Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Blogs Review - 2.5.13

 

via RUSSIA and THE WEST - РОССИЯ и ЗАПАД by Mike Nova on 2/5/13
This is an example of hateful, if not rabid anti-Americanism whipped up by Putinistas in Russia these days, in media news coverage. I wonder to what extent and how far beyond the words this "inspiration" might go; if it has a single informational and actional source and how much involved in "wars by proxies" it is. And also, and probably most importantly if it reflects a new, more aggressive stance as a matter of doctrine and policies (of antiwestern self-preservation), including more aggressive and overt "special operations" abroad.

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Russia Blogs · 9 like this
2 hours ago ·

СМЕРТЬ НЕГОДЯЯ

  • Feb. 4th, 2013 at 8:19 PM


Автора книги "Американский снайпер", одного из самых опасных снайперов в истории США, Криса Кайла застрелили в тире в маленьком техасском городке.
http://www.newsru.com/crime/04feb2013/shotbestsnipertex.html
Четыре раза он побывал в Ираке, где принимал участие в боевых операциях и получил множество правительственных наград.
"Я отправился на войну не для того, чтобы рассматривать свои мишени как людей. Мне не интересно было знать, есть ли у них семьи или дети", - признался в 2012 году Кайл в интервью журналу Time.
Первой его жертвой была иракская женщина, в одиночку вышедшая с гранатой в руке навстречу американским морпехам.

Только в одной Фаллудже он убил 40 человек.Официально на его счету 160 застреленных иракцев, хотя сам он утверждал, что убил не менее 255 человек.

Ни об одном совершенном убийстве Кайл в итоге не жалел, и в отвечал в интервью, что "все убитые были плохими людьми".

Иракское сопротивление прозвало его "Дьяволом".

Криса "Дьявола" застрелил бывший сослуживец, такой же бессовестный наёмник, как и сам Кайл...


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Putin Doctrine - 2012:

If some birds (foreign or domestic) do not fly with us, bash them over the head ("carefully", if it is possible; which means: use a good and convincing cover, make it look that it is their own friends who did it, for example in the act of gay bashing, etc. - historically the most favorite KGB method and style, from the times of Trotsky assassination).


9 сентября 2012 года Владивосток

V. Putin, with a meaningful smirk:
Да, есть, конечно, птички, которые в стае вообще не летают, они предпочитают вить гнёзда где-то отдельно. Ну что делать? Это уже другая проблема. Даже если они не члены стаи – они члены нашей популяции, и к ним нужно относиться бережно, по возможности.

There are of course birds that do not fly in flocks and prefer to build their nests apart from the others. What can one do? That’s a whole different problem. In any case, even if they are not part of the flock, they are still part of our population, and we need to look after them as much as we can.

More exact translation: and we have to be careful ("protective") with them, if it is possible. 

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via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/4/13
The traditional Munich security conference had a particular and very different meaning last weekend for US Vice President Joseph Biden and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who had an hour-long face-to-face meeting in addition to delivering their keynote speeches. Biden had good reason to be proud of his “reset” policy initiative, presented at that conference in 2009, and he sought to explore new opportunities for keeping the “reset” going without becoming naïve about the depth of current discord (Newsru.com, February 2). Lavrov was instructed to play hard-ball and remonstrate against Western interference in Russia’s domestic affairs in the spirit of the famous “Munich speech” delivered by President Vladimir Putin back in 2007. In particular, the Russian foreign minister was authorized to present the determination of Russia’s counter-revolutionary course in the Syrian civil war, reject any forceful external intervention, and to insist that the Assad regime continues to maintain full control over its arsenal of chemical weapons (RIA Novosti, February 2).

