quasi-communism.
When Putin attended the KGB Higher School in Moscow in 1985, the KGB was furiously engaged in an effort to save the Soviet system by searching for a new economic model that would include elements of capitalism. Unlike most of his fellow Soviet citizens, Putin studied and had access to Western texts on economics and management. It became clear to him that communism was flaws.
But Putin faced a specifically Russian dilemma: How can you have private ownership in an "inverted funnel" economy and still guarantee State interests? The Soviets couldn't resolve it. Stalin opted only for control. Later leaders made attempts to reconcile efficiency and control. Putin found an answer by drawing upon one of his other personalities: that of the case officer.
Survivalist
Given their long history of war and privation, a focus on survival may be the mentality that is the most widespread of all among Russians of nearly all backgrounds and ages. But Putin's life experiences have made him extraordinarily focused on survival. His father and mother lived through the Nazi siege of Leningrad in World War II, in which over a million people (including the Putin's first son) died of starvation and disease. His involvement in St. Petersburg's 1991 food shortage only strengthened his impulses to prepare for the worst.
Putin has been obsessed with avoiding and coping with worst-case scenarios. He was influenced by an American textbook on corporate management that he likely read while at the KGB Academy. That book defined the essence of true "strategic" planning as "planning for contingencies," for the unexpected.
Putin has implemented this worst-case-scenario, survivalist idea on a national scale. The key is his emphasis on reserves. He built up Russia's financial reserves, reduced its debt, and reduced exposure to the global economy. He also built massive material reserves in the form of Russia's super-secret "State Reserves," managed by a former KGB colleague.
Outsider
All St. Petersburgers are by definition outsiders to the center of power that resides in Moscow. Putin was an outsider to the privileged circles of the KGB. Unlike most other Soviet citizens, Putin did not experience perestroika -- he stationed in Dresden, Germany. He was brought into Moscow by politician Anatoly Chubais as outsider. He was not a "Golden Boy."
Putin cultivated this reality to his benefit. The outsider can be pragmatic; he has no vested interest in current policies. In a system so burdened by ideology, only an outsider could clearly see the flaws of the Soviet system. This is what allowed Putin to abandon the strongest element of communist ideology, the myth of state ownership and central planning. He could admit that the principles of free enterprise and private property were superior. Later, as Russia began to redesign herself, Putin and his circle of friends were based in St. Petersburg – a perch from which they could observe and critique Moscow's moves. Those observations would later inform Putin's decisions as Russian Head of State.
History Man
In Putin's Millennium Message, he said that Russia should find its path forward by looking back to its past. As he has progressed in his political career, Putin has constantly cited historical themes, thus making himself a protagonist in Russian history.
When Putin decided to return to the Russian presidency in 2011, he said it was because he wanted to see the process of restoring the Russian State to its full conclusion. He sees himself as the only person who can guarantee that this will be completed. Mr. Putin becomes the History Man; he becomes the standard-bearer of centuries of Russian attempts to reform the state, to put the Russian state on a firm footing, to give the Russian state the greatness that he believes that it should have.
Conclusion
Each of the identities and the outlooks they represent have been important components of Putin's strength as a leader and ruler. They explain how he succeeded in coming to power and why he defined his tasks as he did. But they are also key to explaining his vulnerabilities.
These personalities are often in conflict with one another. Putin the Survivalist is in conflict with Putin the Free Marketeer: policies oriented towards survival and security are costly and inefficient. Putin the Case Officer is also in conflict with Putin the Free Marketeer: the Case Officer controls the businessmen through a protection racket. He manipulates them, and he constrains them. Because of the constraints, they cannot be truly free entrepreneurs.
These personalities may hinder Mr. Putin's political future. Many Russians want a modern government, and parts of Putin's personalities do not or cannot allow him to do that. After more than a decade in positions of political power, it is hard to reinvent one's self. But not all is lost for Putin. He is equipped with the pragmatism of an Outsider, the skill of a Case Officer, and a changed, enlightened view of what it means to be a Statist, these personalities could provide Putin the next steps to leading a modern Russia without compromising his personal mission.
SUMMARY
In Mr. Putin, Russia experts Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy reveal Vladimir Putin as a man of many and complex identities...a man more intricate and multifaceted than he wants the world to believe he is.
This is an example of hateful, if not rabid anti-Americanism whipped up by Putinistas in Russia these days, in media news coverage. I wonder to what extent and how far beyond the words this "inspiration" might go; if it has a single informational and actional source and how much involved in "wars by proxies" it is. And also, and probably most importantly if it reflects a new, more aggressive stance as a matter of doctrine and policies (of antiwestern self-preservation), including more aggressive and overt "special operations" abroad.
Четыре раза он побывал в Ираке, где принимал участие в боевых операциях и получил множество правительственных наград.
"Я отправился на войну не для того, чтобы рассматривать свои мишени как людей. Мне не интересно было знать, есть ли у них семьи или дети", - признался в 2012 году Кайл в интервью журналу Time.
Первой его жертвой была иракская женщина, в одиночку вышедшая с гранатой в руке навстречу американским морпехам.
Только в одной Фаллудже он убил 40 человек.Официально на его счету 160 застреленных иракцев, хотя сам он утверждал, что убил не менее 255 человек.
Ни об одном совершенном убийстве Кайл в итоге не жалел, и в отвечал в интервью, что "все убитые были плохими людьми".
Иракское сопротивление прозвало его "Дьяволом".
Криса "Дьявола" застрелил бывший сослуживец, такой же бессовестный наёмник, как и сам Кайл...
If some birds (foreign or domestic) do not fly with us, bash them over the head ("carefully", if it is possible; which means: use a good and convincing cover, make it look that it is their own friends who did it, for example in the act of gay bashing, etc. - historically the most favorite KGB method and style, from the times of Trotsky assassination).
Да, есть, конечно, птички, которые в стае вообще не летают, они предпочитают вить гнёзда где-то отдельно. Ну что делать? Это уже другая проблема. Даже если они не члены стаи – они члены нашей популяции, и к ним нужно относиться бережно, по возможности.
There are of course birds that do not fly in flocks and prefer to build their nests apart from the others. What can one do? That’s a whole different problem. In any case, even if they are not part of the flock, they are still part of our population, and we need to look after them as much as we can.
More exact translation: and we have to be careful ("protective") with them, if it is possible.
The traditional Munich security conference had a particular and very different meaning last weekend for US Vice President Joseph Biden and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had an hour-long face-to-face meeting in addition to delivering their keynote speeches. Biden had good reason to be proud of his “reset” policy initiative, presented at that conference in 2009, and he sought to explore new opportunities for keeping the “reset” going without becoming naïve about the depth of current discord (Newsru.com, February 2). Lavrov was instructed to play hard-ball and remonstrate against Western interference in Russia’s domestic affairs in the spirit of the famous “Munich speech” delivered by President Vladimir Putin back in 2007. In particular, the Russian foreign minister was authorized to present the determination of Russia’s counter-revolutionary course in the Syrian civil war, reject any forceful external intervention, and to insist that the Assad regime continues to maintain full control over its arsenal of chemical weapons (RIA Novosti, February 2).
The most productive avenue in the partnership reinvigorated during the first Obama administration was arms control, and there is plenty of unfinished and even untried business in reducing redundant but dangerous armaments. Washington is not discouraged by the expressed lack of interest in Moscow about advancing to a nuclear-free world. Moreover, US National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon is due to deliver new proposals on unblocking the firmly fixed deadlock on the missile defense issue (Grani.ru, January 14). The chances for success, however, appear less than slim—and not only because Putin has developed an unhealthy obsession with the hypothetical US anti-missile “shield,” but also because this deadlock is extremely convenient for blocking any serious negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which Russian strategists want to keep out of any arms control limitations (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 1). Nor is there any intention to re-institute Russia’s participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, particularly as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is so busy with sorting out the military reform process that he was unable to make an international debut at the Munich conference (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, January 31). With no outward signs that Russia is ready to reach a compromise with the United States on arms control, the invitation to President Barack Obama to visit Moscow in summer 2013 is all but senseless (Kommersant, February 1).
If there were expectations for expanding the economic foundation of bilateral relations after Russia’s long-delayed accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the cancellation of the long-irritating Jackson-Vanik Amendment, they have quickly evaporated. The problem is not just that few in the Russian government have bothered to learn what obligations and self-discipline WTO membership actually entails, as the head of Sberbank German Gref recently revealed (RBC Daily, January 18). A deeper problem is the pervasive anti-Americanism inherent in Russian bureaucratic mindsets. Illustratively, US support for Russia’s entry into the WTO was seen as evidence of the harmfulness of free trade for domestic producers (Moscow Echo, February 1). The ban on imports of beef and pork from the United States, under the pretext of “scientific” concerns about the safety of growth stimulant ractopamine, fits perfectly into this “patriotic” mindset (Kommersant, January 31).
The controversial meat ban follows the pattern of curtailing many joint enterprises that constituted the substance of the “reset”: from discontinuing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to the most recent cancellation of the agreement on cooperation in law enforcement and drug control (Novaya Gazeta, February 1). It was Russia that benefitted most from this agreement, which provided for information exchange and training of specialists, particularly in the Federal Drug Control Service. Russia’s withdrawal from cooperation amounts to Moscow shooting itself in the foot. Motivation for such erratic behavior comes from the desire to prove that Russia is perfectly capable of addressing security risks without US help (Gazeta.ru, January 31). Money may indeed not be a problem, but the experience of the Nunn-Lugar program shows that joint projects tend to have greater accountability and yield better results. Whereas, corruption in Russia’s defense sector has reached such heroic proportions that this year, Transparency International ranked Russia in the same group with Bangladesh and Rwanda (Kommersant, January 29).
