Подготовленный Минфином проект бюджета на 2017–2019 годы фиксирует новую экономическую реальность: медленное угасание экономики с дальнейшим уменьшением или, в лучшем случае, стагнацией реальных доходов населения. Главная задача бюджета — «ночь простоять, да день продержаться», хоть как-то свести концы с концами.
Бюджетные расходы, по сравнению с уровнем 2016 года, планируется сократить на 200 млрд руб. в 2017 году, и на 400 млрд руб. — в 2018 и 2019 году. Резервный фонд, вероятнее всего, будет полностью потрачен уже в следующем году. Дефицит бюджета планируется покрывать за счет резкого увеличения внутренних заимствований. Пока власти отрицают планы по повышению фискальной нагрузки, но эта тема активно обсуждается, и вероятность того, что через год или два граждане и бизнес получат какой-нибудь новый налог, весьма высока.
Главный смысл трехлетнего бюджета — отчаянные попытки уменьшить размер дефицита. В 2017 году, по проекту Минфина, он должен составить 2,74 трлн руб. (3,2% ВВП), в 2018 году — 1,99 трлн руб. (2,2% ВВП), в 2019-м — 1,14 трлн руб. (1,2% ВВП).
При этом
уже сегодня каждой третьей российской семье не хватает денег на самое необходимое.
Минувшим летом 36% домохозяйств в России столкнулись с финансовыми трудностями и не смогли осуществить необходимые платежи. Почти четверть (23%) граждан оказались не в состоянии оплатить даже ЖКХ, следует из исследования НИУ ВШЭ «Мониторинг доходов, расходов и потребления российских домохозяйств».
Кроме того, гражданам пришлось серьезно урезать расходы на лекарства и медицинские услуги. Несмотря на то что первые подорожали заметнее, расходы россиян на медпрепараты сократились на 8%, а на медицинские услуги — на 15%. При нехватке денег на платные медицинские услуги даже самых больших оптимистов пугает запланированное в проекте бюджета серьезное — больше чем на треть — сокращение финансирования здравоохранения.
Российские власти уже даже на публику говорят не о реформах, прорывах или «удвоении ВВП», как это было в первый президентский срок Путина. Не о модернизации и создании современной инновационной экономики вместо сырьевой, как было во время президентства Медведева.
Говорят лишь о «макроэкономической стабилизации» (она же достигнутое дно) и о надеждах на маленький восстановительный рост экономики в 2017 году.
Даже традиционно оптимистичный министр экономического развития Алексей Улюкаев на инвестфоруме «Россия зовет!» заявил, что не ждет начала роста инвестиций в страну раньше второго полугодия 2017 года. При том, что инвестиции в российскую экономику стали падать еще в 2012 году, когда о войне санкций и обвале мировых цен на нефть никто и не подозревал. И с тех пор падают неизменно.
Хотя Центр стратегических разработок во главе с Кудриным и готовит проект реформ, решится на них глава государства (если вообще решится) уж точно не раньше середины 2018 года, после президентских выборов. То есть 2017 год — это год гарантированной консервации «дна». А вот после выборов могут быть пересмотрены цифры на 2018–2019 годы, но совершенно точно, что легче не будет. Реформы в экономике никогда не несут облегчения сразу, это горькое лекарство с отложенным эффектом.
Если вспомнить, с чем шел на выборы президент пять лет назад, это были обещания увеличения зарплат бюджетникам и пенсионерам, сокращение диспропорций в оплате труда между частным и государственным секторами, 25 млн новых рабочих мест к 2025 году. В 2018 году ему практически нечего предложить гражданам, кроме затягивания поясов и суровой реформации экономики. При таком подходе особенно важно наличие доверия к власти.
Но оно падает.
Россияне хотя и пытаются адаптироваться к новой реальности, она им явно не по душе.
Согласно осторожному опросу ВЦИОМ, граждане стали строже оценивать политический и экономический курсы страны. А судя по результатам опроса нового иностранного агента Левада-центра, граждане за год стали заметно меньше доверять практически всем государственным структурам и общественным институтам.