The most productive avenue in the partnership reinvigorated during the first Obama administration was arms control, and there is plenty of unfinished and even untried business in reducing redundant but dangerous armaments. Washington is not discouraged by the expressed lack of interest in Moscow about advancing to a nuclear-free world. Moreover, US National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon is due to deliver new proposals on unblocking the firmly fixed deadlock on the missile defense issue (Grani.ru, January 14). The chances for success, however, appear less than slim—and not only because Putin has developed an unhealthy obsession with the hypothetical US anti-missile “shield,” but also because this deadlock is extremely convenient for blocking any serious negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which Russian strategists want to keep out of any arms control limitations (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, February 1). Nor is there any intention to re-institute Russia’s participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, particularly as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is so busy with sorting out the military reform process that he was unable to make an international debut at the Munich conference (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, January 31). With no outward signs that Russia is ready to reach a compromise with the United States on arms control, the invitation to President Barack Obama to visit Moscow in summer 2013 is all but senseless (Kommersant, February 1).

If there were expectations for expanding the economic foundation of bilateral relations after Russia’s long-delayed accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the cancellation of the long-irritating Jackson-Vanik Amendment, they have quickly evaporated. The problem is not just that few in the Russian government have bothered to learn what obligations and self-discipline WTO membership actually entails, as the head of Sberbank German Gref recently revealed (RBC Daily, January 18). A deeper problem is the pervasive anti-Americanism inherent in Russian bureaucratic mindsets. Illustratively, US support for Russia’s entry into the WTO was seen as evidence of the harmfulness of free trade for domestic producers (Moscow Echo, February 1). The ban on imports of beef and pork from the United States, under the pretext of “scientific” concerns about the safety of growth stimulant ractopamine, fits perfectly into this “patriotic” mindset (Kommersant, January 31).

The controversial meat ban follows the pattern of curtailing many joint enterprises that constituted the substance of the “reset”: from discontinuing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to the most recent cancellation of the agreement on cooperation in law enforcement and drug control (Novaya Gazeta, February 1). It was Russia that benefitted most from this agreement, which provided for information exchange and training of specialists, particularly in the Federal Drug Control Service. Russia’s withdrawal from cooperation amounts to Moscow shooting itself in the foot. Motivation for such erratic behavior comes from the desire to prove that Russia is perfectly capable of addressing security risks without US help (Gazeta.ru, January 31). Money may indeed not be a problem, but the experience of the Nunn-Lugar program shows that joint projects tend to have greater accountability and yield better results. Whereas, corruption in Russia’s defense sector has reached such heroic proportions that this year, Transparency International ranked Russia in the same group with Bangladesh and Rwanda (Kommersant, January 29).

It might seem that disagreements between the United States and Russia are technical and issue-specific and that it is only the lack of political will that prevents advancement to a more mature partnership. In reality, however, Putin is not just disappointed in the condescending attitude of his Western peers, but has come to see them as malicious sponsors of a domestic opposition that aims to destabilize and destroy the “legitimate” political order in Russia by revolutionary means. Anti-Americanism is thus not merely a means of mobilizing support among the “patriotic” political base, but a profound feature of the political regime that is retrogressing to uglier forms of authoritarianism. Amid this escalating hostility, it is remarkable to observe that the majority of Russians (estimated by polls at 53 percent) retains a positive attitude toward the US, while the trend in bilateral relations is seen as negative (Levada.ru, January 30).

Returning from Munich, Lavrov expressed his master’s wish that the US not create any more causes for tensions in bilateral relations or “artificial problems” (RIA Novosti, February 2). It might appear to be a hollow warning, but it hints at an answer to the question left out of the diplomatic bickering. Putin knows that one issue of crucial strategic importance to the US is the transit to, and increasingly from Afghanistan, and he is very careful not to waste this trump card prematurely. The new Obama administration is seen in the Kremlin as pragmatic, cautious in advancing the cause of democratic transitions, and keen to keep the “reset”-redux on track (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 31). Lavrov may be right in assuming that newly appointed Secretary of State John Kerry is averse to fanning tensions. But Putin is definitely wrong to think the US will perpetually avoid condemning the violations of democratic freedoms that the Kremlin is firmly set to proceed with. President Obama has not yet had his “rendezvous-with-destiny” moment, and the deepening crisis of Putinism may well supply one; the harassed but defiant “white opposition” can count on his readiness to rise to any challenge and his moral resolution to do the right thing.