It might seem that disagreements between the United States and Russia are technical and issue-specific and that it is only the lack of political will that prevents advancement to a more mature partnership. In reality, however, Putin is not just disappointed in the condescending attitude of his Western peers, but has come to see them as malicious sponsors of a domestic opposition that aims to destabilize and destroy the “legitimate” political order in Russia by revolutionary means. Anti-Americanism is thus not merely a means of mobilizing support among the “patriotic” political base, but a profound feature of the political regime that is retrogressing to uglier forms of authoritarianism. Amid this escalating hostility, it is remarkable to observe that the majority of Russians (estimated by polls at 53 percent) retains a positive attitude toward the US, while the trend in bilateral relations is seen as negative (Levada.ru, January 30).
Returning from Munich, Lavrov expressed his master’s wish that the US not create any more causes for tensions in bilateral relations or “artificial problems” (RIA Novosti, February 2). It might appear to be a hollow warning, but it hints at an answer to the question left out of the diplomatic bickering. Putin knows that one issue of crucial strategic importance to the US is the transit to, and increasingly from Afghanistan, and he is very careful not to waste this trump card prematurely. The new Obama administration is seen in the Kremlin as pragmatic, cautious in advancing the cause of democratic transitions, and keen to keep the “reset”-redux on track (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 31). Lavrov may be right in assuming that newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry is averse to fanning tensions. But Putin is definitely wrong to think the US will perpetually avoid condemning the violations of democratic freedoms that the Kremlin is firmly set to proceed with. President Obama has not yet had his “rendezvous-with-destiny” moment, and the deepening crisis of Putinism may well supply one; the harassed but defiant “white opposition” can count on his readiness to rise to any challenge and his moral resolution to do the right thing.
On January 26, police carried out mass arrests in Stavropol region to prevent ethnic Russians from rallying against the North Caucasians, arresting 87 people in the city of Nevinnomyssk. The protesters’ chief slogan was “Stavropol Is Not the Caucasus!” They demanded the introduction of a special migration regime in Stavropol region, its separation from the North Caucasian Federal District and even closing the administrative borders with the republics of the North Caucasus. The unregistered organization Novaya Sila (New Power) led the protests. The authorities’ reaction was harsh, and the protesters were apprehended before reaching the central square of the city where the rally was to have taken place (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2114620).
The planned rally in Nevinnomyssk was the first large-scale grassroots protest in southern Russia explicitly demanding that the Russian government separate the ethnic Russian population from the North Caucasus. When the North Caucasian Federal District was created in 2010, Stavropol appeared to be the only region in the district that had a predominantly ethnic Russian population. Since then various activist groups in Stavropol region have campaigned for the region’s separation from the North Caucasian Federal District, but Moscow has invariably rejected these demands. Ethnic Russians in Stavropol region complain that the North Caucasians bring crime with them and are changing the ethnic makeup of the region as ethnic Russians gradually leave and are replaced by North Caucasus natives. Stavropol region is the first stop for North Caucasians as they migrate from their home republics in search of jobs, a chance for a better life, and an escape from instability while remaining close to home.
For the Russian government, the presence of Stavropol region in the North Caucasian Federal District has both symbolic and practical meaning. On the one hand, through Stavropol region, Moscow retains the image of controlling the North Caucasus—for example, Moscow’s envoy to the region, Alexander Khloponin, officially resides in the city of Pyatigorsk, which is located in the southern part of Stavropol region. At the same time, Moscow’s hopes have been that Stavropol could become a melting pot for the North Caucasians. Stavropol region is almost as large as Dagestan with its population of nearly 3 million. Moreover, while Dagestan is the largest region in the North Caucasian Federal District, because it is ethnically fragmented, ethnic Russians in fact still comprise the largest ethnic group throughout all of the federal district. Yet, ethnic Russians increasingly seek insulation from the North Caucasus, and Stavropol region finds itself on the frontline of this movement.
The trouble in Nevinnomyssk started last December 6, when an ethnic Russian resident, Nikolai Naumenko, got into a fistfight with an ethnic Chechen, Viskhan Akaev. Akaev, assisted by his brother, reportedly stabbed Naumenko to death and ran away. Even though Akaev and his brother were declared fugitives and put on the federal wanted list, they were not found. The Russian population of the Stavropol region accused the authorities of inaction and started to organize public protests. On December 22, 37 protesters were arrested, sparking further protests among residents of the city. Even nationalists from Ukraine arrived in Nevinnomyssk to support the uprising (http://www.ng.ru/regions/2013-01-25/6_stavropolie.html). Some Russian activists alleged that up to 400 people were arrested during a protest held on December 22. Police forces from Moscow, Stavropol city and St. Petersburg were reportedly dispatched to prevent the protesters from staging the public rally (http://via-midgard.info/news/srochno-nevinnomyssk-na-osadnom-polozhenii.htm).
It is not surprising that the Russian authorities were aghast as the protest spread among ethnic Russians in Stavropol region. Indeed, while difficult, it is possible for the Russian authorities to cope with separatism of the North Caucasians for the time being. However, it would be impossible for Moscow to withstand serious pressure from ethnic Russian groups and resist Russian separatism. While the authorities have suppressed the Russian protests for now, destabilizing processes are apparently going on under the radar of the mainstream media. A commentator on the website of the newspaper Kommersant alleged that Nevinnomyssk was experiencing “a hunt for vehicles with Chechen license plates. Under the best scenario [locals] refuse to refuel their cars and, in the worst, four vehicles have been burned, [along with] two trucks and two vans” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2114620). Nevinnomyssk is located on the principal highway that connects all the republics of the North Caucasian Federal District to Krasnodar region and the rest of Russia.
Xenophobic attitudes are not an attribute of only ordinary people in Stavropol region. The authorities in the city of Stavropol expelled two Ingush students from the local university after they learned that the non-Russian students performed the traditional Caucasian dance known as the Lezginka in the streets of Stavropol. The students were accused of hooliganism and sent back to their home region, apparently without even an attempt to prosecute them for their “crime” (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219326/). Although there is no official visa regime between Stavropol region and Ingushetia, in practice such a regime seems to be materializing.
While the Russian government resists popular Russian demands to restrict the inflow of migrants from the North Caucasus and CIS countries, local Russians in Stavropol, including the local authorities, appear to be taking preemptive measures already. So far Moscow has indicated little resolve to address the issue of Russian nationalism, which ultimately drives Russian separatism. Therefore, more such incidents are likely to follow in Stavropol region and elsewhere in Russia.
On February 1, the Russian human rights group Agora released a report [ru] on RuNet censorship in 2012, titled “Russia As a Global Threat to a Free Internet,” documenting various limitations on Internet usage in Russia, including violence, administrative pressure, and other forms of intimidation and punishment used against netizens by state authorities. Agora has also created [ru] a “map of free Internet violations” for 2012, showing which areas of Russia are least friendly to bloggers and netizen journalists.
Written by Kevin Rothrock · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper
Russia's position on press freedom appears to have worsened, according to the 2013 Press Freedom Index published annually by Reporters without Borders. We asked various representatives of their Russian media their opinion on the matter:
Vladimir Putin has given another speech [ru] in defense of Russian Orthodox values, this time calling on the Church to study the lessons of the twentieth century. (One imagines that Putin has in mind Soviet religious oppression, which he seems to blame for the Russian Civil War.) “We must avoid a vulgar, primitive understanding of secularism,” he told the Bishops’ Council, a massive gathering of Orthodox clergy. Putin's comments are hard to divorce from several legislative efforts in the last year, which include Internet censorship and anti-gay initiatives that shield children from supposedly immoral influences.
Some activists argue that the Kremlin's recent cultural conservatism is intended to bait the liberal opposition into taking unpopular stances on issues that often stoke religious sentiments in the country's regions. The harsh prosecution of the Pussy Riot members, some say, was a Kremlin gambit to mobilize liberal protesters in support of artists too radical for Russia's political mainstream.
Vladimir Putin meets the participants of the Bishop's Council. 1 February 2103, Russian Presidential Service 3.0.
The draft law to ban “homosexual propaganda” is a case in point. In late January, blogger Oleg Kozyrev described [ru] the anti-gay law as an attempt to distract the “Bolontnaia” protester crowd from the real issues of election fraud, political prisoners, and so on. He wants activists to holster their rage and live to fight another day:
А поэтому я очень надеюсь, что мы по минимуму позволим себя втянуть в этот законодательный троллинг. По возможности надо не вестись на эти законы – все они будут отменены со временем по признакам маразма и бессмысленности.
And that's why I really hope that we keep our involvement to a minimum in this legislative trolling. To the extent possible, we don't need to buy into these laws. They'll all be cancelled in time, on the grounds of lunacy and inanity.
Writer Boris Akunin came to the opposite conclusion, calling [ru] on liberal oppositionists to stay true to their values, though he, too, acknowledged that the Kremlin's conservative legislative campaign is intended to reduce scrutiny on “electorally disadvantageous” topics like healthcare.
Putin's speech also recycled key fragments from remarks his chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, delivered to another audience of Orthodox figures in October 2012. Posting to the LiveJournal forum “ru_politics,” blogger Yuri Shtengel appears to be the first one to have noticed [ru] the similarities between Putin's and Ivanov's statements.
Several Russian newspapers reported Shtengel's finding, though many exaggerated both the size and scope of the controversy, claiming that a whole group of bloggers had discovered Putin's “plagiarism.” Orthodox activist and strong critic of the liberal opposition Boris Yakemenko took aim [ru] at news websites for this embellishment, adding that Putin's comments about secularism were merely “a statement of the obvious”—not a contentious “revelation.” Also annoyed by the hyperbole, Shtengel published an update to his LiveJournal denying any plagiarism accusations, and clarifying that his objections relate to the content of Putin's speech.
