"PERISCOPE - ПЕРИСКОП" via Mike Nova
via Region Related Event Feeds by ian on 6/2/11
This paper was presented at a conference entitled "Carnegie Council's Program on U.S. Global Engagement: a Two-Year Retrospective."
NATO And Russia: Missile Defence - A Sticking Point?
via Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia on 9/30/11
NATO, Russia and Missile Defence mark a triangle which contains political promises but also the danger of failure and friction. At last year's Lisbon Summit, NATO decided to develop a missile defence capability protecting the entire Alliance territory against the growing danger of ballistic missile attacks. The core of the system will be provided by the United States (US) and will consist of so called ‘Aegis’ vessels with interceptors aboard cruising in European waters. NATO’s European allies should provide additional capabilities to complete the system and to build the bridge between the US national missile defence efforts and the NATO system. Earlier in 2010 NATO and Russia agreed to reset their relationship – after the Georgia war and the debate about a potential NATO membership of Ukraine had led to serious irritations on both sides. Given Russia’s traditional concerns about US or NATO defence systems which – in Moscow’s view – could neutralise Russian strategic missile capabilities, a close collaboration between NATO and Russia on missile defence could kill two birds with one stone: it could provide a field for practical teamwork for mutual benefit and could help to alleviate reservations and suspicions on both sides. However, whether missile defence can really become a sticking point for the NATO-Russian relationship remains to be seen. Currently, at least five truths could become game changers and require particular attention. First, NATO-Russian relations will remain bumpy despite cooperation rhetoric on both sides. It is true that Russia has never had such a stable and peaceful region west of its borders than NATO today. There is definitively no military threat emanating from the Atlantic Alliance. In turn, from NATO’s viewpoint there was never so much cooperation and partnership than with the Russia of the 21st century – despite Moscow not always being easy to deal with. Still, both sides seem to communicate on different wave lengths and harbour traditional conceptions about each other. Moscow still seems to believe that NATO is the executing arm of the American global strategy. This was not the case - not in the Cold War and definitively not today. In turn, NATO regards Russia as a unified actor which shapes its strategies in a cohesive (and sometimes offensive) manner. Instead, decision making circles in Moscow seem often fragmented and occasionally contradictory. For both sides, NATO and Russia, regard the purpose and the added value of cooperation differently. For Russia, cooperation – particularly within the respective forum, the NATO Russia Council (NRC) – is primarily a means of getting influence on NATO’s decision making processes. By being an equal partner at the discussion table, Moscow hopes to solve tricky issues – like, for instance, the membership question. For NATO, the NRC is more a forum for consultation and common action in those areas where a consensus seems possible. This implies the option of ‘agreeing to disagree’ if it comes to truly delicate questions – NATO enlargement being one of them. Both views are legitimate but contradictory and therefore a frequent source of frustration on both sides. NATO suspects Russia of trying to drive a wedge into the Alliance. In turn, Moscow will persistently be upset about NATO acting as a unified body with a pre-consulted position among the 28 member states. Instead, Moscow was always hoping for meetings in a true “29 spirit” in a sense that each country would speak for itself, whether it belongs to NATO or not. Then, as a consequence, there is occasional dishonesty on both sides. NATO purportedly states that it does not define Russia as a risk or threat. But in reality, some NATO members do. Particularly NATO’s new members in the east point to the fact that Moscow’s harsh rhetoric or Russian military activities in its north-western territories do not help to alleviate historical concerns in those countries, and many actually joined the Alliance partly because of Russia. Russia in turn always emphasises how much relevance it puts on the cooperation with NATO. In reality, though, the relations with Brussels range comparably low on Moscow’s foreign policy priority list. Moreover, since WikiLeaks, it is no longer a secret that President Vladimir Putin regards it as his historical mission to dissolve the Atlantic Alliance. Some see the harsh words Putin and others use vis-à-vis NATO as an inferiority complex or the remnants of the ghost pain of having lost the Soviet empire. Missile defence seems to encapsulate all the inconsistencies and contradictions of the US-Russian or NATO-Russian relationship. It is sometimes difficult to fully understand what both sides are up to – except a general consensus that missile defence should be a cooperative and perhaps even a somehow common effort. Russia for a long time favoured a truly common missile defence project where both sides would decide together on whether or not to intercept incoming missiles –knowing that this is a step way too far. Neither the US nor the eastern European NATO members are ready to accept Moscow’s finger on the button of a NATO missile defence. Washington promotes the cooperation with Russia on missile defence and professes to deal