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/4/13
On January 26, police carried out mass arrests in Stavropol region to prevent ethnic Russians from rallying against the North Caucasians, arresting 87 people in the city of Nevinnomyssk. The protesters’ chief slogan was “Stavropol Is Not the Caucasus!” They demanded the introduction of a special migration regime in Stavropol region, its separation from the North Caucasian Federal District and even closing the administrative borders with the republics of the North Caucasus. The unregistered organization Novaya Sila (New Power) led the protests. The authorities’ reaction was harsh, and the protesters were apprehended before reaching the central square of the city where the rally was to have taken place (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2114620).

The planned rally in Nevinnomyssk was the first large-scale grassroots protest in southern Russia explicitly demanding that the Russian government separate the ethnic Russian population from the North Caucasus. When the North Caucasian Federal District was created in 2010, Stavropol appeared to be the only region in the district that had a predominantly ethnic Russian population. Since then various activist groups in Stavropol region have campaigned for the region’s separation from the North Caucasian Federal District, but Moscow has invariably rejected these demands. Ethnic Russians in Stavropol region complain that the North Caucasians bring crime with them and are changing the ethnic makeup of the region as ethnic Russians gradually leave and are replaced by North Caucasus natives. Stavropol region is the first stop for North Caucasians as they migrate from their home republics in search of jobs, a chance for a better life, and an escape from instability while remaining close to home.

For the Russian government, the presence of Stavropol region in the North Caucasian Federal District has both symbolic and practical meaning. On the one hand, through Stavropol region, Moscow retains the image of controlling the North Caucasus—for example, Moscow’s envoy to the region, Alexander Khloponin, officially resides in the city of Pyatigorsk, which is located in the southern part of Stavropol region. At the same time, Moscow’s hopes have been that Stavropol could become a melting pot for the North Caucasians. Stavropol region is almost as large as Dagestan with its population of nearly 3 million. Moreover, while Dagestan is the largest region in the North Caucasian Federal District, because it is ethnically fragmented, ethnic Russians in fact still comprise the largest ethnic group throughout all of the federal district. Yet, ethnic Russians increasingly seek insulation from the North Caucasus, and Stavropol region finds itself on the frontline of this movement.

The trouble in Nevinnomyssk started last December 6, when an ethnic Russian resident, Nikolai Naumenko, got into a fistfight with an ethnic Chechen, Viskhan Akaev. Akaev, assisted by his brother, reportedly stabbed Naumenko to death and ran away. Even though Akaev and his brother were declared fugitives and put on the federal wanted list, they were not found. The Russian population of the Stavropol region accused the authorities of inaction and started to organize public protests. On December 22, 37 protesters were arrested, sparking further protests among residents of the city. Even nationalists from Ukraine arrived in Nevinnomyssk to support the uprising (http://www.ng.ru/regions/2013-01-25/6_stavropolie.html). Some Russian activists alleged that up to 400 people were arrested during a protest held on December 22. Police forces from Moscow, Stavropol city and St. Petersburg were reportedly dispatched to prevent the protesters from staging the public rally (http://via-midgard.info/news/srochno-nevinnomyssk-na-osadnom-polozhenii.htm).

It is not surprising that the Russian authorities were aghast as the protest spread among ethnic Russians in Stavropol region. Indeed, while difficult, it is possible for the Russian authorities to cope with separatism of the North Caucasians for the time being. However, it would be impossible for Moscow to withstand serious pressure from ethnic Russian groups and resist Russian separatism. While the authorities have suppressed the Russian protests for now, destabilizing processes are apparently going on under the radar of the mainstream media. A commentator on the website of the newspaper Kommersant alleged that Nevinnomyssk was experiencing “a hunt for vehicles with Chechen license plates. Under the best scenario [locals] refuse to refuel their cars and, in the worst, four vehicles have been burned, [along with] two trucks and two vans” (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2114620). Nevinnomyssk is located on the principal highway that connects all the republics of the North Caucasian Federal District to Krasnodar region and the rest of Russia.

Xenophobic attitudes are not an attribute of only ordinary people in Stavropol region. The authorities in the city of Stavropol expelled two Ingush students from the local university after they learned that the non-Russian students performed the traditional Caucasian dance known as the Lezginka in the streets of Stavropol. The students were accused of hooliganism and sent back to their home region, apparently without even an attempt to prosecute them for their “crime” (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219326/). Although there is no official visa regime between Stavropol region and Ingushetia, in practice such a regime seems to be materializing.