Ultra-popular blogger Artemy Lebedev weighed in on Russia's need to avoid “vulgar, primitive secularism,” writing [ru] with intentional vulgarity:
А я вот, блять, не собираюсь уходить от вульгарного, примитивного понимания светскости. Я на хую вертел всю религиозную хуетень, в гробу видал всех попов, и срать хотел на все чувства всех верующих.
Оставьте мне вульгарную, примитивную светскость и валите нахуй.
Now listen, s**t, I'm not gonna avoid any vulgar, primitive understanding of secularism. I'd f**kin’ like to throw the whole religious s**tfest and all priests into a grave, and I'd gladly s**t on all the [religious] feelings of all believers.
Leave me my vulgar, primitive secularism and f**k off.
Lebedev's response is a good demonstration of the challenge that faces Russian oppositionists generally and secularists specifically. On the one hand, Lebedev's antics are doomed to appeal only to a narrow audience. The same uncompromising sense of humor, however, is an important ingredient in the glue that keeps together Russia's “creative class,” which is widely credited with generating the country's political turmoil last winter. Committed religious conservatives—on and offline—are free to respond to Putin's “moral erosion” worries with earnest sympathy. For firebrand secularists, gay rights activists, and others, there seems to be an almost irresistible need for irreverence. Whether it's Lebedev's obscenities or Nadezhda Tolokonnikova's cathedral gyrations, the opposition's compulsion to offend has been both a blessing and a curse.
Written by Kevin Rothrock · comments (0)
Share: Donate · facebook · twitter · reddit · StumbleUpon · delicious · Instapaper
The Sandunovsky Baths are Moscow's most famous banya. Their history began with Sila Sandunov and Yelizaveta Uranova, actors at the court of Empress Catherine II (the Great). After the two were married, the empress presented the couple with diamonds, which Sandunov sold. With the money, he bought a plot of land near the Neglinnaya River in Moscow. Later, he bought land from his neighbors. He knocked down all the buildings on his land to build the banya. The construction was completed in 1808.
PHOTO OF THE DAY - Mikhail, a trainer from a travelling circus troupe based in Moscow, grooms Masha, an 11 year-old bear, during rehearsals at the Circus on Fontanka in St.Petersburg February 1, 2013. The troupe, which has four bears who have completed a three year training programme, will soon perform for the first time in 20 years in Russia's second city
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is considering signing into law a new “defense plan,” setting out in a comprehensive document the long-term threat assessment and strategic environment facing Russia over the next few decades. It will mark an effort on a grand scale to re-conceptualize Russian security documents and provide a framework for the defense ministry, General Staff and the military industrial complex to implement defense modernization. Although its details remain unknown, recent statements and speeches by the top brass and leading members of the Military Academy of Sciences point to the underlying precepts contained in the document at a time when it is increasingly clear that the “new look” reform of the Armed Forces is dead (see EDM, January 31; Interfax, January 29).
On January 29, the Defense Minister, Army-General Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Valeriy Garasimov, presented the draft defense plan to President Putin. Shoigu explained that the defense plan is the work of “49 ministries and departments,” and takes into account the long-term development of defense capabilities and the state armaments program. Its merit, according to the defense minister, lies in taking account of “all the programs” linked to defense, specifically mentioning the “arms program” and “mobilization.” Alongside the new defense plan, an additional framework has been devised for the military industrial complex, which sets out a vision for the maintenance and servicing of military equipment. Shoigu said this involves “lifetime contracts, from production to scrapping” (Interfax, NTV, January 29).
Some elements of Russia’s threat assessment and the prevailing views on the strategic environment as well as the type of armed forces required to meet these challenges were the subject of discussion during last month’s annual conference of the Academy of Military Sciences. Shoigu addressed the conference—unusual in the sense that the previous Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov had avoided contact with the academy—speaking of the escalating military threats to the Russian state. With “hot spots” located close to Russia’s borders, the Armed Forces need an optimal structure, an “efficient management system,” modern weaponry and a professional staff. But the nature of threats outlined, including “color revolutions,” was not extraordinary, ranging from missile defense to local conflicts such as Libya, Syria or potential conflict over Iran. Garasimov told his audience that the General Staff has not forgotten about the possible risk of “large-scale” wars, and as if to reinforce the message, Shoigu tellingly used the term “mobilization” when handing the defense plan to Putin (Interfax, January 29; www.vkonline.ru/234506/article/vpervye-razrabotan-plan-oborony-strany-uchityvayushij-vse-riski.html).
As the number of reform measures implemented during Serdyukov’s tenure as defense minister continues to be rolled back under Shoigu, the General Staff has requested that the extra-territorial principle applied to conscript service should now be reinstituted. That principle allows conscripts to be sent to serve in different parts of Russia. Serdyukov had abolished applying this principle to conscription, believing it is better to allow conscripts to serve closer to home (Izvestiya, January 30).
Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer published the entire text of the speech to the Academy of Military Sciences by its president, Army-General (retired) Makhmut Gareev, widely recognized as Russia’s leading military theorist. Of course, since the “new look” was launched in the fall of 2008, Gareev has frequently appealed to the political-military leadership not to abandon conscription or mobilization as the very basis of Russia’s conventional military security capabilities. However, Gareev had also given qualified backing to the experiment to introduce network-centric approaches to modern combat in the Russian military (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).
Now Gareev, with his ideas fully back in fashion among the defense ministry leadership, has taken the gloves off. Gareev reasserted the view that Russia faces military-political and economic efforts by other actors to squeeze its energy resources. The country will also face growing political pressure from the United States and China, and in this context Gareev said, “It is necessary to do everything in order to maintain our own national interests and to preserve the country’s integrity, above all by political-diplomatic means.” Gareev also referred to the reorientation of US strategic interests to the Asia-Pacific region, and the “re-stationing” of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces in Central Asia, which “cannot fail to affect Russia’s national interests and security” (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).
“Combat engagements will come to have a non-contact character, and the command-and-control of line-units will be accomplished by means of a net-centric system; computers will work out solutions for commanders in several variants,” Gareev told his audience, before reminding them of developments in the First and Second World Wars. He added, “Certainly, the character of armed warfare today is significantly changed, and military operations in the future actually will take on a more highly maneuverable character; but even the First and Second World Wars began with high maneuver operations” (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).
On the reform of the Armed Forces under Serdyukov, according to Gareev, the goal has been achieved of creating “compact, mobile” forces “equipped with the very latest types of arms,” which exaggerates the progress of the modernization. But then he rebuked the brigade-centric system it has produced: The reformed brigades are “2.5- to 3-fold weaker” than the divisions they replaced. Gareev further issued a clarion call for strengthening mobilization, which he described as a system of trained reserves, possibly along the lines of the US reserve system. At heart, Gareev offered a curious mix of old and new, possibly to fill the void of the Serdyukov reform, but openly questioned the value of boosting contract personnel numbers. “The times and experiences of all wars indicate a contract enlistee will serve well for good money in peacetime, but he will not die for money,” he argued (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).
The reworked Russian defense plan will most likely offer a compromise view among government departments on the potential threats to Russia over the next few decades, and also represent an effort to guide the main departments to produce a new level of synergy in their programs. But whatever the final content of the defense plan proves to be, it will have to fit an as yet unknown replacement for the Serdyukov reform. Paradoxically, while reference to “mobilization” signals the persistent influence of such thinking on Russian security policy, no one has yet offered an answer for a manpower system that depends on dwindling numbers due to the demographic crisis. The adjustment has not been made to the new reality that there is no mass mobilization potential in Russia, and this also reflects the deep uncertainty over what may be cobbled together in its place.
Politics surely makes strange bedfellows: Some Russian nationalists now take positions on the North Caucasus that would logically lead to the independence that many non-Russian nationalists in that region seek—in effect forming an implicit alliance of two nationalisms that most on each side of the divide would see as antithetical. But at the same time, other Russian nationalists are working side by side with leaders like Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov to strengthen the Russian state, thus explicitly forming an alliance of statist leaders whom many nationalists on both sides at a minimum distrust or even despise. Indeed, as journalist Svetlana Bolotnikova writes about these paradoxical situations, “…the Caucasian and Russian nationalists are sometimes so close in their views on what is going on that you can only be surprised” (www.bigcaucasus.com/events/actual/30-01-2013/82261-krylov-0/).
Many Chechen nationalists, she continues, heartily support the idea for which Russian nationalist Konstantin Krylov was recently sentenced to 120 hours of corrective labor: his call for Russia to “stop feeding the Caucasus.” Were that to happen, the North Caucasus could go its own way—an intriguing example of the convergence of two nationalisms often thought to be at odds, and one that might open the way for “a political alliance” between them, with both destroying the united Russian Federation in their pursuit of the benefits of separation.
On her blog, Chechen nationalist poet Zulikhan Magomadova is even more explicit about the ways in which these nationalisms have come together, and thus on why Moscow has no choice but to try to keep them at odds with each other (zulikhan.livejournal.com/137689.html). She writes that the Moscow authorities came down hard on Krylov because they “understand that if they do not pay the jail keepers”—in this case, the “corrupt” bosses at the top of the Caucasus republics—“the prisoners will run away.” And Magomadova argues that “the scenario of the loss of the Caucasus is so real—it would be sufficient simply to stop feeding it!—that [Moscow] is afraid of it and persecutes Russian nationalists” who broach the subject.
But at the same time, Bolotnikova calls attention to another curious convergence—that between another kind of Russian nationalist and another kind of North Caucasian one. Dmitry Demushkin, head of the “Russians” ethno-political movement, is working with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov to prepare a “Codex of Behavior for Young People” to help save Russia by bringing the two groups together.
