4.1.17
"Trumpism" as the "social experiment" and the "Gang of Four":
The engineered election of Donald Trump as the U.S. President is the joint operation of the German, Russian, and Israeli Intelligence Services with the major executive and operational role played by the Russian-Jewish Mafia at the head of the International Organized Crime.
M.N.: Predictions:
Within the next six months, Trump and Pence will be out, with Trump facing a prison term. Paul Ryan will become the next President - a very good replacement. The train has left the station and is moving somewhat slowly but surely.
In Russia, Putin, very likely, will be out (I do not see how he could politically survive the Trump debacle), or dead (from the illness, suicide, or both)
- I do not wish it to you, Vovchick; I just prognosticate. Medvedev might be bypassed (with the lack of mass appeal and popularity cited as a problem), Sergei Ivanov will likely become the next Russian President; the signs of the power struggle for the succession are evident.
(Excuse the frankness and the bluntness of these assessments.)
S. Ivanov appears to be more pragmatic, much less nationalistic, and more West, especially the Scandinavian model oriented. The accompanying changes in the Russian political system and the geopolitical orientations appear to be almost inevitable.
Merkel will be out in Germany.
It is foreseeable, that Russia will be admitted to NATO within next 5 to 10 years.
At the present time, all the efforts to restore the relations between the Western: US - NATO and the Russian military systems should continue, despite all the
perceived recent setbacks and mutual recriminations, which should be gradually resolved; and also despite all the temporary uncertainties in the political situations and circumstances, which will eventually be resolved in due time too. This should be viewed as a strategic choice. Good will, the readiness, and the skills in communicating and listening to each other, active search for the practical and mutually acceptable solutions will help in this process.
I see this good will and the guarded but balanced optimism in the NATO officials, for example in NATO Secretary General's press conference after NATO - Russia meeting on 3.23.17.
Both sides should make an extra effort and an extra step, to go an extra mile in this direction; there should be no doubts in the positive outcome.
From the point of view of the balances of military powers, freed from the temporary, ever-changing and fleeting "political" or "ideological" considerations, no one could be a better Ally for Russia than NATO, and no one could be a better Ally for the core big powers of NATO, than Russia; much better than the swirling Eastern European midgets. The jealousy and fears of these military midgets is clearly present and evident, they were said to be more anti-Russian than the core big powers, and they are tireless in their efforts to drive a wedge between the big guys, and to drive it as deeply as they can, in order to retain and to enhance their power share in influence and the decision making. This might be one of the problems that Gen. Gerasimov complained about in his recent meetings with Gen. Dunford.
The role and the place of Germany was, is, and will be quite ambiguous and ambivalent, determined by the historical factors. The urge and the push for the German revanche, in whatever new forms and ways, covert and overt, hidden and obvious, is historically un-rootable and has to be always kept in check.
See also: "Germany and nuclear weapons: M.N.: Germany uses the pretenses of "Trump's withdrawal" and the "dangers of Putin's aggression" to open the discussions about "going nuclear"...
"Nuclear weapons are expensive, contentious, potentially contagious, and dangerous. Germany is in no rush to get them. But if the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is removed while Russian weapons are still pointed at Berlin, it will have no choice."
M.N.: This article, presenting the arguments for Germany "to go nuclear" due to "Trump's withdrawal from NATO" and the "dangers of Putin's aggression", confirms, in my opinion, the German part of the "Gang of Four" hypothesis, namely the role of the German Intelligence in the "Trump affair".
In fact, this is the attempt to justify the German revanchism and Germany's 70+ years old itch to acquire the nuclear weapons. This reveals their motivation at interference in the U.S. 2016 Presidential Elections, and their skillful and concealed manipulations, in addition to the design to demonstrate the Germany's "leading moral role and status" as the "protector" of the human rights in Europe and the world, especially when compared with the "aggressive Russia" and the "decadent, dysfunctional, dictatorial" America under Trump.
