RUSSIA and THE WEST - РОССИЯ и ЗАПАД: 3.1.13 - Russia News Review - Mike Nova's starred items: The fall of a meteorite in Chelyabinsk has sparked new fears of an imminent catastrophe | Russian bank chief given UK asylum | Речь Д.Медведева попала в список экстремистских материалов - РБК - RBC.Ru | Тревога в партии "жуликов и воров" - Inopressa | Преподаватель МГУ пострадал за «липовые» диссертации | ФСБ: радикальный ислам набирает популярность на Урале и в СибириРИА Новости

Friday, March 1, 2013

3.1.13 - Russia News Review - Mike Nova's starred items: The fall of a meteorite in Chelyabinsk has sparked new fears of an imminent catastrophe | Russian bank chief given UK asylum | Речь Д.Медведева попала в список экстремистских материалов - РБК - RBC.Ru | Тревога в партии "жуликов и воров" - Inopressa | Преподаватель МГУ пострадал за «липовые» диссертации | ФСБ: радикальный ислам набирает популярность на Урале и в СибириРИА Новости

Mike Nova's starred items

Russians Conquered My Heart - Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making

via Videos matching: PBS NewsHour Russia by AllWorldNews1 on 2/28/13

	Russians Conquered My Heart - Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making 'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 ... ► 9:51► 9:51 www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4Z1e6HWV3Y 22 horas atrás - Vídeo enviado por PBSNewsHour 'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making. PBSNewsHour·6 ... Mais vídeos para Russians Conquered My Heart - Pianist Van ... » 'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 ... acocktailparty.com/.../russians-conquered-my-he... - Traduzir esta página 21 horas atrás -- Van Cliburn Reflects on 1958 Tchaikovsky Competition Master pianist Van Cliburn reflects on his historic victory at the 1958 Tchaikovsky Piano ... Russians Conquered My Heart: Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 ... www.aplatestnews.com/usnewsvideo.php?...russi... - Traduzir esta página 22 horas atrás -- Russians Conquered My Heart: Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making( Lye Victim Gets New Face in Transplant Surgery ... 'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 ... in-the-news.net/russians-conquered-my-heart-pia... - Traduzir esta página This entry was posted on Wednesday, February 27th, 2013 at 8:42 pm and is filed under General News, US News. You can follow any responses to this entry ... Russians Conquered My Heart Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 ... www.channels.com/.../-Russians-Conquered-My-... - Traduzir esta página 16 horas atrás -- 'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making Van <b>...</b>	From:AllWorldNews1 Views:0 0ratings
	Time:09:51	More inNews & Politics

'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making

via Videos matching: PBS NewsHour Russia by PBSNewsHour on 2/27/13

	'Russians Conquered My Heart': Pianist Van Cliburn Reflects on 50 Years of Music Making Van Cliburn Reflects on 1958 Tchaikovsky Competition Master pianist Van Cliburn reflects on his historic victory at the 1958 Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in Moscow and on the vitality of the classical arts. This interview first aired on PBS NewsHour April 11, 2008.	From:PBSNewsHour Views:1163 0ratings
	Time:09:51	More inNews & Politics

What Does the Russian Meteorite Tell Us About Surveillance Culture? | Idea Channel | PBS

via Videos matching: PBS Russia by pbsideachannel on 2/27/13

	What Does the Russian Meteorite Tell Us About Surveillance Culture? \| Idea Channel \| PBS A meteorite crashed into earth!!!! This wasn't the first time and it won't be the last, but it is the first time such an event was captured by SO MANY CAMERAS! The incredible number of views and angles filmed was made possible by Russia's bizarre driving culture and the MILLIONS of car dash cams installed all over the country. But besides providing the world with some hilarious, frightening, and amazing footage, the dash cams also make us think about surveillance, and what role it will play in the future. Let us know what sorts of crazy ideas you have, about this episode and otherwise: Tweet at us! @pbsideachannel (yes, the longest twitter username ever) Email us! pbsideachannel [at] gmail [dot] com Idea Channel Facebook! Facebook.com Hosted by Mike Rugnetta (@mikerugnetta) Made by Kornhaber Brown (www.kornhaberbrown.com) Music Roglok: vimeo.com Binarpilot: www.jamendo.com Level 5: Room for the Homeless: www.jamendo.com Want some more Idea Channel? Here's Last Week's episode: "There's No Such Thing As Offline?!?" youtu.be Want another one? Here ya go: "Are Bitcoins and Unusual Hats the Future of Currency?" youtu.be Here's Some More: "Is Futurama the Best Argument Against Transhumanism?" youtu.be	From:pbsideachannel Views:37177 2105ratings
	Time:05:50	More inEducation