Рейтинг доверия правительству снизился почти в два раза (с 45% год назад до 26%) и оказался самым низким за последние пять лет. Доверие к Совету Федерации за год упало с 40 до 24%, к Госдуме — с 40 до 22% (на этом фоне тем более вряд ли можно оценивать итоги недавних думских выборов при рекордно низкой явке как триумф власти). Прокуратура вызывает доверие у 24% респондентов (год назад 37%), полиция — у 24% респондентов (29%), суд — у 22% респондентов (29%). Областным органам власти симпатизируют 23% россиян (38% год назад), местным органам власти — 22% (32%), политическим партиям — 12% (20%), церкви — 43% (53%).
Власть так долго и упорно строила перегородки между собой и населением, что между ними образовалась глубокая пропасть.
И бюджет, который сейчас обсуждается, показывает эту пропасть не менее наглядно, чем соцопросы, — он скорее спасает от разорения государство, чем его жителей.
Наибольшее доверие у россиян все еще вызывают президент, армия и органы госбезопасности. Но и рейтинг главы государства упал с 80 до 74%. Показатели возвращаются к тем, что были «до Крыма», поясняет заместитель директора Левада-центра Алексей Гражданкин.
По сути,
мы видим ситуацию, при которой высокий рейтинг президента вовсе не означает высокого уровня доверия государству. И даже отчасти является следствием недоверия к государству.
У нас обыденное сознание отделяет «хорошего» царя не только от плохих бояр, но и от государства как такового. В этом сознании царь становится кем-то вроде высшего защитника народа от государства. Только защищать становится все труднее — по проведенному также в сентябре 2016 года опросу Левада-центра, 80% россиян оценивают ситуацию в экономике страны как кризисную.
Разумеется, власти могут уповать на высокий пока рейтинг президента и на хроническую боязнь перемен у населения. Но проблема в том, что радикальные перемены в положении людей — причем к худшему — уже происходят явочным порядком. Ситуация выглядит тупиковой: реформ одинаково боятся и власть, и народ, но и без реформ удержать ситуацию «сытых нулевых» в экономике явно не получается. Не говоря уже о том, что даже такая «новая нормальность» выглядит зыбкой из-за возможности новых санкций против России в случае дальнейшего обострения отношений с Западом из-за Сирии.
Пока можно говорить лишь о том, что хотя благодаря рейтингу президента политическая стабильность в стране более или менее сохраняется, во всем остальном мы живем в эпоху больших перемен без реформ. И, главное, в ситуации полной непредсказуемости, от которой не защищен никто — ни народ, ни власть.
Не случайно в проекте бюджета при сокращении трат даже на армию растут расходы на национальную безопасность.
Как справедливо подмечает политолог Екатерина Шульман, «если кто-то считает, что мы готовимся к мировой войне, то по архитектуре бюджета этого не видно. Если мы к чему-то и готовимся, то к каким-то внутренним беспорядкам. Мы собираемся чуть меньше кормить наше Министерство обороны, но побольше кормить наши спецслужбы и внутренние силовые структуры».
Беда в том, что эти структуры ничего не производят и богаче нас с вами точно не сделают. А старт экономических реформ все время откладывается по политическим причинам.
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This article was originally published by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) on 14 September 2016.
The changes which have been taking place over the past few years in Azerbaijan’s international environment and the growing concern about internal stability have led to President Ilham Aliyev’s regime to thoroughly revise the country’s security policy by establishing closer relations with Russia and opening up to cooperation with Iran. One consequence of this move was Azerbaijan’s victory in the so-called Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh in April this year – a symbolic success in military terms which nevertheless brought about a real political breakthrough. Baku has chosen the political rapprochement with Russia because it has no other alternative. Over the past three years, Azerbaijan has revised its risk assessment and has reached the conclusion that the West cannot guarantee its security, Turkey’s policy is unpredictable, and the strengthening position of its traditional enemy, Iran, generates threats to Azerbaijan. The rapprochement with Russia is a tactical solution intended at helping maintain internal stability and to weather the unfavourable geopolitical, economic and social conditions. The cooperation with the Kremlin has brought tangible benefits: a new dynamic in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (beneficial to Azerbaijan); and a strengthening of the regime’s stability, which is necessary during a continuing economic slump. In strategic terms, closer relations with Russia in fact mean a withdrawal from the previous vision of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy based on cooperation with the West and Turkey. The consequences of this turn towards Russia will include a further bolstering of the authoritarian regime, restricting Azerbaijan’s political subjectivity and making it part of the geopolitical bloc being built by Russia in the post-Soviet area, for example, as part of the Eurasian Economic Union. The situation in Azerbaijan will also depend on the emerging anti-Western Russian-Iranian-Turkish concert of powers which Baku may also join.