with Russia on the same basic level – aware that Russia is not on that same level, either militarily or technologically. Russia might hope for a technology transfer but has nothing to offer which is indispensible for the success of the US missile defence plans. This is why missile defence cooperation is not such an easy ground for re-launching the US-Russian or NATO Russian relationship as both sides indicate. Instead, it has a high potential for frictions and disappointments on both sides – given the positions and preferences as they are. Lastly, even for NATO itself, an Alliance wide missile defence seems a very difficult project. Since Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), missile defence has been a key priority of the United States. Various presidents have pursued the project with different speeds but all have driven the idea forward. President George W. Bush foresaw a system with ground based interceptors and radar sites based in eastern Europe. It should have been able to destroy long range missiles flying over Europe to reach North America. As a side effect, the Bush system would have protected large parts of the European NATO territory as well. Thus, this architecture contained a natural incentive for transatlantic cooperation: conceptually, the European allies could focus on the medium range missile threats and could take care of those regions not covered by US protection. The downside of the Bush approach was that Russia was highly alarmed about radar sites or missile launchers stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic. Neither the fact that only ten interceptors were planned in Poland - which is nothing in comparison with Russia’s huge strategic missile arsenal - nor the hint that the American defence effort was primarily directed against Iran, could stop Moscow from complaining. President Barack Obama removed this stumbling block for the US-Russian relationship by proposing a new architecture. His ‘European Phased Adapted Approach’ (EPAA) will focus at least initially on medium range threats for Europe coming from the Middle East – Iran in particular – and only in the longer run on intercontinental missiles threatening the United States. The interceptors will be deployed on ships – the Aegis cruisers – and will be able to cover all European NATO member states. As a result, the EPAA built by the US will provide NATO’s Europe with a missile defence system for free. Of course, the European allies could supply additional components (radars, interceptors) to complete the system or to make it more redundant. However, given the dramatic budget cuts in almost all member states, this seems illusionary – no ally has made a concrete offer so far. In sum, European NATO supports a missile defence system built by the US, with common decision making structures, but does not specify what it is going to contribute. Some European allies even doubt the urgency of a missile defence. For them, agreeing to the project was more a bargaining chip to get the US to withdraw its nuclear forces from Europe, following the flawed argument that if there is defence there is no need for deterrence any more. The Obama administration will go on with its Phased Adapted Approach focusing first on Europe and later on the American homeland. The first Aegis ships have already been deployed. The US will realise its step by step programme towards a comprehensive missile defence, preferably together with its NATO allies and in some form of cooperation with Russia. However, Washington will not make itself dependent either on NATO’s support or on Russia’s consent. If Moscow wants to be a partner, it has to agree to a form of cooperation which is acceptable for both sides. If European NATO wants a say in a common missile defence, it has to make concrete contributions. Just to comment from the sideline will not be enough. Thus, the triangle of NATO, Russia and missile defence will remain a very delicate one. Even if it is unpleasant for Moscow and for some European capitals to realise – in the missile defence business, Washington is in the driver’s seat. Karl-Heinz Kamp is the Research Director of the NATO Defence College in Rome. The author expresses his personal views.
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via Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia on 9/16/11
This roundtable discussion will look at the role of elite networks in Russian politics, an area of increasing interest to academics and politicians alike given the country's approaching presidential election. Vadim Kononenko will discuss the dualism of state institutions and networks of power in Russia and how this affects the implementation of government decisions. He will speak for approximately twenty-five minutes, followed by an hour of questions and discussion. This event is strictly by invitation only. For more information please contact Ms Lubica Pollakova
The Parliament, the Presidency, and Elections in Russia
via Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia on 9/26/11
In advance of Russia’s parliamentary elections on 4 December, this expert roundtable seminar will look at the significance of the Duma and the role of parties in Russia’s political system. The event will consider the function which the legislature fulfils within Russia’s political system and possible scenarios for its evolution. There will also be discussion of the extent and limitations of the Russian presidency. Attendance at this event is strictly by invitation only. For more information please contact Ms Lubica Pollakova.