Top Russian Blogger, Opposition Activist Moves To Prague - RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (blog)

via Opposition in Russia - Google News on 3/1/13

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (blog)

Top Russian Blogger, Opposition Activist Moves To Prague
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (blog)
PRAGUE -- Prominent Russian blogger and opposition activist Rustem Adagamov says he has left Russia for the Czech Republic. Adagamov, who writes under the nickname "Drugoi" (The Other), said on February 28 he had "always wanted to live" in Prague ...
Hounded Russian Blogger Moves to PragueRIA Novosti
Russian blogger flees to Prague following paedophilia probeRT

all 3 news articles »

Georgia: Political Power Transfer and Its International Implications

via General Items of Interest - The Jamestown Foundation on 3/1/13

Is Georgia experiencing a rotation of government, or regime change? Have the recent elections advanced or retarded institution-building and Western influence in Georgia? What lessons can be drawn for U.S. policy? To consider these issues, The Jamestown Foundation and the SAIS Central Asia–Caucasus Institute are co-hosting a panel discussion of experts from the United States and Europe.

With introductory remarks by:

Glen E. Howard, President, The Jamestown Foundation

Featuring panel speakers:

Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, The Jamestown Foundation

Svante E. Cornell, Director, SAIS Central Asia–Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center

Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council

Friday, March 1, 2013
9:30 A.M.–11:30 A.M.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Root Conference Room
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

*To attend this free event, please visit our registration page here.

Bios

Svante E. Cornell

Svante E. Cornell is the Director of the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. He is the Editor of the biweekly Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (www.cacianalyst.org) and author of numerous publications on the Caucasus and Central Asia, most recently “Azerbaijan Since Independence” (M.E. Sharpe, 2011).

Vladimir Socor

Vladimir Socor is a Senior Fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation and its flagship publication, Eurasia Daily Monitor (1995 to present), where he writes analytical articles on a daily basis. An internationally recognized expert on former Soviet-ruled countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, he covers Russian and Western policies there, focusing on energy policies, regional security issues, secessionist conflicts, and NATO policies and programs.

Mr. Socor is a frequent speaker at U.S. and European policy conferences and think-tank institutions. He is a regular guest lecturer at the NATO Defense College and at Harvard University's National Security Program’s Black Sea Program (Kennedy School of Government). He is also a frequent contributor to edited volumes. Mr. Socor was previously an analyst with the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute (1983–1994). He is a Romanian-born citizen of the United States based in Munich, Germany.

Damon Wilson

Damon Wilson is an American foreign policy advisor and the Executive Vice President at the Atlantic Council of the United States. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, between 2007 and 2009, Mr. Wilson served as Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council during President George W. Bush’s second term. Previously, he served at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Iraq as the executive secretary and chief of staff.

From 2001 to 2004, Mr. Wilson served as deputy director of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General. Prior to serving in Brussels, Mr. Wilson worked in the Department of State’s Office of European Security and Political Affairs where he was responsible for cooperation with NATO Allies on missile defense, nuclear policy, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Wilson also worked on the State Department’s China desk and at the U.S. embassy in Beijing as a Presidential Management Fellow. Mr. Wilson began his service at the State Department by helping coordinate policy to adapt NATO to modern security challenges and planning for the Alliance’s 50th anniversary summit in Washington during the Kosovo conflict.

Murder and Selective Use of Justice in Ukraine (Part One)

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/25/13

On February 25, President Viktor Yanukovych arrived to a frosty reception in Brussels for a European Union–Ukraine summit (Kyiv Post, February 25), less than two weeks after Kyiv’s Pechersky District Court launched investigatory proceedings into the 1996 murder of then Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch, Yevhen Shcherban. The prosecutor’s office alleges the CEO of United Energy Systems of Ukraine (YESU) Yulia Tymoshenko and Shcherban had “a conflict of business interests” related to the supply of natural gas and its price. Tymoshenko and Pavlo Lazarenko then allegedly put into effect a “joint criminal intention” to eliminate Shcherban, whereby Lazarenko was to find the murderers, while Tymoshenko was to pay for the assassination. Tymoshenko purportedly paid $2.329 million from her accounts, while Lazarenko allegedly paid another half a million dollars in cash.

The Shcherban murder opens up a Pandora’s Box from the 1990s that many in Ukraine’s political elite would prefer to remain closed. If the opposition returns to power, it will arguably be able to use this precedent to open up murder investigations of other high-profile Ukrainians from the 1990s. According to Ukrainian journalist Sergei Vysotsky, “Following Tymoshenko’s conviction, the entire Ukrainian oligarchy and political class will lose their legitimacy. They will be taken back in time twenty years” (http://liga.net/opinion/98778_delo-shcherbanya-syadut-vse.htm#).