While the Russian government resists popular Russian demands to restrict the inflow of migrants from the North Caucasus and CIS countries, local Russians in Stavropol, including the local authorities, appear to be taking preemptive measures already. So far Moscow has indicated little resolve to address the issue of Russian nationalism, which ultimately drives Russian separatism. Therefore, more such incidents are likely to follow in Stavropol region and elsewhere in Russia.

via Global Voices » Russia by Kevin Rothrock on 2/4/13
On February 1, the Russian human rights group Agora released a report [ru] on RuNet censorship in 2012, titled “Russia As a Global Threat to a Free Internet,” documenting various limitations on Internet usage in Russia, including violence, administrative pressure, and other forms of intimidation and punishment used against netizens by state authorities. Agora has also created [ru] a “map of free Internet violations” for 2012, showing which areas of Russia are least friendly to bloggers and netizen journalists.
Written by Kevin Rothrock · comments (0)
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via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 2/4/13
Russia's position on press freedom appears to have worsened, according to the 2013 Press Freedom Index published annually by Reporters without Borders. We asked various representatives of their Russian media their opinion on the matter:


Russia sinks to 148th place on Press Freedom Index | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
Russian media fell near the bottom of the list on the 2013 Press Freedom Index. The authors of the rating cite President Putin’s return to power as the main catalyst in the increase of repression aimed against the opposition

via Global Voices » RuNet Echo by Kevin Rothrock on 2/5/13
Vladimir Putin has given another speech [ru] in defense of Russian Orthodox values, this time calling on the Church to study the lessons of the twentieth century. (One imagines that Putin has in mind Soviet religious oppression, which he seems to blame for the Russian Civil War.) “We must avoid a vulgar, primitive understanding of secularism,” he told the Bishops’ Council, a massive gathering of Orthodox clergy. Putin's comments are hard to divorce from several legislative efforts in the last year, which include Internet censorship and anti-gay initiatives that shield children from supposedly immoral influences.
Some activists argue that the Kremlin's recent cultural conservatism is intended to bait the liberal opposition into taking unpopular stances on issues that often stoke religious sentiments in the country's regions. The harsh prosecution of the Pussy Riot members, some say, was a Kremlin gambit to mobilize liberal protesters in support of artists too radical for Russia's political mainstream.
Vladimir Putin meets the participants of the Bishop's Council. 1 February 2103, Russian Presidential Service 3.0.Vladimir Putin meets the participants of the Bishop's Council. 1 February 2103, Russian Presidential Service 3.0.
The draft law to ban “homosexual propaganda” is a case in point. In late January, blogger Oleg Kozyrev described [ru] the anti-gay law as an attempt to distract the “Bolontnaia” protester crowd from the real issues of election fraud, political prisoners, and so on. He wants activists to holster their rage and live to fight another day:
А поэтому я очень надеюсь, что мы по минимуму позволим себя втянуть в этот законодательный троллинг. По возможности надо не вестись на эти законы – все они будут отменены со временем по признакам маразма и бессмысленности.
And that's why I really hope that we keep our involvement to a minimum in this legislative trolling. To the extent possible, we don't need to buy into these laws. They'll all be cancelled in time, on the grounds of lunacy and inanity.
Writer Boris Akunin came to the opposite conclusion, calling [ru] on liberal oppositionists to stay true to their values, though he, too, acknowledged that the Kremlin's conservative legislative campaign is intended to reduce scrutiny on “electorally disadvantageous” topics like healthcare.
Putin's speech also recycled key fragments from remarks his chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, delivered to another audience of Orthodox figures in October 2012. Posting to the LiveJournal forum “ru_politics,” blogger Yuri Shtengel appears to be the first one to have noticed [ru] the similarities between Putin's and Ivanov's statements.
Several Russian newspapers reported Shtengel's finding, though many exaggerated both the size and scope of the controversy, claiming that a whole group of bloggers had discovered Putin's “plagiarism.” Orthodox activist and strong critic of the liberal opposition Boris Yakemenko took aim [ru] at news websites for this embellishment, adding that Putin's comments about secularism were merely “a statement of the obvious”—not a contentious “revelation.” Also annoyed by the hyperbole, Shtengel published an update to his LiveJournal denying any plagiarism accusations, and clarifying that his objections relate to the content of Putin's speech.
Ultra-popular blogger Artemy Lebedev weighed in on Russia's need to avoid “vulgar, primitive secularism,” writing [ru] with intentional vulgarity:
А я вот, блять, не собираюсь уходить от вульгарного, примитивного понимания светскости. Я на хую вертел всю религиозную хуетень, в гробу видал всех попов, и срать хотел на все чувства всех верующих.
Оставьте мне вульгарную, примитивную светскость и валите нахуй.
Now listen, s**t, I'm not gonna avoid any vulgar, primitive understanding of secularism. I'd f**kin’ like to throw the whole religious s**tfest and all priests into a grave, and I'd gladly s**t on all the [religious] feelings of all believers.
Leave me my vulgar, primitive secularism and f**k off.
Lebedev's response is a good demonstration of the challenge that faces Russian oppositionists generally and secularists specifically. On the one hand, Lebedev's antics are doomed to appeal only to a narrow audience. The same uncompromising sense of humor, however, is an important ingredient in the glue that keeps together Russia's “creative class,” which is widely credited with generating the country's political turmoil last winter. Committed religious conservatives—on and offline—are free to respond to Putin's “moral erosion” worries with earnest sympathy. For firebrand secularists, gay rights activists, and others, there seems to be an almost irresistible need for irreverence. Whether it's Lebedev's obscenities or Nadezhda Tolokonnikova's cathedral gyrations, the opposition's compulsion to offend has been both a blessing and a curse.
Written by Kevin Rothrock · comments (0)
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via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 2/5/13
The Sandunovsky Baths are Moscow's most famous banya. Their history began with Sila Sandunov and Yelizaveta Uranova, actors at the court of Empress Catherine II (the Great). After the two were married, the empress presented the couple with diamonds, which Sandunov sold. With the money, he bought a plot of land near the Neglinnaya River in Moscow. Later, he bought land from his neighbors. He knocked down all the buildings on his land to build the banya. The construction was completed in 1808.