Quite a twist: a mixture of the utter moral hypocrisy and the suppressed, pent-up rage at their old defeats and the potential aggressive tendencies of the "great economic power", claiming its "natural rights".
We cannot exclude that at least in part, these "concerns" (re the "Russian aggression" and the "Trump dictatorship") were also engineered by the survived, revived, and increasingly ambitious and sophisticated German Intelligence.
Not to see this possible connection would be a blindness of criminal proportions.
With the
strategic vision of the NATO - Russia Alliance clarified and affirmed, the issue of the anti-missile defense shield will be resolved by itself: it will be a common shield for everyone, including NATO, Russia, and their close allies, such as Israel, in the Northen hemisphere.
The traditional, historical, dysfunctional and misplaced (just like it happened so many times in the past) Russian military paranoia has to be replaced with trust and cooperation, aided by the clear and the mutually acceptable verification mechanisms.
The alternative for Russia would be putting herself in a box without any exit: she absolutely cannot afford self-destructive military-industrial competition with the West which would only lead to her eventual demise and the dissolution as a state and the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country.
4.6.17 - На встрече с Александром Евстифеевым.
Europe is not "stiff", warm her up by resolving the Ukranian, Crimean, Georgian, and other conflicts, avoid the mortal dangers, escape the abyss; start building the new Alliance honestly, wisely, strategically, with the long-term perspectives, and, I think, these new efforts will be noted with appreciation. Do not try to fool the others with the "extra-smart" special operations and political interference, they are not "lapots". In the end, it happens that you get fooled by the others yourselves, including by those whom you consider being friends, such as the same Germany, for example. "
Не рой другому яму, сам в нее попадешь", (Russian Lessons).
You can kill the messengers but not the clarity of the message written on the wall. To misread these messages is madness.
So far, as I can see, the U.S. did not and is not trying to dig a trap hole for you, if they really did, we would hear a very different kind of music.
4.5.17 - Note the nice smiles in the foreground and some interesting telling gesture in the background.
However, I am afraid that this advice will fall on the stiff and dead ears. Putin's pseudo-nationalism and his irrational anti-Western slant and stance are short-sighted and self-serving, they are determined by his general, narrow, oligarchic power centered, survivalist principle: "after us - the flood", "après nous le déluge", with the propagandist populist slogans and the half-hearted populist policies employed as the convenient and the necessary covers to maintain his personal and his Mafiosi-oligarchic circle which he serves, predatory, abnormal hold on power.
Russia's admission to NATO will signify and accomplish her complete return to the pre-1917 geopolitical positions and arrangements, to her larger European family and the assumption of her position within the Western fold and within the Western Civilization, a position which for the last 300 years made her the country as it was known before 1917, and as we know her now. Putin's "Euroasianistic" obsessions and delusions are just another set of the convenient covers to enhance and to secure his hold on power.
Putinism is the legitimization of the criminal power - the "Mafia State" combined with the neo-Sovietization of modern Russia. There is no contradiction between these two components: the Soviet power was always criminal by its nature, with the ideological pseudo-Marxist dressing, which no one and never took seriously. Putin as a human beeing and as a politician is rather complex, he might or might not sincerely believe in what he says and does. His pronouncements, official positions, and his actions do not free the thinking part of the contemporary Russian society, its administrative, management, intellectual, cultural, and, very importantly, military elites, from the responsibility to think for themselves what is good or not so good for the country, to discuss it openly and freely, and to determine for themselves, as a society, the directions in which the country should proceed in its development.
"Trumpism", in my view, among many different things, is first of all and most of all a social experiment, designed, constructed, and implemented by the "unholy alliance" of the elements within the German, Russian (most likely of Putin's personal intelligence services, of which he has several), and the Israeli Intelligence services, for their own, coinciding in this case and the situation, practical goals and purposes, including the "revenge" for the past "hurts" and "injustices", and nurtured first of all by the anti-Obama - anti-Clinton sentiments.