Re-opening only one murder case and investigating only the 2009 gas contract are both selective uses of justice. Vysotsky believes observers “will be entitled to ask the question, why only Tymoshenko? Did no other current oligarchs and political leaders give bribes, misappropriate state property and order the removal of their competitors in the 1990s?” (http://liga.net/opinion/98778_delo-shcherbanya-syadut-vse.htm#).

Former Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, also a victim of the authorities’ selective use of justice, gave details of how First Deputy Prosecutor Renat Kuzmin released two alleged heads of organized crime groups, Aleksandr Melnyk (see EDM, February 17, 2012) and Givi Nemsadze, the alleged head of the bloodiest organized crime gang in Ukraine active in the Donetsk region in the 1990s where, Lutsenko said, he was responsible for 57 murders (http://www.unian.ua/news/484218-lutsenko-moya-sprava-prirechena-na-vipravdalniy-virok-tekst-vistupu-u-sudi.html). Nemsadze was released from criminal liability by Kuzmin who claimed that not Givi but his deceased brother Guram had led the gang. Journalist Tetyana Chornovil’s investigations found that Nemsadze was a business partner of Borys Kolesnikov, currently Ukraine’s first deputy prime minister (http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/51069d2d85e92/; blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/51091bb245751/).

The Tymoshenko murder charge will increase the already high 70-percent distrust in Ukraine’s judicial system (AP, February 6) and further undermine the country’s already poor rule of law. The prosecutor’s office has been led by Donetsk loyalists Svyatoslav Piskun (2002–2003 and 2004–2005), Hennadiy Vasylyev (2003–2004), Oleksandr Medvedko (2005–2010) and Viktor Pshonka (since 2010). Vasylyev, Pshonka and First Deputy Prosecutor Kuzmin held senior positions in the Donetsk prosecutor’s office in the 1990s when they failed to investigate a single high-profile murder. Eastern European expert Hans Van Zon writes that Vasylyev was in office “during the gang wars in the province without managing to capture a single one of the assassins of the dozens of politicians and gang masters” (“The Rise of Conglomerates in Ukraine: the Donetsk Case” in Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom eds., Big Business and Economic Development: Conglomerates and Economic Groups in Developing Countries and Transition Economies Under Globalization, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 389). In 2007, the United States Embassy wrote from Kyiv that the prosecutor’s office was stalling the investigation into the (still unresolved) 2004 poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko because Kuzmin is “prone to politically-motivated comments about orange politicians” (http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07KYIV282.html).

The “blackmail state” pressures individuals and collects corrupted evidence (see EDM, January 20, 2012). Former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said that Tymoshenko’s name was never mentioned in the Shcherban investigation (see EDM, February 6). Moreover, Serhiy Taruta, one of three current heads of the Industrial Union of Donbas (ISD), noted that the gas dispute between ISD and YESU had been resolved by January 1996, eleven months before Shcherban was murdered (http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2013/02/8/6983135/).

Yevhen Shcherban’s son, Ruslan, who survived the assassination that killed his father and mother, never mentioned Tymoshenko or Lazarenko during the trial of Vadym Bolotskykh (pseudonym Vadyk Moskovych) who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2003 for the assassinations of Akhat Bragin (1995), Alexander Momot and Yevhen Shcherban (both 1996)—who, with Rinat Akhmetov, were co-owners of ISD. Bolotskykh claimed he had undertaken these murders on behalf of Yevhen Kushnir who allegedly led an organized crime gang that reportedly was behind 27 murders and 17 attempted murders (http://gazeta.dt.ua/POLITICS/aktualni_spravi_minulih_dniv.html). The prosecutor’s office claims Tymoshenko and Lazarenko hired Kushnir’s gang.

“New evidence” has now come from three “witnesses,” who investigative reporter Chornovil found had long-term business relationships with Oleksandr Yanukovych, the Ukrainian president’s son (http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/511cf62064a09/ blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/chornovol/511e5bc4a816d/). Furthermore, Serhiy Zaytsev and Ihor Maryinkov had testified in previous criminal trials in the 1990s in Donetsk. Criminal cases were closed against Zaytsev in exchange for providing the right kind of testimony, according to former Deputy Interior Minister Hennadiy Moskal (http://glavcom.ua/articles/10015.html). Moskal claimed the third witness, Ruslan Shcherban, gave testimony under pressure because he had been with a group of hunters where there had been an accidental death (http://tvi.ua/new/2013/01/21/rozsliduvannya_tvi_khto_spravzhniy_zamovnyk_vbyvstva_scherbanya).