Learn more: http://rbth.ru/22509

Image: Sandunovsky Baths sign. Source: Alexey Kudenko/RIA Novosti


via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 2/5/13
PHOTO OF THE DAY - Mikhail, a trainer from a travelling circus troupe based in Moscow, grooms Masha, an 11 year-old bear, during rehearsals at the Circus on Fontanka in St.Petersburg February 1, 2013. The troupe, which has four bears who have completed a three year training programme, will soon perform for the first time in 20 years in Russia's second city

Source: Reuters
http://rbth.ru/22539


Photo of the day 2013

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/5/13
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is considering signing into law a new “defense plan,” setting out in a comprehensive document the long-term threat assessment and strategic environment facing Russia over the next few decades. It will mark an effort on a grand scale to re-conceptualize Russian security documents and provide a framework for the defense ministry, General Staff and the military industrial complex to implement defense modernization. Although its details remain unknown, recent statements and speeches by the top brass and leading members of the Military Academy of Sciences point to the underlying precepts contained in the document at a time when it is increasingly clear that the “new look” reform of the Armed Forces is dead (see EDM, January 31; Interfax, January 29).

On January 29, the Defense Minister, Army-General Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Valeriy Garasimov, presented the draft defense plan to President Putin. Shoigu explained that the defense plan is the work of “49 ministries and departments,” and takes into account the long-term development of defense capabilities and the state armaments program. Its merit, according to the defense minister, lies in taking account of “all the programs” linked to defense, specifically mentioning the “arms program” and “mobilization.” Alongside the new defense plan, an additional framework has been devised for the military industrial complex, which sets out a vision for the maintenance and servicing of military equipment. Shoigu said this involves “lifetime contracts, from production to scrapping” (Interfax, NTV, January 29).