But this experiment also has the "theoretical aspects", of interest first of all to the Germans, who, I think, were the main but the skillfully invisible and the very carefully masked authors in this group (of the "Ivanovs", "Frances" and "Iosifs"): to examine the origins and factors determining the development of the rightist, fascist type of dictatorship, with the aim to prove and to demonstrate to the world that in principle the establishment of such a dictatorship is quite possible everywhere, including America, the bastion of the civil freedoms; thus relieving the German conscience of its historical guilt.
Well, I have to disappoint you, my dear non-friends: the dictatorship is impossible in America, despite the engineered "election" of Mr. Tump, who is a very interesting person, to say it in one word (and to save the time and space here for the more detailed description and study, which should be the aim of the future efforts), and definitely with the "dictatorial" tendencies and propensities. The dictatorship is impossible in America simply because her people are genuinely free and will never allow it. The more detailed elaboration of this statement is also left for the future.
The dictatorships of any kinds are theoretically and practically possible in the countries like Germany and Russia, I sincerely and strongly hope that it is not possible in Israel either.
There is another, and quite possibly, the major "executive" player in this group, which turns it into a "Gang of Four": the Russian-Jewish Mafia, which is at the helm of the contemporary International Organized crime. This is the real enemy, the real adversary, the very real and almost imminent threat, and the real mortal danger, with the sweet and seductive smile on its face. This is who will kill you - this society and culture, invisibly and "softly", and then wiil hire a slew of writers, journalists, singers and other performers and talents to tell you a nice bedtime story, to lull you into the disbelief, complacency, and the happily blissful ignorance. I hope, that our most gifted and beloved FBI knows well about all of this, at least in part.
I do not know how I veered from the NATO - Russia issues to the "Trumpism" (that what probably is mainly on my mind), but I will return briefly to the security issues before I finish.
I guess, that the deeper connection between this two seemingly disparate and different issues is that the freedom and the Law loving majority of this country, the U.S., in their opposition to Trumpism, should stand united with the freedom and the Law loving people in today's Russia and with the Jews of Israel, just like they did when they defeated the Nazi Germany.
With the admission of Russia to NATO, the new structures of the Global Security will be formed.
Within this period of time (5-10 years), Iran, very likely, will go through the series of revolutions and will eventually become a secular state.
Similar changes will occur in the Middle East.
Elections 2016 will be fully investigated and the lessons will be learned.
And zis is not the April 1 joke, zis iz for real!
Michael Novakhov
Last Update: 4.6.17
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4.1.17
3.31.17
Since well before Donald Trump was elected president, the media have been obsessed with his supposed Russia problem—stemming from the Putin regime’s alleged interference in the 2016 election and its purported ties to key members of Trump’s campaign.
Think about it: If you wanted to hurt the Russians, what would you do? Their economy is on the verge of recession and they have only two major exports — oil and natural gas. If you wanted to hurt Russia, you would unleash the American energy industry to drive down the price of oil. If you wanted to hurt Russia, you would reconsider one-sided arms control treaties, increase the defense budget, as Trump has proposed to do by ten percent, and follow Ronald Reagan’s playbook and rebuild the American military. (Here’s some irony: Virtually all of the Democrats fretting about Trump’s alleged collusion with Russia will vote against his proposed military buildup.) And if you wanted to hurt Russia, you would tell our NATO allies to drop the socialism and beef up their own defenses.
Consider that Trump has criticized the START arms control treaty with Russia as “just another bad deal that the country made.” START required parity in strategic nuclear arsenals between the US and Russia. “It’s a one-sided deal like all other deals we make,” Trump told Reuters. “It’s a one-sided deal. It gave them things that we should have never allowed.” Leonid Slutsky, chairman of the Commission on International Affairs in the Russian State Duma, said that Trump’s statements are a “source for concern” for Russia.