Demushkin’s ideas about inclusivity are even broader. He argues that “the indigenous peoples of Russia who have participated in the construction and strengthening of the country can be full members of the party of [Russian] nationalists” and says that he plans to open branches of his party in the North Caucasus and other non-Russian areas. Those are things both Krylov and most North Caucasus nationalists would find absurd. (For additional details on this coming together of the two, see kavpolit.com/russkie-nacionalisty-s-chechencami-berutsya-za-molodyozh/).
As Magomadova points out, “A Russian nationalist is someone who first of all thinks about the interests of [ethnic] Russians. Is it profitable for Russians that Russia is an empire? That is very doubtful. To constantly occupy one’s neighbors […] to be hated by all one’s neighbors, to have enemies inside and out […] and at the end of all this to die a shameful death… A doubtful happiness, that.”
Both such convergences are inherently unstable. Those who, like Krylov, think that ridding Russia of the North Caucasus would solve all problems forget, Bolotnikova says, that “the appetites of the non-Russian separatists spread much further north than the currently existing Caucasus republics. For them, ‘Rus’ is limited to six or seven oblasts around Moscow. The rest of the territory of Russia they divide into the lands of various tribes who are supposedly conducting ‘a national liberation struggle.’”
But those like Demushkin are equally deluded. They do not understand that their presence, in and of itself, undermines the very cause they seek to promote. Russian nationalists like them may be willing to take under their wing “the younger brothers,” but Chechen nationalists like Magomadova will retort that such a combination weakens not only those seeking to maintain the status quo in the Russian Federation, but also the local North Caucasian bosses they are supporting.
Beyond that, these cases of strange bedfellows among nationalists call attention to two even more important points. On the one hand, Russians, as an ethnic community, are far more internally divided on what being a Russian means than most non-Russians are about their nations (rb21vek.com/clio/677-identichnosti-i-etnicheskie-ustanovki-molodezhi-bashkortostana61482.html). And on the other, again as Magomadova notes, Russian President Vladimir Putin operates on the principle of “divide and conquer” and will do anything necessary to ensure that the defenders of various nations will not work together or even work separately against him.
The Kremlin, after all, controls everything in Russia: money, abuse of police
power, laws, local election committees, the judges, the elites, the TV
channels…in other words, the regime has everything it needs to extend its rule
ad infinitum. Or more precisely, until the moment when god finally
decides to punish this arrogant power vertical by removing the last vestiges of
political sense from its collective head, grown dizzy with its own success. It
isn’t yet clear when this will happen, but there is a growing feeling that it
will be soon. Putin and all his initiatives are becoming increasing odious and
unpopular among wide circles of opinion –musicians, writers, actors, directors,
journalists, popular bloggers etc. – who for long years maintained a political
neutrality but have now roused themselves into civic engagement.
Trial of Putin Foe Shows No Russian Investors are Safe Bloomberg
Gennady Gudkov, a protest leader and ex-lawmaker who was stripped of his parliamentary seat last year and faces possible charges of “illegal business activity,” says Putin's reaction to criticism recalls the dark days of Stalinist mass trials and ...
Gennady Gudkov, a protest leader and ex-lawmaker who was stripped of his parliamentary seat last year and faces possible charges of “illegal business activity,” says Putin’s reaction to criticism recalls the dark days of Stalinist mass trials and repression.
Tempers flared during the recording of a TV discussion in Moscow. The host appealed for calm. Seconds later, Lebedev punched property developer Sergei Polonsky, knocking him off his chair. A video of the Sept. 16, 2011, incident became a YouTube sensation.
Tempers flared during the recording of a TV discussion in Moscow. The host appealed for calm. Seconds later, Lebedev punched property developer Sergei Polonsky, knocking him off his chair. A video of the Sept. 16, 2011, incident became a YouTube sensation. Photographer: HO/Reuters/Landov
LONDON (Reuters) - London's Evening Standard, backed by the family of Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev, won a London television franchise on Monday, beating four other bidders with a package offering live news from the paper's West London offices. Britain's telecoms regulator is offering 21 licenses for local digital TV stations, most covering single cities. The London franchise, which offers an audience of up to 4 million people, is potentially the most lucrative. ...
Trial of Putin Foe Shows No Russian Investors are Safe Bloomberg
Gennady Gudkov, a protest leader and ex-lawmaker who was stripped of his parliamentary seat last year and faces possible charges of “illegal business activity,” says Putin's reaction to criticism recalls the dark days of Stalinist mass trials and ...
Gennady Gudkov, a protest leader and ex-lawmaker who was stripped of his parliamentary seat last year and faces possible charges of “illegal business activity,” says Putin’s reaction to criticism recalls the dark days of Stalinist mass trials and repression.
Tempers flared during the recording of a TV discussion in Moscow. The host appealed for calm. Seconds later, Lebedev punched property developer Sergei Polonsky, knocking him off his chair. A video of the Sept. 16, 2011, incident became a YouTube sensation.
Tempers flared during the recording of a TV discussion in Moscow. The host appealed for calm. Seconds later, Lebedev punched property developer Sergei Polonsky, knocking him off his chair. A video of the Sept. 16, 2011, incident became a YouTube sensation. Photographer: HO/Reuters/Landov
LONDON (Reuters) - London's Evening Standard, backed by the family of Russian oligarch Alexander Lebedev, won a London television franchise on Monday, beating four other bidders with a package offering live news from the paper's West London offices. Britain's telecoms regulator is offering 21 licenses for local digital TV stations, most covering single cities. The London franchise, which offers an audience of up to 4 million people, is potentially the most lucrative. ...
Download Executive Summary here The oil era is dawning in Uganda. It has the potential to accelerate development and drive the country's transformation into a regional – and even global – economic player. But oil also brings risks – of the erosion of the relationship between people and government, of economic distortion, of increased corruption and of internal tensions. A well-informed, inclusive national conversation about the management options available to Uganda is vital in generating broad-based political consensus robust enough to stand up to the pressures that oil will inevitably bring Uganda has time on its side. Though geography and the technical challenges of extracting 'waxy' on-shore oil mean that production has not yet begun, and full capacity is unlikely to be reached before 2020, the relatively slow pace of oil development is an advantage as well as a frustration. Debate over the management of Uganda's oil is already intense in the country, and has been the subject of considerable controversy. It is incumbent on all stakeholders – government, opposition and civil society alike – to rise above the politics of today and look to the long term.
Another Reset of Relations With Russia in Obama’s Second Term
www.nytimes.com
Four years after Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. proposed a “reset” with Russia, the United States is quietly adopting a new approach to its old cold war rival: the cold shoulder.
MOSCOW — Four years ago, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. used an audience of world leaders at an annual security conference in Munich to propose a “reset” with Russia, the Obama administration’s first big foreign policy statement. But as Mr. Biden arrives in Germany for the same conference this weekend, the United States is quietly adopting a new approach to its old cold war rival: the cold shoulder.
The intense engagement on the reset led to notable achievements, including the New Start nuclear arms treaty and Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. But after more than a year of deteriorating relations, the administration now envisions a period of disengagement, according to government officials and outside analysts here and in Washington.
The pullback — which may well be a topic of discussion when Mr. Biden meets with the Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, on the sidelines of the conference — is a response to months of intensifying political repression in Russia since Vladimir V. Putin returned to the presidency last May and a number of actions perceived by Washington as anti-American.
Because American officials do not want to worsen the relationship and still hope for cooperation, they declined to publicly describe the plans. But within the administration it is taken for granted that the relationship with Russia is far less of a priority.
“We have real differences, and we don’t hide them,” said Tony Blinken, who has served as Mr. Biden’s national security adviser and is now joining the president’s national security team.
Briefing reporters before the Germany trip, Mr. Blinken said: “We have differences over human rights and democracy. We have differences over — in a number of areas that have been in the media in recent days and weeks.”
The distancing began with the recent withdrawal by the United States from the “civil society working group,” one of 20 panels created in 2009 to carry out the reset between Moscow and Washington under an umbrella organization known as the Obama-Medvedev Commission.
If that step was barely perceptible outside diplomatic circles, the strategy will soon become far more obvious. American officials say President Obama will decline an invitation — publicly trumpeted by Mr. Lavrov and the Russian news media — to visit Moscow on his own this spring. Instead, he will wait until September, when the G-20 conference of the world’s largest economies is scheduled to take place in St. Petersburg, Russia.
And while Secretary of State John Kerry has yet to select his first overseas destination, officials said Russia had been ruled out.
The main goal seems to be to send a message that the United States views much of its relationship with Russia as optional, and while pressing matters will continue to be handled on a transactional basis, Washington plans to continue criticizing Russia on human rights and other concerns. As for the anti-Americanism, the new approach might be described as shrug and snub.
Nevertheless, Mr. Blinken said there was real potential to work through the differences. And American officials are clearly betting that Mr. Putin desires a prominent role on the world stage and will ultimately decide to re-engage.
But the chances of that seem slim. Mr. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, warned that a pullback would be a shirking of American responsibility to work with Russia to maintain global stability. He said that Russia wanted to improve economic ties and build a stronger relationship, but that the United States must stay out of Russia’s affairs.
“We have heard numerous times the word in Washington that Russia’s domestic affairs are not satisfactory,” Mr. Peskov said. “Unfortunately these voices cannot be taken into account here, and we cannot agree with them. We are a genuine democratic country, and we are taking care of ourselves.”
In the nearly three years since the signing of the New Start treaty, followed by Russia’s vote two months later at the Security Council in support of sanctions on Iran, American officials say only one major thing has changed: the return of Mr. Putin to the presidency.
Confronted by the emergence of a potent political opposition movement among Moscow’s urban middle class, Mr. Putin has taken steps since his inauguration last May to suppress political dissent. Many of those steps were also seen in Washington as anti-American and undermining human rights.