Additional evidence comes from Petro Kirichenko who resides in the US and testified at Lazarenko’s trial (http://www.ord-ua.com/2013/01/26/donetskij-zhurnalist-dokazyivaet-chto-ubijstvo-scherbanya-mog-zakazat-ahmetov/). In Ukraine there had been two criminal cases pending against Kirichenko and one against his spouse, Isabella. Their three Ukrainian apartments and one office had been seized by authorities. In September 2011, Isabella Kirichenko travelled to Ukraine to sell the apartments and was imprisoned for three months, followed by one month under house arrest, on charges of fraud and forgery. In August 2012, the charges against Isabella Kirichenko were dropped after the prosecutor’s office obtained from her “evidence” against Lazarenko and Tymoshenko (http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/wife-of-ex-lazarenko-aide-arrested-on-fraud-charge-112484.html; www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/us-citizen-says-she-was-used-as-bargaining-chip-in-124807.html).

Kuzmin travelled to the United States in summer 2012 to collect further evidence without informing the US authorities and his visa has since been revoked (http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/us-ambassador-kuzmin-was-really-deprived-of-us-visa-but-he-can-apply-for-a-new-one-317442.html).

Four questions remain unanswered:

Firstly, in relation to the Shcherban murder investigation, journalist Serhiy Kuzin asks why nobody has questioned law enforcement officers about how it was possible for, “a group of people to freely sneak into the airport dressed as airport workers and police, shoot the deputy and quietly escape from the crime scene?” (http://gazeta.dt.ua/POLITICS/aktualni_spravi_minulih_dniv.html). Secondly, why have the murders of Bragin and Momot not been re-opened? Thirdly, why is there no investigation of the suspicious deaths of Bolotskykh’s two accomplices in jail? Fourthly, why has there been no investigation of the two failed assassination attempts on Akhmetov in 1994 (http://forbes.ua/nation/1347849-delo-shcherbanya-chleny-bandy-kushnira-dvazhdy-pytalis-ubit-ahmetova) and Lazarenko three weeks after he was appointed prime minister in May 1996?

Planning for, and execution of, the murder charge against Tymoshenko has been in motion since Viktor Yanukovych came to power in 2010—irrespective of the torrent of Western criticism of his government’s selective use of justice. Tymoshenko’s probable sentence for murder (Ukrainian courts have an incredibly high conviction rate of 95 percent) could bring about US and EU sanctions. Indeed, on the same day that investigative proceedings were launched in Ukraine, the US Senate began discussing sanctions against Ukrainian officials (http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/senator-mccain-us-congress-to-consider-sanctions-against-ukrainian-officials-320401.html).

Kremlin Set to Replace Some North Caucasus Governors Before the Sochi Olympics

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/25/13

On February 18, the popular Russian website RBC daily announced that the Kremlin is preparing the ground for removing the heads of several republics in the North Caucasus. The website asserted that after the president of Dagestan resigned from his position at the end of January, the next leader to follow would be the head of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. “The president of the country tasked the government to provide stability in the North Caucasus in the run up to the Olympics in Sochi, so changes in regional leadership are inevitable,” a Kremlin source told RBC daily. “There are no questions only about the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; the positions of practically all the other leaders of the North Caucasian republics are tenuous.” A senior source in the security services confirmed this information to the news outlet.

The Kremlin source elaborated on why Moscow has decided to sack the head of Ingushetia: “He [Yevkurov] appeared to be not tough enough as a leader and in the [North] Caucasus only such [tough leaders] can rule; therefore, a search is underway for his successor. So far no replacement has been identified, but there is an understanding that the republic needs someone like Kadyrov. The republic is mono-ethnic, so the candidate should necessarily be an Ingush.” The source alleged that Yevkurov’s tense relations with Ramzan Kadyrov also contributed to his political demise. Since gubernatorial elections in Ingushetia are due this September, the decision reportedly has been taken in Moscow not to allow Yevkurov to run for the office (http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949985756574).

Even though no official confirmation of Yevkurov’s resignation followed, chances are indeed high he will not run for the leadership position in Ingushetia in September and may be replaced even earlier. The Kremlin’s earlier move to replace the president of Dagestan indicated that Moscow is not excessively hesitant about changing governors in the North Caucasus even shortly before the Olympics. Human rights activists have criticized Yevkurov for allowing government forces to abuse their powers. Kadyrov accused Yevkurov of sympathizing with the rebels. Now, the Kremlin also appears to be dissatisfied with the degree of Yevkurov’s “toughness.”