Or consider that Donald Trump has signed executive orders that will make it easier to construct two oil pipelines that were long delayed because of the Obama administration’s meddling. According to CNN, the US will import just 11 percent of its oil from abroad by the end of Trump’s first term in 2020, down from 65 percent in 2005.
America’s revolution in hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, and Trump’s pro-energy agenda have helped place Putin’s petro-state on the verge of recession. Trump’s focus on energy independence and bolstering US defenses explains why Russian state-run media has turned on Trump.
Despite all this, the media continue to portray Trump as a lap dog of the Kremlin. But recall that it was George W. Bush who said he looked Russia’s Vladimir Putin in the eye and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” And it was Barack Obama who dismissed Russia as a “regional power” and ridiculed Mitt Romney’s suggestion that Russia was America’s chief geopolitical foe.
This week FBI Director James Comey and National Security Agency Director Admiral Michael Rogers testified before the House Intelligence Committee about Trump’s Russia connections.
The “big news” from the hearing so far appears to be Comey’s statement that there is an active, ongoing investigation of Russian interference in the election and potential collusion by the Trump campaign.
Allegations of collusion between the Trump administration and Russia will likely follow the president throughout his term—the liberal media will make sure of that. And the media will likely continue to ignore the real news about Trump and Russia—that Trump’s efforts to “make America great again” are in direct conflict with Russia’s interests.
Former presidential candidate Gary Bauer is president of American Values and chairman of Campaign for Working Families.
Trump’s Russia policy is scaring allies and confusing even the Kremlin - VOX
"There is, in short, little concerted effort from the Trump administration to implement the pro-Russia policy it promised. The Kremlin-friendly rhetoric that’s been so painful for Trump politically has yielded little in the way of concrete gains, either for US-Russia relations or for Trump personally...
Normally, Russia would be rubbing its hands with glee at anything sowing dissension in the NATO ranks. But the public rhetoric from the Kremlin since inauguration, at least where Trump is concerned, has been fairly sour.
“The Russian media, up until recently, put a lot of effort into praising Trump,” Mathers says. “Lately, they seem to have pulled the plug on that propaganda. The media coverage of Trump has changed pretty radically in the past several weeks.”
Reportedly, Russian state media is being echoed in the halls of the Kremlin...
In the short term, then, Trump’s theory of foreign policy is kind of working: Unpredictability is deterring Russia from trying anything too dangerous. In the longer run, though, it’s plausible that Russia might push Trump’s limits too far — or that in a crisis situation in a place like Syria, both sides act in a destabilizing fashion."
M.N.: In summary: There is no coherent and formed Russia policy on the part of Trump Administration presently, and the "unpredictability" as a tactical device has its limits and might be even, to a certain extent, provoking and dangerous with regard to Russia's actions and her desire to probe and to test the limits.
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NATO–Russia relations - Wikipedia
Historical Notes:
"As the first Secretary General, Ismay was "assuming an entirely new role in the history of international organizations," and as such he helped to define the position itself.[185] While Ismay "deemed it wise not to step too boldly in a political role" in disputes among the members, he asserted himself strongly on issues relevant to the organisation of NATO.[186] From the very beginning of his time in office, Ismay worked to empower the permanent representatives to NATO, and emphasised that they had the same legal authority to make decisions as the NATO foreign ministers.[186]
Ismay was also a proponent of NATO expansion, saying that NATO "must grow until the whole free world gets under one umbrella."[187]
However, before Warsaw Pact was even put in place, he opposed the request to join NATO made by USSR in 1954[188] [189] saying that "the Soviet request to join NATO is like an unrepentant burglar requesting to join the police force"[190] thus making apparent that NATO alliance ("the police force") was directed against USSR.