These included the prosecution and jailing of members of the punk band Pussy Riot; the decision to end more than 20 years of cooperation on public health programs and civil society initiatives run by the United States Agency for International Development; cancellation of a partnership to dismantle unconventional weapons; and approval of legislative initiatives clamping down on pro-democracy groups and other nonprofit organizations.
The final straw appeared to be a law signed by Mr. Putin in December prohibiting the adoption of Russian children by American citizens, which the Kremlin said was retaliation for a new American law punishing Russian human rights violators. Senior Obama administration officials viewed the adoption ban not only as geopolitically disproportionate, but so utterly cruel in denying orphans the chance to join a family that it left many speechless and some near tears.
That the Russian government would put children in the political cross-fire convinced American officials that they were not confronting political theatrics, as they believed when Mr. Putin was running for re-election, but rather an increasingly idiosyncratic government driven by Russian domestic concerns, especially Mr. Putin’s fears of popular unrest.
“It’s a feeling of frustration that Putin and company are unnecessarily imposing strains on the Russian and American relationship,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser, now a trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in a telephone interview.
“I would not construe that as saying that Russia needs to be downgraded, or is irrelevant,” Mr. Brzezinski said, but that “we do not need it for everything.”
Even Russia’s most critical role in the global economy, as a major supplier of oil and gas — particularly to American allies in Europe — has ebbed, given the rise of the United States as a major producer of shale gas and the return of Iraq as a big oil producer.
At the same time, outside its borders, Russia remains indisputably relevant on a range of global issues, including the threats and opportunities from climate change in the Arctic and the political uncertainty in North Korea, that prevent the United States from pulling back too far.
“We can manage these issues effectively together, or end up shouting at each other,” said James F. Collins, who was ambassador to Russia from 1997 to 2001 under President Bill Clinton. “Anybody who suggests we are going to disengage and let them stew just doesn’t get it. We will have to deal with them.”
Matthew Bryza, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Eurasian affairs, said it would be best to deal dispassionately with Moscow.
“Every American president in my career has come into office thinking that they are going to be the great communicator that makes a breakthrough with Russia,” Mr. Bryza said. “As their terms have continued, every president has been disappointed.”
He added: “Russia behaves like Russia. Russia pursues its own hard-core national interests. That is realpolitik. We should de-sentimentalize our relations.”
Peter Baker contributed reporting from Washington, and Nicholas Kulish from Berlin.
Police Began Violence At Protest, Panel Says
russialist.org
(Moscow Times – themoscowtimes.com – Alexander Winning – February 4, 2013) Members of the Kremlin’s human rights council believe that police, not activists, instigated viole...
Father Tikhon Shevkunov looks a little too polished to fit the image of the Orthodox Christian monk branded into the western imagination by Dostoevsky. The beard is just unkempt enough, but his chin i...
Anna Nemtsova spoke on behalf of RBTH to the artistic director of the Bolshoi Ballet Sergei Filin, who was recently the victim of a sulphuric acid attack. Check out the full interview here:
Bolshoi drama: Looking for answers | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
On Jan. 17, a man wearing a mask splashed sulphuric acid into the face of the Bolshoi Theater’s artistic director, Sergei Filin. After spending two weeks in a Russian hospital, he left for additional care in Germany on Feb. 4. Just after undergoing his fourth surgery in Moscow, he spoke to Anna Nemt...
THE Obama administration has decided it’s time to “reset the reset” with Russia. The reset was one of the administration’s first foreign policy initiatives in 2009 and certainly reduced bilateral tensions for a period. But President Obama now faces Vladimir Putin as Russia’s president instead of Dmitri Medvedev, and the entire premise of U.S.-Russia relations will have to be reviewed.
After 12 years at the top of Russian politics, Putin should be a known quantity. But policy makers and pundits are constantly diverted by the images that proliferate inside and outside Russia — from the action man tranquilizing tigers and flying with cranes, to the cruel anti-American autocrat who exploits orphans to undermine U.S. human rights legislation.
For the Obama administration to chart a new course in relations with Russia, it needs to be clear about who Vladimir Putin is and what he wants.
Putin is a man fixated on the survival of the Russian state, not just his own survival. In his first two presidential terms he worked to restore and consolidate the strength and independence of the Russian state. He did so primarily by channeling windfall revenues from the oil boom to pay off the colossal debts accumulated by his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. He then proceeded to build up Russia’s financial and material reserves.
Putin now believes it is time to concentrate on strengthening Russia internally. In his annual “Message to the Federal Assembly” (the Russian equivalent of a State of the Union Message) in December 2012, Putin barely mentioned the outside world. The international system, he suggested, is fraught with risk for Russia, not opportunity. Russians, Putin commanded, need to turn inward. They should look to patriotism, not Westernism; to solidarity, not individualism; to spirituality, not consumerism and moral decay. He touted Russia’s historic roots and traditional values as the basis for its future trajectory.
Putin’s priority for 2013 is to reduce Russia’s exposure and vulnerability to external shocks. He is not interested in foreign policy adventures, especially not a confrontation with the United States. Putin firmly opposes U.S. policy toward Syria and the threat of force against Iran. But his opposition stems neither from anti-Americanism nor a desire to back the Iranian mullahs or Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in their struggles with the West. It is rooted in his obsession with stability. Helping Tehran secure a nuclear weapon and keeping Assad in Damascus are not Putin’s goals. But an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, and NATO or the United Nations intervening in Syria to forcibly remove Assad, would increase global volatility.
Putin wants Russia to be left alone, unencumbered by liabilities and obligations. He wants Russia to hunker down in its Eurasian neighborhood and not embark on further integration with an embattled West. Putin has never seen the West as a model for Russia. Now, he is not even interested in joining it as a partner. The euro zone crisis has convinced him there is no need for Russia to pursue a “common European home” (an idea he picked up from Gorbachev and Yeltsin early in his presidency).
Although he championed Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization, Putin saw this as a long-denied right, as well as a rite of passage into the “big boys club.” In his annual address, Putin promised he would ensure there is a “demand” for Russia in the world, both for the Russian economy and for a Russian role in geopolitics. Putin’s goal is to make sure the ailing West knows it needs Russia and its vast territory and resources more than Russia needs the West, even if that is an overreach.
Where does this leave the reset? The reality is this: There are no big deals to be had with Putin. Outside the traditional U.S.-Russian bilateral realm of arms control, there is no great opportunity for the Obama administration in Russia. The only quid pro quo Putin would likely strike with the United States is one no administration could (or would) contemplate — where Moscow agrees not to make life too difficult for Washington, as long as the U.S. ignores Russian domestic developments and human rights abuses.
On Iran and Syria, Putin will calibrate his moves to reduce Moscow’s exposure and increase its leverage. Meanwhile, Putin’s perceptions of U.S. meddling in Russian politics will remain the sore point in the relationship. When he considers the Russian state insulted or challenged in any way on this issue, Putin will be quick to respond.
For Putin very little is off-limits in getting his message across, as the recent ban on U.S. adoptions makes clear. Even when the myths are dispelled, the real Vladimir Putin is difficult to deal with. Putin is a man who knows what he wants. Only once the administration is clear about what that is can it begin to figure out its own message and limits in dealing with Putin’s Russia.
Fiona Hill is senior fellow and director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. Clifford Gaddy is senior fellow in foreign policy and global economics and development at Brookings. They are co-authors of the forthcoming book, “Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin.”
"..По результатам проверки, объем списанного текста в псевдонаучных работах доходил до 90 процентов.
Результаты проверки ошеломили всех, в том числе и самих проверяющих. Цифры — запредельные. Рассмотрели 25 кандидатских и докторских, защищенных в Московском педагогическом государственном университете. Оказалось, что в 24 названы несуществующие публикации, в 22 ложно указаны ведущие организации.
Семь работ проверили в Российской государственной библиотеке, и все оказалось плагиатом. Вердикт комиссии не оставил шансов профессору Александру Данилову, главе Диссертационного совета: 17 кандидатов и докторов наук теперь предлагают лишить ученой степени. Среди тех, кто симулировал занятия наукой, есть и очень известные люди...
...
"Вести недели" решили позвонить по такому телефону. Полная неожиданность — даже после разразившегося скандала на другом конце провода любезно отвечают:
- Мне очень нужно быстрее защитить кандидатскую, есть хорошее место в музее. Я в аспирантуре. Но мне надо быстрее, понимаете. Я из Петербурга, но мне сказали, в Москве это легче устроить.
- Мы вам поможем.
В советское время защититься было сложно. Вокруг часто кипели макиавеллиевские страсти. Были "черные" оппоненты, которые писали критические отзывы. Иногда все заканчивалось инфарктом. Но престиж науки высок.
"Когда я защищал докторскую в 1965 году, это была первая диссертация, защищенная в новом здании Института истории. Актовый зал был набит. У меня сохранились фотографии. Диссертация была событием", — вспоминает профессор Института российской истории РАН, почетный доктор РГГУ Сигурд Шмидт.
В 90-х система стала разрушаться. ВАК теперь рассматривает только докторские, да и то на предмет соблюдения формальностей. В вузах стали возникать в огромном количестве диссертационные советы разного уровня, ведь определенное количество защит диссертаций в год — это престиж учебного заведения.
Изменилась пропорция. Раньше докторов наук было в десять раз меньше, чем кандидатов, теперь — в три раза. При этом новоиспеченных докторов почему-то не приглашают преподавать в западные университеты, им не дают Нобелевскую премию, хотя, возможно, им это и не нужно.
"Это котируется. На визиточке какого-то политического деятеля или большого бизнесмена пишут, что они кандидаты или доктора — желательно экономических наук", — говорит Вадим Радаев.