According to the well-known opposition figure in Ingushetia, Magomed Khazbiev, some in the republic think Yevkurov was asked to leave after an Ingush opposition figure and former official of Ingushetia’s government, Sultan-Girey Khashagulgov, was killed in a police operation under suspicious circumstances on February 13. However, Khazbiev said that corruption was a much more likely motivation behind the Kremlin’s intention to replace Yevkurov. Commenting on Yevkurov’s legacy, human rights activist Magomed Mutsolgov stated: “Russian laws essentially do not work in the republic. No officer was held responsible for torture, for extralegal killings. There were many proven extralegal murders, including the murders of women and children. No one was held accountable for them.” At the same time some experts asserted that Moscow is not in a position to remove Yevkurov, because the security situation in the republic has significantly improved under his leadership (http://publicpost.ru/theme/id/3276/pochemu_uhodyat_evkurova).

While Yevkurov’s possible leave has been discussed in the Russian media for a while now, it is less certain who else could be removed by the Kremlin in the run up to the Olympics in Sochi in 2014. The head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Arsen Kanokov, is one of the most probable candidates to have evoked the Kremlin’s ire. Kanokov has been in power in the republic since 2005 and presided over the steady deterioration of the security situation in Kabardino-Balkaria. Kanokov may also be deemed by Moscow as not harsh enough on Circassian activists in the republic who are demanding the return of Syrian Circassians, a boycott of the Olympics in Sochi and are involved in a number of other issues that are extremely irritating to Russian authorities.

Yevkurov could be replaced by the previous head of Ingushetia, Murat Zyazikov (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2130299). The other possible candidates—Khazbiev and the first president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev—are entirely unacceptable to Moscow, (http://publicpost.ru/theme/id/3276/pochemu_uhodyat_evkurova). The list of alternative candidates is even less clear in Kabardino-Balkaria. Ingushetia’s example shows that Moscow’s range of choices is limited to people who have already been tried out as republican leaders. With the “removal” and “appointment” of candidates in the North Caucasus republics openly being discussed in the Russian media, the existing law on electing governors across the Russian Federation is rendered a mockery that the government does not even bother to disguise. However, the longer Moscow postpones free and fair elections in the North Caucasus, the more the region slips into a process of Balkanization. Even the return of elections at this stage will probably only reinforce this process.

Ingushetia is one of the best examples of Moscow’s hands-on management logic and why it is failing across the North Caucasus to varying degrees. Moscow prefers having as heads of the regions easily manageable people who can be manipulated and coerced into any deal Moscow proposes. However, such leaders often are easily influenced not only by Moscow, but also by their own entourage, informal leaders and other local actors. Thus, Moscow essentially conflates governance of the regions with governance of governors. While Moscow may easily manage the governors who are politically weak, these particular governors invariably fail to manage their respective republics, precisely because they are so weak politically. Chechnya, of course, is a special case that is hardly replicable elsewhere in the region.

Kondratyev, Network-Centric Warfare and the Race Against Time (Part Two)

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/26/13

Russia’s political-military leadership continues to display interest in the future modernization of the conventional Armed Forces rooted in the adoption network-centric capabilities. The set of interlinked challenges this will present, in terms of technology, force structure, military manpower and combat training are far more revolutionary than any of the top brass or politicians realize. Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Kondratyev consistently states that the concept itself must be thoroughly understood before defining the implications for rearmament. He also suggests a range of complimentary activities in order to facilitate the close cooperation of the defense ministry, the defense industry and research institutes as this process unfolds. Kondratyev has, however, started to push his writings to promote the idea that network-centric capabilities present not only a force multiplier for Moscow but can be cost effective (see EDM, February 19).

Kondratyev’s most recent work has extended to considering the impact of network-centric theory on the protection of critical infrastructure and has examined planned information integration approaches within the United States intelligence community. In an article in Zarubeznoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, Kondratyev reminded his readers that modern warfare also regards civilian infrastructure as one of the most important targets for destruction. Consequently, critical infrastructure research has become a priority among the most advanced nations, but the modeling involved has required a degree of uncertainty particularly linked to the facility risk index (Zarubeznoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 2012).

By examining the recent history of critical infrastructure research in the US, Kondratyev highlights the manner in which Washington is integrating systems across a range of government agencies and analytical tools to reduce the level of uncertainty in such approaches. He notes the limits of simulation in critical infrastructure research due to its reliance upon graph theory, but concludes that the struggle to improve standards in this area are rooted in the information era: “Thus, foreign countries presently have developed an enormous number of models used for research of ship systems, university cities, large power distribution networks, waterways and much more. The main task has been to integrate them in a single hardware-software complex, which will enable heads of corresponding management echelons to make a substantiated and correct decision in getting an answer to the question: ‘What must be defended or destroyed and how much will this cost [the efforts and resources expended]?’” (Zarubeznoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 2012).