As stated in the official NATO website "the request tested the limits of NATO's willingness to admit new members".[191]
As Secretary General, Ismay also worked to encourage closer political co-ordination among the members of the alliance. During the Suez Crisis he offered his good offices to help resolve issues among members of the alliance.[192] Ismay also offered to help mediate disputes over Cyprus.[186]
In December 1956, Ismay decided to retire from NATO. He told the press that "he was not giving up his position for personal reasons, but because he felt it needed a fresh hand and a fresh brain."[193] Paul-Henri Spaak was immediately chosen as his successor, but Ismay remained in office until May 1957, when he left with "the affection and respect" of all the NATO members.[193]
While Secretary General, Ismay is also credited as having been the first person to say that the purpose of the alliance was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down," a saying that has since become a common way to quickly describe the alliance.[194][195]
Suggestions of Russia joining NATO
The idea of Russia becoming a NATO member has at different times been floated by both Western and Russian leaders, as well as some experts.[100]
In 1990, while negotiating German reunification at the end of the Cold War with United States Secretary of State James Baker, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev said that "You say that NATO is not directed against us, that it is simply a security structure that is adapting to new realities ... therefore, we propose to join NATO." However, Baker dismissed the possibility as a "dream".[101]
In March 2009, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, suggested including Russia in NATO.[86] Speaking to one of the main Polish daily newspapers after the lecture, Mr Sikorski explained, 'I stand by everything I said, but that doesn't mean I'm inviting Russia to join the NATO. I simply presented a certain hypothetical vision, a reference to a debate that took place in the NATO in the mid-1990s. Then, under the Clinton administration, there was a debate on whether, and on what terms, Russia could become a member of the Alliance.'[102] Russian leadership, however, made it clear Russia did not plan to join the alliance, preferring to keep cooperation on a lower level now. In March 2009, the Russian envoy to NATO,
Dmitry Rogozin, in response to Radosław Sikorski′s proposal, while not ruling out NATO membership at some point in the future, was quoted as saying: "Great powers don't join coalitions, they create coalitions. Russia considers itself a great power."[86]
In early 2010, the suggestion was repeated in an open letter co-written by German defense experts General Klaus Naumann, Frank Elbe, Ulrich Weisser, and former German Defense Minister Volker Rühe. The letter′s authors posited that Russia was needed in the wake of an emerging multi-polar world in order for NATO to counterbalance emerging Asian powers.[103]
In Sept 2010, in New York, the NATO-Russia Council met for the first time after relations were suspended as a result of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war of 2008; on the eve of the meeting, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ivo Daalder, mentioned the hypothetical possibility of Russia joining NATO.[104]
Putin wants NATO to let Russia join - Associated Press - Published: July 18, 2001
MOSCOW — Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday that his country should be allowed to join NATO or the alliance should be disbanded and replaced by a new body that includes all of Europe and Russia.
In his first major Kremlin news conference, Putin also said Russia has no plans for a joint response with China to counter U.S. moves to build a missile defense system. The prospect of a coordinated stance was raised by Putin's meetings this week with the Chinese president.
The Russian president — who in two days attends the G-8 summit in Italy gathering the leaders of the world's top economic nations — said the U.S.-led NATO alliance has outlived its usefulness, having been created during the Cold War to oppose the Soviet bloc.
"There is no more Warsaw Pact, no more Soviet Union, but NATO continues to exist and develop," he said.
"We do not see it as an enemy," he said. "We do not see a tragedy in its existence, but we also see no need for it."
M.N.: These positive views of NATO membership went through subsequent and quite unfortunate devolution.
See also:
Putin and NATO
"How Can Russia Join NATO?
The affirmative case for Russian eligibility for NATO membership is fairly straightforward and easy to make. The alliance has at least two implicit and at least five explicit criteria for admission. The first implicit requirement is that the candidate be a member of the Atlantic community--that is to say, the West. The second is that the candidate share important security concerns with the other members.
Russia surely qualifies on both counts. Since the end of the Cold War, it has repeatedly declared its identification and wish to align with the West, a region that, for NATO's purposes, already extends eastward to Greece and Turkey..."
Russia in NATO? - James Addison Baker - The Washington Quarterly 25.1 (2002)
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PORTLAND, Ore. Mar. 26, 2017 /Troy Media/ – During the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump roiled the foreign policy establishment by praising Russian President Vladimir Putin.