Кандидат технических наук — совсем не интересно, физико-математических — не понятно. Котируются остепененные юристы и гуманитарии. Тут — традиционно. За сложносочиненными фразами можно скрыть отсутствие мысли..." http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1022936
--------------------------
This is the example of hateful, if not rabid anti-Americanism whipped up by Putinistas in Russia these days, in media news coverage. I wonder to what extent and how far beyond the words this "inspiration" might go; if it has a single informational and actional source and how much involved in "wars by proxies" it is. And also, and probably most importantly if it reflects a new, more aggressive stance as a matter of doctrine and policies (of antiwestern self-preservation), including more aggressive and overt "special operations" abroad.
Четыре раза он побывал в Ираке, где принимал участие в боевых операциях и получил множество правительственных наград.
"Я отправился на войну не для того, чтобы рассматривать свои мишени как людей. Мне не интересно было знать, есть ли у них семьи или дети", - признался в 2012 году Кайл в интервью журналу Time.
Первой его жертвой была иракская женщина, в одиночку вышедшая с гранатой в руке навстречу американским морпехам.
Только в одной Фаллудже он убил 40 человек.Официально на его счету 160 застреленных иракцев, хотя сам он утверждал, что убил не менее 255 человек.
Ни об одном совершенном убийстве Кайл в итоге не жалел, и в отвечал в интервью, что "все убитые были плохими людьми".
Иракское сопротивление прозвало его "Дьяволом".
Криса "Дьявола" застрелил бывший сослуживец, такой же бессовестный наёмник, как и сам Кайл...
Russian lawmakers have given preliminary approval to a law to allow governors to be appointed in the country’s 83 regions, reversing last year’s move to restore direct elections. As Daniil Kotsyubinsky reports, this issue is unimportant in itself, but it exposes the regime’s soft underbelly, unrest in the Caucasus.
So, there are to be no direct elections of governors, or at least not in the Northern Caucasus. Without waiting for the Russian parliament to pass the law giving regions the right to decide whether to have their regional chiefs elected or appointed, the heads of Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kababrdino-Balkariya, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, north Ossetia and Chechnya — masters of political synchronised swimming — have collectively asked the government of the Russian Federation (RF) to spare them the dangers that might accompany the direct expression of the public will.
A reform that backfired
Vladimir Putin introduced Russia’s crooked gubernatorial appointment system in 2004. Until then regional heads were directly elected, except in Dagestan where the governor was appointed by the local parliament. But after the terrorist attack on the school in Beslan (in north Ossetia) in September 2004, Putin suddenly came out against the election of regional chiefs, proposing instead that they be effectively appointed by the president, i.e. himself. Formally, three candidates’ names would be put before regional parliaments for approval. Given the absolute domination of the president’s United Russia party in all these bodies, the results of these ‘elections’ would clearly be a foregone conclusion.
However, the pros of this impulsive reform turned out to be outweighed by its cons. In the first place, the obviously spurious implied connection between elected governors and Chechen separatists in Beslan only strengthened public suspicion that the seizure of the school might have been secretly initiated by the Russian security services. Putin destroyed any remaining illusions the public had about being able to influence government, even if only at a local level, and handed the opposition a new and highly popular rallying cry: ‘Bring back governors’ elections’.
In the second, by abolishing gubernatorial elections, Putin dismantled a system that created a political buffer between himself and the voters. Elected governors served the useful purpose of deflecting the flak for any problems or failures away from the Kremlin – now that option had disappeared.
Lastly, Putin destroyed any remaining illusions the public had about being able to influence government, even if only at a local level, and handed the opposition a new and highly popular rallying cry: ‘Bring back governors’ elections’. And the opposition, which until then had been unsure about what reforms to demand of the Kremlin, seized it with gratitude and made it one of its key slogans.
As a result, when in the autumn of 2011 the political situation in Russia suddenly began to deteriorate sharply and fearful government officials even began to pronounce the words ‘political reform’, first PM Putin and then President Medvedev spoke out in favour of reintroducing gubernatorial elections. On Medvedev’s initiative the law was duly changed. The first elections, for those regional heads whose terms of office ran out between June and December 2012, were scheduled for autumn 2012. They took place without any hitches – or indeed any unpleasant surprises for Vladimir Putin.
Not that any were likely! The Kremlin, after all, controls everything in Russia: money, abuse of police power, laws, local election committees, the judges, the elites, the TV channels…in other words, the regime has everything it needs to extend its rule ad infinitum. Or more precisely, until the moment when god finally decides to punish this arrogant power vertical by removing the last vestiges of political sense from its collective head, grown dizzy with its own success. It isn’t yet clear when this will happen, but there is a growing feeling that it will be soon. Putin and all his initiatives are becoming increasing odious and unpopular among wide circles of opinion –musicians, writers, actors, directors, journalists, popular bloggers etc. – who for long years maintained a political neutrality but have now roused themselves into civic engagement. To give an example, the celebrated musician Yuri Bashmet has been universally ostracised for his implicit support for the recent Dima Yakovlev Law, which among other things bans the adoption of Russian children by US citizens.
How much longer will the regime last?
The current situation in Russia is beginning to resemble the years 1915-6, when the Tsarist government suddenly found itself the object of universal hatred and it seemed that it would only take one serious spark of revolution for all the Grand Dukes, generals and ministers to let go of power and leave the Tsar to his fate. Although of course the roots of that revolution didn’t lie in ‘the odd mistake’ made by the government, but events stretching back over many years.
‘The current situation in Russia is beginning to resemble the years 1915-6, when the Tsarist government suddenly found itself the object of universal hatred and it seemed that it would only take one serious spark of revolution to leave the Tsar to his fate’
There are also objective and fundamental reasons for the moral and political decline of the Putin regime, the most significant of which is the public’s weariness with the long years of economic and political stagnation which have not given them the stability and prosperity they were promised. Another important factor is Putin’s increasingly obvious physical aging, magnified by the lack of a constitutional (rather than emergency) procedure for a handover from one ruler to another. Everyone, both those close to power and the public at large, is becoming increasingly neurotic about this state of affairs. Sooner or later, we shall see an inevitable split in the Kremlin ranks, followed by the fateful ‘spark of revolution’…with Putin looking less and less immortal, it is only a matter of time before someone in his inner circle will risk gambling on a drop in his political stock, to avoid going down with the presidential Titanic. Putin’s autocracy, in other words, is being eroded from within, and the question of how regional governors are selected is neither here nor there.
While the Dragon is still strong, he will make short work of any election campaigns, whether direct or indirect, as is clear from not only the last parliamentary and presidential elections, but also the direct gubernatorial elections that took place in five Russian regions last autumn. Unsurprisingly, these passed off in just as orderly a fashion as the previous indirect ones, with the sitting candidates duly re-elected.
What’s more, should, heaven forbid (as has been known in some mayoral elections), the election winner be not the ruling party candidate, but some local Robin Hood or William Tell, he or she will be forced to fit into the existing power vertical. It is unthinkable for someone to successfully govern a region while at the same time voicing any disagreement with the Kremlin. The overwhelming majority of Russia’s regions are reliant on central government hand-outs for their survival, and any official at any level can at any time be sacrificed to the latest ritual war on corruption — everyone knows this, and knows to watch their step.
How the pyramid of power is constructed – directly or indirectly – is totally unimportant. What is important is for a prince to have received from the hands of the Great Khan a letter patent entitling him to ‘govern, raise taxes and collect tribute’. If you have, then get on with it. Otherwise, join the Yuri Luzhkov Club for Retired Heavyweights.
But if that’s the case, why did the Kremlin then make another U-turn and revert to an appointment system for governors (whether total or partial is still not clear)? Boris Nemtsov, leader of the opposition Parnas Party, blogged on the ‘Moscow Echo’ radio station website: ‘Gubernatorial elections, which they had apparently just reinstated, were already emasculated by all kinds of municipal filters and innumerable ways of disqualifying ‘unsuitable’ candidates. Yet they are still being abolished. I predict that they will try to abolish any elections where there is even the slightest threat of their power being challenged.’
Bolotnaya Square's revolutionaries were unable to advance truly influential ideas. The one so-called reform, on governors elections, will ultimately be refashioned in the interests of the regime. Photo: (cc) Flickr/mpeake
So, the Russian opposition is such a threat to the regime that even in its emasculated state it has enough political potential to have the Kremlin running scared? Alas, no. Sadly for Nemtsov and other professional opponents of the regime, direct gubernatorial elections as such present no danger whatsoever to either Putin or his electoral system. The clearest proof of this is that the opposition leader’s contention has been echoed by a United Russia member of the country’s upper chamber, Senator Vadim Tyulpanov, who has declared that ‘the idea of abolishing the election of governors even in part of Russia could lead to the downfall of our country’, and that it was ‘a great pity’ that Parliament had taken such a decision.
A Theatre of the Absurd?
So what is this Theatre of the Absurd, where Tyulpanov appears as Putin’s antagonist and Nemtsov dramatically brandishes castrated revolutionary marionettes about? In fact there is nothing absurd at all. Or rather, the absurdity began last winter. At the very height of the street protests, the opposition missed the opportunity of demanding radical change (i.e. Putin’s resignation and a full scale programme of political reform). Instead, all they could come up with was the nonsensical ‘Churov Out!’ (a reference to the Chair of Russia’s Central Election Commission and Eminence grise behind election fraud) and a cry for new elections without any change of government or its regime. Among other patently dead horses being flogged was the idea of a return to the direct election of governors. And the Kremlin, terrified by the hell that was breaking loose outside its gates, quaked. And it promised to deliver.
‘The new law’s chief purpose is not to ‘keep Nemtsov and Co. away from power’ (there is no risk of that anyway). The message is clear: the boss is back in town and any Kremlin wavering and worrying in December 2011 is history.’