In February 2013, Kondratyev turned his attention to how information tools and systems integration influence the US intelligence community. His starting point was noting that James Clapper had set March 2013 as the starting point in a five-year transition to create modernized computer infrastructure across all US intelligence agencies. Kondratyev asked whether this represents an attempt by the United States to build and secure its information superiority; and if so, would this demand a response from Moscow (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, February 8).

Kondratyev explained that this involves a gamble on the use of cloud computing as a way of integrating the information space for US intelligence agencies, as well as facilitating all important budget savings over the next decade. US experts believe that a single distributed cloud computing environment will be cost effective and offer a new level of information security. This represents the next stage in the reform of the US intelligence community, and the use of information tools and systems integration is the key to its success. Cloud technologies will form the basis for the new information space for US intelligence (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, February 8).

Kondratyev asserts that the main direction of intellectual effort in the information era is defined by and associated with “balanced globalization” of the fundamental operations of information (collection, storage, processing) to automatic processing of its increasing flows; this will demand an integration of computing resources through global networks of industrial technologies of distributed computing. However, Kondratyev doubts whether this will actually result in a single information space, questioning if it can achieve full integration. “The situation is similar to the current state of various databases, with huge amounts of data that have already been driven. Compiling all this data is extremely hard, and with cloud computing it is made even more difficult” (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, February 8).

Kondratyev believes it would be a mistake for Russia to blindly follow the US in cloud computing as the way forward to integrating existing intelligence structures. He believes that Russian science and the domestic defense industry can find a more cost effective alternative to cloud computing as the next step in forming a single information space for intelligence and military structures. The prototype in Russia is the experimental “control computer on a chip,” which he sees as two to three years away from production and may allow Moscow to avoid choosing between strictly grid-based or cloud-based computer integration. If the “control computer on a chip” successfully enters production, it may offer Russia a historic opportunity to avoid playing catch-up and actually surpass the US in advanced technologies (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, February 8).

While Russia’s leading specialists on network-centric approaches to warfare are not advocating blindly copying the US, they understand that such advanced technology-based approaches do not offer a panacea. However, Kondratyev represents this as a gamble for the state. No alternative exists for Russia, a country heavily reliant upon its nuclear capabilities to guarantee its security. Network-centric capabilities would present a force multiplier, but Kondratyev also wants to convey the message that it can be cost-effective. His focus is shifting into critical infrastructure protection and intelligence integration, with the key being how information technology is radically transforming these areas. The work of such Russian analysts guides the top brass to believe that network-centric warfare is, indeed, the way forward. Most importantly, however, it is possible to discern that Russia’s military intelligence also believes the network-centric agenda is alive and well, despite the shambles associated with the reforms initiated by former Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. For Russian military thinkers like Kondratyev, this push into the information-era thus constitutes the real “race against time.”

Georgia Once Again Finds Russia To Be a Bad Negotiating Partner

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/26/13

On February 4, a Georgian delegation led by Levan Davitashvili, the head of the National Wine Agency at the Ministry of Agriculture, held another round of trade negotiations with Gennady Onishchenko, the head of the Russian state consumer agency Rospotrebnadzor. After the negotiations, the officials declared that the imports of Georgian wines and mineral waters to Russia could be allowed to resume by the end of this spring, at the latest. However, as Onishchenko stated, groups of experts from Rospotrebnadzor would visit Georgia within two weeks to inspect wine- and mineral water–producing factories (Georgian Public Broadcaster, Info 9, February 4). So far, no final trade agreement has been reached between Georgia and Russia. Negotiations are still largely ongoing.

Russia, citing quality and safety concerns, banned the imports of Georgian wines and mineral waters in spring 2006 (www.civil.ge, May 5, 2006) amid a Russian-Georgian spy row, in order to sabotage the Georgian economy (see EDM, March 28, 2006).

On February 25, 2013, incidentally on the day of the 92nd anniversary of Soviet Russia’s occupation of Georgia, three groups of Russian food sanitation experts, after some delay, arrived in Georgia to inspect 40 wine- and 4 mineral water–producing factories. The week-long inspection will decide which of about 60 to 80 companies will be given rights to export their products to Russia (www.commersant.ge, Vestnik Kavkaza, February 25). Certainly, such an approach leaves much room for arbitrary discrimination against certain undesirable companies.

Russian-Georgian trade negotiations provide Moscow with an inexpensive political chip in its relations with Tbilisi. On numerous occasions, various Russian experts enthusiastically advocated pushing Georgia into accepting more concessions and luring it back into Russia’s (economic and political) sphere of influence. This strategy appears to be working. The new Georgian government has already conceded a great deal to Russia, and the list of compromises is lengthening (see EDM, December 4, 2012).