Some elements of Russia’s threat assessment and the prevailing views on the strategic environment as well as the type of armed forces required to meet these challenges were the subject of discussion during last month’s annual conference of the Academy of Military Sciences. Shoigu addressed the conference—unusual in the sense that the previous Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov had avoided contact with the academy—speaking of the escalating military threats to the Russian state. With “hot spots” located close to Russia’s borders, the Armed Forces need an optimal structure, an “efficient management system,” modern weaponry and a professional staff. But the nature of threats outlined, including “color revolutions,” was not extraordinary, ranging from missile defense to local conflicts such as Libya, Syria or potential conflict over Iran. Garasimov told his audience that the General Staff has not forgotten about the possible risk of “large-scale” wars, and as if to reinforce the message, Shoigu tellingly used the term “mobilization” when handing the defense plan to Putin (Interfax, January 29; www.vkonline.ru/234506/article/vpervye-razrabotan-plan-oborony-strany-uchityvayushij-vse-riski.html).

As the number of reform measures implemented during Serdyukov’s tenure as defense minister continues to be rolled back under Shoigu, the General Staff has requested that the extra-territorial principle applied to conscript service should now be reinstituted. That principle allows conscripts to be sent to serve in different parts of Russia. Serdyukov had abolished applying this principle to conscription, believing it is better to allow conscripts to serve closer to home (Izvestiya, January 30).

Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer published the entire text of the speech to the Academy of Military Sciences by its president, Army-General (retired) Makhmut Gareev, widely recognized as Russia’s leading military theorist. Of course, since the “new look” was launched in the fall of 2008, Gareev has frequently appealed to the political-military leadership not to abandon conscription or mobilization as the very basis of Russia’s conventional military security capabilities. However, Gareev had also given qualified backing to the experiment to introduce network-centric approaches to modern combat in the Russian military (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).

Now Gareev, with his ideas fully back in fashion among the defense ministry leadership, has taken the gloves off. Gareev reasserted the view that Russia faces military-political and economic efforts by other actors to squeeze its energy resources. The country will also face growing political pressure from the United States and China, and in this context Gareev said, “It is necessary to do everything in order to maintain our own national interests and to preserve the country’s integrity, above all by political-diplomatic means.” Gareev also referred to the reorientation of US strategic interests to the Asia-Pacific region, and the “re-stationing” of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces in Central Asia, which “cannot fail to affect Russia’s national interests and security” (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).

“Combat engagements will come to have a non-contact character, and the command-and-control of line-units will be accomplished by means of a net-centric system; computers will work out solutions for commanders in several variants,” Gareev told his audience, before reminding them of developments in the First and Second World Wars. He added, “Certainly, the character of armed warfare today is significantly changed, and military operations in the future actually will take on a more highly maneuverable character; but even the First and Second World Wars began with high maneuver operations” (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).

On the reform of the Armed Forces under Serdyukov, according to Gareev, the goal has been achieved of creating “compact, mobile” forces “equipped with the very latest types of arms,” which exaggerates the progress of the modernization. But then he rebuked the brigade-centric system it has produced: The reformed brigades are “2.5- to 3-fold weaker” than the divisions they replaced. Gareev further issued a clarion call for strengthening mobilization, which he described as a system of trained reserves, possibly along the lines of the US reserve system. At heart, Gareev offered a curious mix of old and new, possibly to fill the void of the Serdyukov reform, but openly questioned the value of boosting contract personnel numbers. “The times and experiences of all wars indicate a contract enlistee will serve well for good money in peacetime, but he will not die for money,” he argued (http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14094).

The reworked Russian defense plan will most likely offer a compromise view among government departments on the potential threats to Russia over the next few decades, and also represent an effort to guide the main departments to produce a new level of synergy in their programs. But whatever the final content of the defense plan proves to be, it will have to fit an as yet unknown replacement for the Serdyukov reform. Paradoxically, while reference to “mobilization” signals the persistent influence of such thinking on Russian security policy, no one has yet offered an answer for a manpower system that depends on dwindling numbers due to the demographic crisis. The adjustment has not been made to the new reality that there is no mass mobilization potential in Russia, and this also reflects the deep uncertainty over what may be cobbled together in its place.
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