What’s more, the promise was kept! After which it resolved to dot all the ‘i’s, in case any doubt remained about the outcome of the previous political year. Then the new law was tabled. Its chief purpose is not to ‘keep Nemtsov and Co. away from power’ (there is no risk of that anyway), but simply to demonstratively draw a line under the phantom trials and tribulations of the opposition and its sympathisers among the public, all of it precipitated by the fuss around Putin and Medvedev’s announcement of their job swap in September 2011. The message was clear: the boss was back in town and any Kremlin wavering and worrying in December 2011 was history. This is the reason for the opposition’s present hopeless and needless anger as Putin dismisses them now as ‘disqualified for total debility’.
Of course the Kremlin’s rationale is not only an ethico-political one; an indirect form of election of governors is both simpler and cheaper. There is never going to be any problem about lining up a few dozen regional MPs to vote the right way. Sorting out the media, the police and all the local election committees before a direct election is a much bigger hassle, although all these issues are of secondary importance to the Kremlin. And the fact that Tyulpanov was joining with Nemtsov in criticism of Putin probably only means that the Kremlin hasn’t yet made up its mind whether to reimpose the old indirect system everywhere or to invent a new game of ‘letting a hundred flowers of regional freedom bloom’.In which case of course the regime’s PR stress will be on the complete freedom of self development enjoyed by Russia’s regions and any suggestions to the contrary come from the mendacious corridors of the US State Department.
The real truth behind the law
But this whole story nevertheless contains a ‘moment of truth’ which allows us to see which haystack hides the needle of Putin’s downfall. It is obviously not Bolotnaya Square, synonymous with last year’s protest rallies. It is not Moscow at all. It is the Caucasus. That is the area where Moscow will not even pretend to hold a dialogue with the public. That is the area where the President’s men on the ground are starting to sound nervous. In December 2012 Aleksey Machnev, the speaker of North Ossetia’s parliament, told Putin that direct gubernatorial elections would lead to ‘an increase in social and political tension, a deterioration in the socio-economic situation, and escalation of inter-regional discord and a threat to security in the area’. And on the eve of the national parliamentary debate on the new Bill the President of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Yevkurov made an almost monarchist appeal in support of the appointment system:‘The President’s administration will never appoint some good-for-nothing who won’t be up to the job. What would be the point of that?’ In the heat of the moment, Yevkurov seems to have forgotten that formally it is still local MPs who elect regional governors, and the President merely ‘nominates three candidates’.
Are the Northern Caucasus Putin's nemesis? Photo: (cc) Wikimedia/Peter Fitzgerald
It is clear in any case that the vote after the Bill’s first reading has ended the ‘Moscow’ stage of the anti-Putin revolt, and has effectively announced the beginning of a new stage in which we may assume that the revolutionary flame that has gone out in Bolotnaya Square will flare up in the Caucasus - where, of course, it has never been completely quenched.
Russia sinks to 148th place on Press Freedom Index
russialist.org
(Russia Beyond the Headlines – www.rbth.ru - Yulia Ponomareva, Combined report – February 4, 2013) Russian media fell near the bottom of the list on the 2013 Press Freedom Index. The a...
Twitter End to Love Story Born in Russia’s Protests
www.nytimes.com
Russia’s glamorous political-opposition couple, Kseniya Sobchak and Ilya Yashin, are no more. Ms. Sobchak has surprised Moscow by marrying another man.
U.S. holds key to improving Russia ties: Putin aide
www.reuters.com
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Strained Russian-U.S. ties will not improve unless Washington stops openly criticizing Moscow's human rights record and supporting President Vladimir Putin's foes, the top foreign policy
Russia 2013: Critical Questions for 2013: Regional Issues | Center for Strategic and International S
csis.org
A1: Zero. Nothing. The “Reset” is dead as a doornail. In retrospect I would date its demise to September 24, 2011, when at the United Russia Party Congress it was revealed that Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, the so-called tandem, would switch places with Putin again becoming president of Russia...
Russian diplomat warns of terror threat in Syria, Algeria, Mali
russialist.org
(Interfax – Moscow, 1 February) The events in Syria, Algeria and Mali are interrelated and demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the modern terrorist threat, Aleksandr Zmeyevskiy, the Russi...
Russia mulls resumption of Georgian wine imports
www.mercurynews.com
MOSCOW—A Russian official said Monday that Moscow may soon resume imports of Georgian wine, mineral water and fruit after a seven-year ban, the first tentative step toward repairing the ruptured ties between the two ex-Soviet neighbors.
No Gas Price Deal With Ukraine Yet – Kremlin
russialist.org
SOCHI, February 4 (RIA Novosti) Russia and Ukraine have not yet agreed on ways to lower the price of Russian gas regardless of whether Ukraine joins the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazak...
Five Myths About Russia - Forbes
www.forbes.com
Thus Russia in 2013, unlike Russia of the mid and late 1970's, has a growing birthrate, decreasing mortality, declining numbers of alcohol deaths, and a broadly flat level of military spending. If we want to understand what Russia is and where it's going, we need to take its many positive developmen...
Members of the present Russian political elite have powerful motives for adhering to the status quo: their patronage, protection or predation of many businesses damages competition in the economy and enriches them. It is difficult to see how resistance to change of political and business incumbents would be overcome. Salvation by liberal insiders - Anatolii Chubais, Aleksei Kudrin and Igor Shuvalov - though possible, does not look very likely in Russia. If the present signs of both a split within the leadership and public discontent became stronger, they would have their parts to play. But in that situation only those who had clearly separated themselves from the authorities would be well-placed to exert much influence.
Martin Sieff writes: "Some 70 years after Paulus surrendered, and more than 67 years since the Third Reich was finally crushed, the memories and scars of that struggle still define modern Russia. Communism is dead but Russian patriotism is not. And that is why in an era of growing differences and alienation between Russia and the United States, we need to remember the passionate intensity of that struggle, how much it contributed to The Allied victory and what it cost the Russian people."
What's behind Putin's delay in signing the new Russian Foreign Policy draft?
Putin delays signing Russia’s foreign policy draft | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
Foreign Minister Lavrov reveals that Russia’s draft Foreign Policy Concept is still under review by the head of state. Experts believe Putin is looking for tougher rhetoric regarding Russia’s stance on interference in its domestic affairs
Members of the present Russian political elite have powerful motives for adhering to the status quo: their patronage, protection or predation of many businesses damages competition in the economy and enriches them. It is difficult to see how resistance to change of political and business incumbents would be overcome. Salvation by liberal insiders - Anatolii Chubais, Aleksei Kudrin and Igor Shuvalov - though possible, does not look very likely in Russia. If the present signs of both a split within the leadership and public discontent became stronger, they would have their parts to play. But in that situation only those who had clearly separated themselves from the authorities would be well-placed to exert much influence.
This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 19 November 2012. Nikolay Kozhanov, scholar at the Institute of the Middle East, discussed Russia's approach to the Middle East. Event details.
This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 26 November 2012. Muhiddin Kabiri, Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, discussed the political situation in Tajikistan. Event details.
This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 19 November 2012. Nikolay Kozhanov, scholar at the Institute of the Middle East, discussed Russia's approach to the Middle East. Event details.
This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 26 November 2012. Muhiddin Kabiri, Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, discussed the political situation in Tajikistan. Event details.
This Soviet figure was one of the most prolific leaders the world has ever known. His personal life was complicated, and the circumstances surrounding his death still remain a secret. He was the man with an iron heart: Joseph Stalin.
Joseph Stalin, 73 years old, had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and died at 9:50 p.m. on March 5, 1953. At four in the morning of March 6 it was announced: "The heart of the comrade-in-arms and continuer of genius of Lenin's cause, of the wise leader and teacher of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, has ceased to beat." Stalin as a legend and a leader is still debated but so is the mystery surrounding his death. Some believe it wasn't poor health that killed him.
The Russian Ministry of Economic Development and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) have signed a memorandum of understanding with Goldman Sachs, according to which the investment bank will help to establish a dialogue with foreign investors and ratings agencies.
This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 6 December 2012. The summary highlights the key themes and findings of the event, during which participants discussed different national experiences in the field of demand reduction and the role of public education and prevention in reducing both the supply and demand for drugs globally. Project on Drugs and Organized Crime.
By John Helmer, Moscow
Lars Nyberg (right), chief executive until Friday afternoon of TeliaSonera, the Swedish and Finnish telecommunications group, is something of an expert on the blowback effect. Firearms and forensics experts understand that blowback is what happens after a gunshot, when the vacuum inside the gun barrel draws in blood and tissue from the person who’s just been shot. Even if the corpse cannot be found, the blowback evidence can convict the shooter whose prints are on the gun, of murder. The typical defence in situations like that is no corpus delicti, no evidence of crime.
In the case of TeliaSonera’s payment of more (much more) than $320 million to a one-person company registered in Gibraltar allegedly having nothing to do with Gulnara Karimova (centre), Nyberg claims he is innocent of intending corruptly to advance TeliaSonera’s profits in its Uzbek mobile telephone concession. Karimova is the senior daughter of Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov, and the dominant business figure in the country.
Nyberg is also innocent, he says, of having looked down the barrel of the gun once fired. “Five years ago,” he told the Financial Times in November, “you had to do something to break the law. The law now says if you don’t do something you might be breaking the law. It is a major difference. We have to do a lot more discovery [of documents]. We have to have all the paperwork.”
Before the release on Friday of the investigative report by Mannheimer Swartling, a Stockholm law firm commissioned by TeliaSonera’s board, Nyberg had claimed that “severe media allegations” didn’t upset his “confiden[ce] that the allegations are legally unfounded.” After the TeliaSonera board of directors refused a vote of confidence in Nyberg, and he had resigned, he said: “Even if this transaction was legal, we should not have gone ahead without learning more about the identity of our counterparty. This is something I regret.”