Nevertheless, making concessions does not seem to help Georgia’s position vis-à-vis Russia. On February 4, after the negotiations, Onishchenko stated that the ban will be removed only on bottled wine, not on wine ingredients (grapes, first and foremost), to avoid the risk of counterfeiting Georgian wines within Russia. As Onishchenko declared, this issue can become the subject of future talks (RIA Novosti, www.civil.ge, February 4). Maintaining the ban on wine ingredients deprives thousands of Georgian grape growers—the group that would benefit the most from improved bilateral trade—the opportunity to gain from the reopening of the Russian market. Rather, they will find themselves constrained from exporting directly and independently to Russia. In other words, the reopening of the Russian market in its present negotiated form loses much of its sense for the largest segment of the Georgian agricultural sector—grape growers. The remaining ban on wine ingredients also gives additional leverage to Moscow to drag out negotiations and extract further concessions from Tbilisi. Negotiations on the resumption of imports of Georgian fruits and vegetables are also ongoing (www.gurianews.ge, February 6), leaving Russia with an additional source of pressure over Georgia.

To add insult to injury, during a television interview, Rospotrebnadzor chief Onishchenko was asked when Russians would again be able to taste real Georgian wine, to which he cynically responded that it could happen pretty soon if Georgians “were not as lazy as they have always been” (www.tvrain.ru, February 14). Moreover, Onishchenko, in a somewhat demeaning tone, declared that Georgian wines would occupy no more than four percent of the Russian market, which might be significant for Georgia, but insignificant for Russia (Kyiv Post; Rustavi 2, February 5). In fact, Onishchenko claimed that Russia was doing Georgia a favor. Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a similar statement, emphasizing that the resumption of Georgian imports would be insignificant for Russia, though it might be important for the Georgian economy (www.regnum.ru, December 20, 2012).

This estimation is simply not true. Even by the most optimistic prognoses, Georgian wine exports to Russia will not exceed $25 million annually (www.kvirispalitra.ge, February 11). Adding to this the money that could be generated by the exports of Georgian mineral waters, fruits and vegetables (which are not yet allowed to return to the Russian market), the value of Georgia’s exports to Russia cannot exceed $100–120 million per year, even in the best case scenario. Needless to say, this amount is insignificant to make much, if any, impact even on an economy as small as Georgia’s—whose GDP in 2012 was $15.8 billion. The expectations of this bilateral trade’s positive influence on the Georgian economy are being deliberately exaggerated. And they are exaggerated specifically by the Georgian government, for whom the resumption of Georgian-Russian trade has been the centerpiece of its rapprochement policy with Moscow. In other words, the Georgian government spreads unrealistic expectations about how much the reopening of Russian markets will aid the revival of the struggling Georgian economy. This certainly benefits Moscow, giving it extra leverage over Tbilisi.

Russia, as a World Trade Organization (WTO) member, is not allowed under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rule (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm) to ban any WTO member’s—including Georgia’s—products from its own market, while allowing other members’ goods. Subsequently, Moscow was obliged under the MFN to resume Georgian imports without any complications. This is not what Russia is doing. While trade negotiations drag on, Georgia finds itself making more and more concessions to Moscow. In the process, what Georgia is acquiring is not a new export market, but an unreliable trading partner, which Russia has proved itself to be on multiple occasions not only with Georgia, but with many others, including European Union countries.

See more of Mike Nova's starred items ...

Mike Nova's starred items

Putin Sees Russia Surrounded by Foes, Struggling to Rebuild Its Military

via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 2/28/13

Russia is always extremely secretive about everything and defense in particular, especially so under former KGB agent President Vladimir Putin. The Russian constitution, adopted in 1993, did include a clause that the nation must have a military doctrine that must be a public document. To avoid such unwelcome transparency, a loophole has been created by essentially replacing the public military doctrine with a totally secret “plan to defend Russia,” which, apparently, is a military doctrine in everything, but name. The Kremlin reported last month that Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and his first deputy, Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov presented Putin with a draft Defense Plan (see EDM, January 31).

It turns out Putin signed the Defense Plan into law, but only this week. While addressing a meeting of top brass defense ministry and other government officials at the defense ministry “extended collegium,” the president disclosed: “You know that at the end of January, the ‘Plan to Defend the Russian Federation Until 2016’ was endorsed, involving a military and political threat assessment, deterrence and conflict prevention as well as basic mobilization questions” (www.kremlin.ru, February 27). Of course, the text is totally secret.