Poor Ukrainian-Russian Ties Reflect Yanukovych-Putin Relationship
via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 9/30/11
Ukraine’s poor relations with Russia are nothing new as they also existed under the “pro-Russian” Leonid Kuchma. Nevertheless, Kuchma had to deal with the more democratic Russian President Boris Yeltsin, whereas the certainty of Vladimir Putin returning as Russian President in March 2012 means that Moscow will continue to present a hard line toward Kyiv.
During the last two decades of Ukrainian independence, Kyiv’s relations with Moscow have followed predictable patterns. Moscow has always favored presidents elected by eastern Ukrainian, Russian-speaking voters, whether Kuchma or Yanukovych, but the promise of better relations has never appeared. With Ukrainian “nationalist” presidents, poor relations were inevitable. Leonid Kravchuk, elected in 1991 by Russophone voters, was quickly perceived by Moscow as a “nationalist” because he relied upon national democratic support and quarreled with Russia over the CIS, Black Sea Fleet (BSF), nuclear weapons and many other issues.
Yushchenko, elected in 2004, was always going to be even more suspicious in Putin’s eyes as the Russian leader had been personally humiliated by the Orange Revolution, an event viewed in Moscow and by Yanukovych as a US-backed conspiracy. Putin twice visited Ukraine in October-November 2004 to give support to Yanukovych and congratulated him on his election a day before the Central Election Commission announced the official results. Yushchenko was easy to portray as a “nationalist” villain because of his national identity and foreign policy orientation. Relations with Russia (and Poland) became especially strained over Yushchenko’s honoring of 1940s nationalist leaders and his support for Georgia during Russia’s August 2008 invasion.
In reality, Kuchma was as much of a “nationalist.” Kuchma “Ukrainianized” the country’s education system, and initiated the international campaign to designate the 1933 artificial famine (holodomor) as “genocide.” Kuchma twice requested NATO to offer Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2002 and 2004 – the same number of attempts as Yushchenko in 2006 and 2008. Kuchma and Yanukovych had strained relations with Moscow for the same reason: namely, their eastern Ukrainian naivety about Russia and Slavic brotherhood. Eastern Ukrainian naivety has come face to face with Russian imperial-chauvinism, which does not accept the permanency or existence of Ukraine’s statehood. This is clearly revealed in private conversations with Western diplomats in Kyiv who are unfazed by Russian heavy handiness that they themselves have witnessed during previous tours of duty in Moscow. Putin told the NATO-Russia Council at the April 2008 Bucharest summit: “Well, you understand, George (Bush), Ukraine is not even a state,” adding “What is Ukraine? One part of its territory is in Eastern Europe, and the other part, the significant portion, was a gift from us” (UNIAN, April 18, 2008).
Putin mistakenly believes that “seventeen million are Russians,” mixing up Russophones with “Russians.” In Putin’s eyes, Ukraine is an artificial state where “one third is ethnic Russian,” which would disintegrate if tensions rose as in 2008-2009 when Russian espionage and subversion grew in the Crimea (see November 2010 Jamestown report: The Crimea: Europe’s Next Flashpoint?).
Moscow’s contempt for Ukrainian statehood has not abated despite Yanukovych’s far more pro-Russian position than Kuchma’s. Yanukovych extended the Sevastopol BSF base to 2047, dropped the pursuit of NATO membership and adopted the Russian position that the 1933 famine was Soviet-wide, denouncing the claim that the holodomor is a “genocide” or Ukrainian famine. Two years earlier, Yanukovych was the only CIS politician to support the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
A senior official in the Ukrainian government commented on the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations: “We had the illusion that everything would work out if we removed from our relations with the Russian Federation key irritants like recognition of the Holodomor [1930s famine] as genocide, plans to join NATO and the reluctance to extend the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet. But this has not happened” (Kommersant-Ukraina, June 21).
The Yanukovych administration, like every Ukrainian leadership, became exasperated by the inability of Russia to treat Ukraine on an equal footing. A senior Ukrainian official explained: “It is not we who are moving away from Russia, but the latter that pushes us off.” Yanukovych gave away so much, so quickly, for nothing – including the mythical 30 percent gas “discount.”