In fact the Mannheimer Swartling report stops short of concluding that the transaction, and Nyberg’s actions, were legal. It allows the possibility that the media allegations are true, and passes the buck for issuing indictments to Sweden’s prosecutor: “The suspicions of crime expressed in the media and by the Swedish Prosecution Authority cannot be dismissed by this investigation,” reports Mannheimer Swartling. For the full report, click here. The English summary starts at page 159.
Legally, Nyberg didn’t take over as chief executive of TeliaSonera until September 3, 2007, by which time the Swedish company was well down the path of finding an alternative to a company known to be associated with Karimova as the local partner for the operation of its Uzbek telephone concession. The Mannheimer Swartling report appears to let TeliaSonera off the hook by concluding that “TeliaSonera’s acquisition of MCT was preceded by extensive due diligence and planning on how to structure it the best way.”
However, it is clear from the evidence presented to the law firm that once the Swedes had decided to choose Takilant, a 3-year old entity registered in Gibraltar and owned by a 25-year old Armenian Uzbek named Gayane Avakyan, it had also decided not to investigate how she had acquired the concession TeliaSonera was buying from Takilant. TeliaSonera also failed to investigate whether Avakyan and Takilant had the legal right to sell the asset. According to Mannheimer Swartling, Takilant was “introduced” in the autumn of 2007. The formalities were signed three months later in December. According to the Swedish press reports, the first TeliaSonera payment to Takilant came to about $320 million. Nyberg was in charge and personally responsible at the time.
But he didn’t want to know too much. “The reason for levelling criticism at the current CEO,” reports Mannheimer Swartling, “is the uncritical attitude that has been maintained, despite the presence of continued unclear circumstances in connection with transactions in 2007, as well as subsequent events.”
But there is nothing at all in the report about how much in revenues, profits and dividends TeliaSonera has shared with Takilant, and paid to the benefit of its shareholder, allegedly Avakyan, since December 2007. TeliaSonera’s financial releases report sales revenues for the Uzbekistan operation; in 2011, for example, these came to 1.7 billion Swedish krona ($275 million). But there is no reporting by TeliaSonera of the Uzbek joint venture’s earnings, profits, or dividend distribution to Takilant.
The TeliaSonera reports do show that in 2008 and 2009 the Swedes owned 74% of the joint venture, Uzbek Telcom Holding B.V.,while Takilant owned 26%. In February 2010, with Nyberg in charge, TeliaSonera exercised an option and bought another 20% of the joint venture. According to page 18 of the 2010 annual report, it paid Takilant “approximately SEK 1,600 million (USD 220 million).” That leaves Takilant with 6%, and according to TeliaSonera’s annual report for 2011, this is valued at SEK 495 million ($78 million).
Adding the three share transactions together, the Swedish payments to Takilant, and thus allegedly to Karimova, make at least $618 million, plus the annual dividend stream. TeliaSonera refuses to say how much was paid in dividends to Takilant.
It wasn’t enough for Nyberg to inquire officially into the identity of the beneficiary, in case Nyberg really knew nothing. The sum also wasn’t enough for Karimova. That’s now clear in retrospect, because in May or June of 2012, she had a falling out with Bekhzod Akhmetov, the initial negotiator of TeliaSonera’s entry to Uzbekistan through Takilant, and subsequently the head of Vladimir Yevtushenkov’s mobile operator in Uzbekistan, Uzdunrobita.
The Swedish press have been focusing their investigations on alleged wrongdoing in Uzbekistan by TeliaSonera and Nyberg. The Swiss press have been focusing on the falling-out between Karimova and Akhmedov; the latter’s flight from Uzbekistan; and an attempt by people reportedly close to both of them to remove cash from Takilant’s bank account at the Geneva branch of the private bank, Lombard Odier. The Swiss police arrested two Uzbeks in July 31 on charges of money-laundering, and then released them on bail at the start of November. No indictments have yet been issued in court or released to the press. Lombard Odier has released this document from the Swiss authorities detailing their suspicions of what has been happening.
In Moscow the media focus has been on Yevtushenkov, his Mobile Telesystems (MTS), and the fate of Russian nationals arrested in a sweep of Uzdunrobita last summer by the Uzbek police. There have been warnings from the Russian Foreign Minister to his Uzbek counterpart, and the arrest by Moscow court marshals of real estate owned by Karimova in Moscow. Yevtushenkov continues to express optimism that he will retrieve the Uzdunrobita concession. The Uzbek authorities lost their first attempt to confiscate the assets, but they continue to press for payment of a $600 million penalty for alleged tax evasion. Yevtushenkov has put the subsidiary into bankruptcy to stop payment.
In the interval, it has been crystal clear to every telecommunications sector analyst in Moscow that whatever Karimova’s intentions had been last June, her actions have been good for at least one Russian rival of Yevtushenkov’s, and probably two. According to the MTS financial reports, its sales revenues in Uzbekistan in the second quarter to June 30 came to $132.8 million. After Karimova hit the fan, the corresponding figure for the third quarter (September 30) was just $26 million. The corresponding earnings figures went from $72.3 million to minus-$2.2 million. In MTS’s worldwide balance sheet, the Uzbek concession generated just 3.5% of revenues; 4.4% of earnings. However, if to the third-quarter losses on MTS’s account, the fourth-quarter losses are added, there is now a hole on the balance-sheet of more than $200 million, compared to 2011.
In the Uzbek mobile telephone market until last June, MTS’s Uzdunrobita was the biggest operator geographically and numerically, and claimed to have 9 million subscribers. TeliaSonera’s Uzbek Holding claimed 7 million, and Vimpelcom, controlled by Mikhail Fridman (far left) and his Alfa group, another 7 million. You don’t need Mannheimer Swartling to work out that once Uzdunrobita’s operations had been halted, its local subscribers moved to one of the two alternatives. So Yevtushenkov’s misfortune is turning out to be good for TeliaSonera, good for Fridman.
The latest Vimpelcom financial reports for the second and third quarters reveal that its sales revenues in Uzbekistan have jumped 54% from $89 million to $137 million. Earnings have risen even more lucratively from $45 million to $77 million; that’s a gain of 71%. In Uzbekistan VimpelCom reported on November 14, 2012, it has “substantially strengthened its market position in 3Q12 after the forced closure of a competitor´s network. Revenue was up 88% organically YoY in 3Q12, supported by a 62% YoY increase in the subscriber base as well as 26% ARPU growth.”
TeliaSonera’s latest financial report includes several implicit acknowledgements of how much better business has been in Uzbekistan since Karimova acted against MTS in June. Second-quarter revenues, for example, were $474 million. In the preceding two quarters, Teliasonera recorded comparable sales figures of $462 million and $470 million, respectively. Evidently, TeliaSonera and Miss Avakyan weren’t managing to extract much fresh growth out of the Uzbek subscriber base. However, with Yevtushenkov out of the way, the third-quarter revenue jumped to $684 million, a growth rate of 44% — not quite as good as Vimpelcom had achieved, but much, much better than Nyberg and Avakyan were managing on their own in the first six months.
The December quarter revenue total is $749 million, a quarterly growth rate of 10%. Comparing the first and second-half sales results, TeliaSonera has added $497 million in revenues which it almost certainly could not have earned with Avakyan’s talent — and without Karimova’s influence.
Is it likely that TeliaSonera’s Russian partner assisted in this outcome? That partner is Alisher Usmanov (second from left), a figure in whom Nyberg has so much confidence he personally invested from his own pocket $2 million in the initial public offering of Usmanov’s Megafon last November. Netting Nyberg’s outlay against his income from serving as a board member of Megafon, and adding the 40% capital gain ($800,000) he has already made on the share, Nyberg’s vote of confidence in Usmanov has been a modest one.
Did Usmanov’s relationship with Karimova motivate her conduct in any way towards Yevtushenkov and Uzdunrobita? Did that relationship have any bearing on the good fortune that has befallen TeliaSonera?
For the time being it isn’t clear what relationship there is between Usmanov and Karimova. In 2007 Usmanov told the London Guardian: “There isn’t any relationship between me and President Karimov and any members of his family”. Last September, sources confirm Usmanov was in Tashkent. There have been press reports claiming he attended the celebration of a wedding between a member of his family and a member of Karimova’s. The reports claim Usmanov spoke in praise of Karimova and of his relationship with her. But did he?
Anastasia Gorokhova is an associate partner of the London public relations firm RLM Finsbury, and communication advisor to Usmanov’s Metalloinvest holding. She was asked to clarify what Usmanov said at the Tashkent event. She had not replied by publication time.
FACT OF THE DAY - On the 4th of February 1722 Peter the Great introduced the Table of Ranks, a formal list that defined everyone’s position and status was determined according to service, and not birthright. The Table of Ranks recognized three fundamental types of service: military, civil and court, dividing each into 14 ranks.
Image: Peter the Great, the first emperor of Russia (1672 - 1725). Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin
This is a summary of a study group held at Chatham House in January 2013 in which participants discussed the latest political developments in Yemen. Summary: While the Yemeni government faces a critical budget deficit, negotiations over mechanisms for the delivery of aid pledges have stalled. Meanwhile, the defence budget has been increased. Tensions between the governing Islah and the General People's Congress (GPC) parties have had an unexpectedly positive impact on government transparency, with each party leaking details of government corruption against the other. Youth activists are increasingly drawn to the Houthis, who are emerging as the only credible opposition to established political elites seen as complicit with foreign influence in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has been less involved in Yemen of late as domestic and regional crises have taken precedence. Iran is building contacts with emerging power centres, but the larger impact of this remains to be seen. Yemen Forum.