Most of the “extended collegium” proceedings were equally closed to the public, but Putin and Shoigu did make keynote speeches that were open to the press. Putin for the first time publicly acknowledged that some mistakes had been made in carrying out radical military reforms by Anatoly Serdyukov, appointed defense minister in 2007, and that corrections are needed, but insisted they were minor and “endless revisions of previously made decisions are unacceptable.” Putin did not say a word in public about the investigation of alleged mass misappropriation in the defense ministry under Serdyukov’s watch, but talked about massive threats and enemies surrounding Russia from all sides: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still seeking to enlarge, the United States threatening global stability with ballistic missile defense (BMD), as well as conflicts spreading chaos in the Middle East and creeping closer to Russian borders. Even the Arctic “is threatened by militarization.” According to Putin, this is a short list of existing threats: “There are actually many more I did not name” (www.kremlin.ru, February 27).

Putin ordered “swift and decisive” action to support the reintegration of the post-Soviet space into a new Eurasian Union and uphold “multipolarity” in the world. “Full-strength, permanent, battle-ready military groupings must be deployed on all strategic lines of advance” against the multitude of enemies surrounding Russia. In two years, enough contract soldiers must be recruited so that all units are fully manned with privates and sergeants [today, because of recruitment problems, most army units are seriously undermanned].” Putin confirmed that conscript service will continue to be for one year, which makes the task of accomplishing “100 percent manning” and permanent, top battle readiness an uphill task. Putin insisted that Shoigu has three to five years to achieve a decisive breakthrough and bring the Russian military to a “new level of capability” (www.kremlin.ru, February 27).

Shoigu criticized Serdyukov for making costly mistakes that saddled the defense ministry with some $10 billion worth of unfinished housing projects, while the “outsourcing” of logistical services was in some cases pronounced successful. A new command-and-control center is being created to coordinate the defense ministry forces and the “efforts of the 49 other ministries and departments that are part of the new Defense Plan.” Russia will be working to recreate a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean that it had during the Cold War and abandoned in 1992, announced Shoigu. The Airborne Troops (VDV) will become the basis for a mobile force to be used in conflict zones (RIA Novosti, February 27). The commander of the VDV, Colonel-General Vladimir Shamanov, later told journalists with jubilation that orders were issued for the VDV to this year form 22 permanent readiness battalions manned by contract soldiers to make up the base for a rapid deployment force (Izvesia, February 27).

Serdyukov lost his job and may be indicted on corruption charges because he overestimated his influence in the Russian bureaucratic system and made many enemies within the uniform military, the military industry with which he quarreled over procurement prices and, apparently, within Putin’s inner circle—the defense ministry insisted on selling off surplus real estate on its own without sharing the spoils. Now Shoigu has moved swiftly and decisively, as Putin ordered, to mitigate the outstanding problems. The defense ministry will not be involved anymore in selling off its surplus lands or buildings and will not be directly involved in negotiating the price of the weapons it procures (RIA Novosti, February 27).

The massive overhaul of the military education system begun by Serdyukov is being fully reversed. A year ago in an election manifesto, Putin promoted Serdyukov’s radical reform as his personal achievement and wrote about plans to create “ten research and education canters” to replace an unruly multitude of diverse military academies and schools created during the Cold War to mass produce thousands of lieutenants that the present Russian military did not seem to need. In 2009, the number of new cadets joining the military education system was reduced to some 2,000; in 2010, it was reduced further to several hundred a year as the education system was overhauled (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 27, 2010). Now Shoigu has ordered that old-time military schools be restored under their old names and that in 2013, some 15,000 new cadets be recruited to join the military education system—a more than five-fold increase (http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11650595@egNews).

It seems Putin’s words about the unacceptability of “endless revisions of previously made decisions” were mostly political window-dressing to avoid responsibility for an unpopular military reform that he supervised and supported. The apparent resurrection of a Cold War military education system to mass train tens of thousands of officers—who are probably not needed in such quantities—only to lead a mass multi-million mobilization force is indeed a U-turn in strategic planning. Today, as the Kremlin believes itself surrounded with enemies from all sides, the restoration of everything Soviet seems to be the policy of the day.

	Борис Немцов: Путина посадят Борис Немцов: Не завидую Путину. Как можно завидовать человеку, которого посадят? Российский оппозиционер рассказывает о взаимоотношениях с режимом Путина и об отношении к дорогим часам tvi.ua	From:leonidmart2 Views:5104 113ratings
	Time:08:01	More inNews & Politics

Нет	68.5%
Сомневаюсь	13.5%
Не исключаю такую возможность	10.3%
Да	6.8%
Не готов ответить	1%

Friday, March 1, 2013

Способен ли Дмитрий Медведев возглавить антипутинский протест?

Впервые Москва откровенно говорит: мы будем сдерживать Запад и его влияние не только у себя, но и на постсоветском пространстве

*To attend this free event, please visit our registration page here.

Bios

No comments:

Post a Comment