He suggested it was time for a comprehensive re-evaluation of U.S.-Russian relations and broader co-operation between the two countries, especially in the fight against jihadists.
In doing so, Trump raised political and strategic issues.
By praising Putin and challenging the prevailing view that Moscow posed a long-term threat to American interests around the world, the Trump campaign underscored its anti-establishment credentials and its distance from both the Republican and Washington foreign policy establishments.
The move also gave credence to a strategic view circulating in Washington and closely associated with Michael Flynn (President Trump’s now-deposed national security adviser) that the threat posed to the United States by jihadists outweighed the threat posed by Russia. Since Russia was also threatened by jihadists, there was, in theory, a basis for a realignment of American-Russian relations and expanded co-operation in combatting international jihadism.
Russia has a significant Muslim population, estimated at 12 to 15 per cent of its citizenry or around 27 million people. Moscow has the largest Muslim community in Europe, outside of Istanbul, at as many as 2.5 million inhabitants. Roughly half are Russian citizens, the balance immigrants, many undocumented, from the Caucasus.
Birth rates between Russia’s Muslim and non-Muslim citizens point to a steady increase in the Muslim population. It’s estimated that by 2050, more 50 per cent of Russia’s population will be of Muslim descent, although not necessarily practising Muslims. Muslim conscripts make up more than 50 per cent of the Russian army’s new soldiers and by 2030, this will increase to three-quarters.
The Russian Caucasus have been a hotbed of jihadist activity since the Russian empire began to encroach on the region in the 18th century. Russia has fought two recent, bloody wars in Chechnya, from 1991 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2000. Since then jihadists have carried out an ongoing insurgency in the region and have staged several high-profile terrorist attacks in Russia.
Chechen militants have a reputation for being among the Islamic State’s most ferocious and effective fighters. It’s estimated that 2,500 Russian nationals, many from Chechnya and the surrounding region, have fought with IS in Syria and Iraq.
Jihadism represents a serious threat to Russia.
However, expanded co-operation with the West and an increase in Russia’s role in combatting jihadism would come at a steep price. At very least, it would require the revocation of the economic sanctions placed on Russia following its intervention in Ukraine and its seizure of Crimea. More likely, it would precipitate a Yalta-like agreement under which the U.S. and its NATO allies would recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and some portions of Eastern Europe – what Moscow typically refers to as the “near abroad.”
Such an agreement would end the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union, and would most likely end western aid to Ukraine. Where it would leave the Baltic states or NATO’s newer members is unclear.
Although Russia has often spoken about a joint effort with NATO to combat jihadism, especially in Syria, it has stopped short of indicating what such co-operation would entail and what Moscow is prepared to bring to the effort.
There is a larger issue here than whether the struggle against jihadism might offer a basis for resetting U.S.-Russian relations: to define the nature of Russia’s ongoing relationship with the West.
The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as one of two undisputed superpowers. During the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. represented an alternative and unique ideology for organizing society, albeit one that had become corrupted and diluted.
Modern Russia is no longer a superpower, the Kremlin’s pretensions notwithstanding. It has a formidable military force, however, as well as an advanced military-industrial base and, most importantly, more than 7,000 nuclear warheads and the missile forces to deliver them. It can no longer challenge the U.S. across the globe and no longer boasts the stable of client states it once had. Its presence in Latin America and Africa, once hotbeds of Soviet-American rivalry, for example, is largely nonexistent. Instead, Russia behaves more like an emerging power trying to define its role in the world.
Its primary focus has been in the near abroad, the region previously incorporated into the Soviet Union or under its control, and the Middle East. The latter is particularly important to Moscow since the region represents the petroleum swing producers, whose production can have a significant impact on the prevailing price and because Russia sees issues there where it can gather diplomatic chips to trade for concessions elsewhere.