Yanukovych is faced by a more assertive, wealthier and aggressive Russia, which will again be led by Putin who has never hidden his disdain for Yanukovych. A January 2009 US cable from Kyiv leaked by WikiLeaks cites the then Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia, Kostyantyn Gryshchenko (now Foreign Minister), as stating that Putin hates Yushchenko and has a low personal regard for Yanukovych (Kyiv Post, March 11). Gryshchenko bemoaned to US Ambassador William Taylor that Moscow seeks a “regency” in Ukraine totally subservient to Moscow (Kyiv Post, March 11).
Putin’s hard-line policies toward Yanukovych escalated after Yulia Tymoshenko was accused of abuse of office for her signing of the January 2009 gas contract with Putin. One year earlier, the Kharkiv accords extending the BSF base had recognized the same contract. Yanukovych claimed that the Ukrainian government had taken this step because Russia had agreed to review the contract. Since then, Russia, in Yanukovych’s view, had betrayed them even though the terms of the 2009 contract “were written it seems for an enemy” (Kommersant-Ukraina, September 6).
Yanukovych complained during the Dushanbe CIS summit: “We are not poor relations…We are an independent state,” adding “At first they pushed us into a corner and then they began to dictate terms. This demeans not only myself personally but it demeans the state and I cannot permit this” (Kommersant-Ukraina, September 6).
Ukrainian officials have condemned the “information war” against Yanukovych and his economic nationalist oligarch allies (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 1). Party of Regions deputy Sviatoslav Oliynyk revealed the “mass ideological and technological parachutists” sent into eastern and southern Ukraine to turn the population against Yanukovych. “This ‘geopolitical process’ amounts to support for separatism,” he warned (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 9).
The deterioration in relations could be seen at the September 15-18 Yalta European Strategy (YES) summit, boycotted by Russia (http://yes-ukraine.org/ua/Yalta-annual-meeting/2011). In last year’s YES summit, Russia sent numerous senior figures in the firm belief that “their” man had been elected earlier that year (see analysis of this year’s YES summit by Serhiy Leshchenko in Ukrayinska Pravda, September 19, 23).
Kyiv’s strained relations with Moscow point to three conclusions. Firstly, Russia does not accept, or respect, Ukrainian sovereignty. Secondly, Yanukovych has received nothing in return for naive pro-Russian policies introduced after he was elected. These policies have given him less leverage than Kuchma possessed in the 1990s, when he used US support and cooperation with NATO to persuade Russia to moderate its position. Thirdly, by extending the Sevastopol base de facto indefinitely, Yanukovych has given Russia the ability to intervene and subvert the Crimea (Ukrayinsky Tyzhden, August 23). Tension is again growing with Ukraine, blocking the passage of Russian vessels in the Kerch straits (Ukrayinska Pravda, September 8).
Yanukovych’s inept attempts to pursue Kuchma-style multi-vector foreign policies have led to poor relations with Moscow and Brussels-Washington that have given him two potential pitfalls. Either Yanukovych can agree to join the CIS Customs Union, turning Ukraine into a Russian protectorate and in the process provoking widespread domestic instability through protests at the loss of Ukrainian independence. Or Yanukovych can mend relations with the West by releasing Tymoshenko from imprisonment leading to a Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU, but risking the possibility that she may defeat him in the 2015 presidential elections.
Russia’s Arctic Claims: Neither LOST nor Forgotten
via ARIEL COHEN - Expertise on Geopolitics and Energy Security on 9/14/11
Russia’s Arctic Claims: Neither LOST nor Forgotten
08-16-2011The Arctic is becoming the “wild west” of the 21st century, and the Russians have been quick to claim a good part of it as their birthright. The Russian state is after 380,000 square miles of this final frontier, which may store an estimated one-quarter of the world’s untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Moscow is expected to submit its claim to the United Nations for arbitration under the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) within the next couple of months.
Russia’s scramble for the Arctic’s minerals was on display for all to behold when Artur Chilingarov, a renowned explorer and Deputy Chairman of the Duma, planted a titanium Russian flag beneath the North Pole in 2007 under Vladimir Putin’s orders. Putin also went on a mission to the High North to track and tag polar bears, highlighting Russia’s Arctic policy priorities.
08-11-2011
08-11-2011
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Kudrin’s Dismissal Projects Future Instability in Russia
via Ariel Cohen on 9/29/11
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Blog Post on 9/28/2011 2:30:03 PMKudrin’s Dismissal Projects Future Instability in Russia
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