The problem with the Kremlin’s foreign policy is that its concept of national security is outdated. There’s an inherent contradiction between Russia’s dependence on western capital and technology, and its desire to control its periphery.
Students of Russian history note that the country’s lack of defensible frontiers and its history of repeated invasions from the west create a five-century-old geopolitical imperative. Only by controlling its periphery can Moscow be certain of protecting its core. During periods of Russian strength, that periphery extends; it retreats during periods of Russian weakness. At the height of the Cold War, Moscow succeeded in pushing that periphery all the way to the Adriatic Sea, albeit briefly, and well into central Europe.
Over the last several decades, hydrocarbon exports have represented around 70 per cent of Russia’s foreign earnings and around 50 per cent of the federal government’s budget. During periods of high oil prices, Russia generated surpluses sufficient to finance the modernization of its industry and military. It was still dependent on foreign technology in many industrial sectors, especially petroleum, but the rapidly-growing economy and rising personal incomes made Russia an attractive place to invest.
That didn’t mean that the Kremlin’s desire to exert more control over its periphery contradicted any less with its desire to attract foreign capital and technology. But it was less dependent economically on Europe and the U.S., and better able to afford the price of an aggressive foreign policy.
Since 2008, low oil prices have meant that Russia has been in a period of very low to negative growth and declining real wages. The government has run persistent budget deficits and has been forced to dig into its reserves. It has cut back spending, especially for military modernization. Its intervention in Ukraine and seizure of Crimea resulted in economic sanctions that further aggravate the economic slowdown.
Moscow’s desire to control its periphery, much of which is now part of NATO and the European Union, is incompatible with long-term improvement of its relationship with the United States and its allies. More importantly, it represents an adherence to a national security paradigm that’s largely obsolete.
No state today could mount a significant military threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. Neither Europe nor the United States have the military manpower or political will to mount an invasion. China’s military forces are large enough to pose a threat to Russian control of its Far Eastern regions, but that’s more the stuff of fiction than practical consideration.
But the lessons of the colour revolutions in some former Soviet states hasn’t been lost on Moscow; especially that those colour revolutions received political and financial support from the U.S and Europe. The Kremlin correctly sees such actions as legitimate threats to its ruling elite.
In the age of the Internet, circumstances have changed. When the threat to Moscow came from military might, geography was critical to defence. But geography is irrelevant to social media. Instantaneous digital communication and dissemination of news makes proximity meaningless.
As long as the Kremlin defines security in terms of controlling Russia’s periphery, its relationship with the U.S. and Europe will be problematic. Russia’s gambit in Ukraine has misfired spectacularly: NATO has increased its forces along the east European periphery; under pressure from the Trump administration, its members are beefing up their defence spending; and Russia has been subjected to crushing economic sanctions.
More importantly, there’s no evidence that the U.S. or EU would consider an agreement that would reset Russia’s relations with the West, end the sanctions and give the Kremlin a free hand to shape the national governments along its periphery more to its liking.
High oil prices will make it easier for Russia to pay for an aggressive foreign policy, but they won’t eliminate the contradiction between that policy and the need for better economic relations with the West. The fact that oil prices will likely stay low for the foreseeable future means there’s no easy way out of its dilemma.
It’s in the West’s interest to improve its relationship with Russia. But it needs to convince the Kremlin it won’t pursue a regime change, while making it equally clear it won’t abandon NATO’s newest members or tolerate Russia’s attempts to instigate its own counter-revolutions or to intimidate those states into adopting policies more to Russia’s liking.
U.S.-Russian relations are unlikely to improve as long as the Kremlin adheres to a concept of national security welded to history. Nor will they improve if the U.S. and NATO see every instance of political unrest as an opportunity to encourage new colour revolutions that ultimately necessitate a further eastward expansion of NATO to defend.
Troy Media columnist Joseph Micallef is an historian, best-selling author and, at times, sardonic commentator on world politics. Joe is included in Troy Media’s Unlimited Access subscription plan.
The view
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