The exhausted strategy
From 1992, Azerbaijan’s policy was based on cooperation with Turkey and the West (the EU and the USA) while limiting cooperation with Russia. This strategy has enabled the country to develop independently from the Kremlin. Signs of this include: Western firms’ participation in the development of oil and gas fields in Azerbaijan and the construction of hydrocarbon transport routes running through Georgia and Turkey, bypassing Russia. The effects of this cooperation also included Azerbaijan’s income rising; increased military spending and a strengthening of the army; and the enrichment of the clans governing the country. The intense relations with the West[1] were also expected to strengthen the country in dealing with Russia and to contribute to its efforts to regain Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories around it which had been lost to Armenia in the war in 1991–1994[2].
At the same time, Azerbaijan continued what was branded as ‘strategic’ cooperation with Russia so as not to irritate Moscow, which was viewed as a potential threat. Since the Kremlin backed Armenia in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russian-Azerbaijani relations were full of distrust and were focused above all on the mutually beneficial supplies of Russian arms and employment of Azerbaijani expatriate workers in Russia. Relations with Moscow were also characterised by the tendency to reduce rather than enhance the areas of cooperation, proof of which included the closing of the Russian radar station in Qabali in 2012 and discontinuing imports of natural gas from Russia in 2007. These assumptions of the state development strategy began eroding when it became evident that the West is weak (the first signal of this was the war in Georgia in 2008) and that Ankara’s policy is unpredictable[3] (after its attempt to normalise relations with Armenia in 2008–2009). However, it was only in the past three years that the main assumptions of foreign policy were seriously revised in connection with the changing geopolitical situation around the Southern Caucasus and growing pressure from Russia, which Azerbaijan would prefer to not oppose, choosing instead a policy of forced, albeit maximally constructive, cooperation.
The dangerous reality
Baku’s present policy is affected by both the moves being made by its previous partners (the West and Turkey) and the growing potential of the states which are traditionally perceived as a threat (Russia and Iran).
What the West views as negative changes in the global balance of power is reflected in the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts taking place in Azerbaijan’s close neighbourhood. From Baku’s perspective, the West has failed to show determination in protecting its interests in these conflicts, and has even contributed to a further destabilisation of the situation. At the same time, Azerbaijan fears that EU and US policy in the post-Soviet area might provoke a revolution or a revolt (as, in Baku’s opinion, was the case with Ukraine in 2014, and before that in North African countries, which was labelled as the Arab Spring) and does not believe that the West is willing and able to ensure security and effective support to its allies (proof of which, from Baku’s point of view, was Mikheil Saakashvili’s loss of power in Georgia in 2012). The change in the socio-political values taking place in the EU and the USA (for example, the refugee crisis in the EU and the presidential election in the USA) may cause a serious internal crisis and a shake up of the existing foreign policy priorities—this also adds to the negative evaluation.
The actions taken by its ally, Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rule have also been disadvantageous for Azerbaijan. Baku is concerned about Turkey’s policy aimed at escalating further domestic crises (for example, with the opposition, Kurds, the movement led by the conservative religious leader Fethullah Gulen), the tendency to resort to blackmail and provoke conflicts with countries which are also potentially dangerous to Azerbaijan (for example, with Russia after shooting down the Russian military jet in November 2015) and to make sudden U-turns in international alliances (for example, the normalisation of relations between Ankara and Moscow and the political conflict with the EU and the USA). A further aspect hindering dialogue is the fact that Turkey’s governing party, AKP, and President Erdogan are the opposite of the secular regime in Azerbaijan, and in fact are building a state which is the antithesis of the Kemalist idea of secularism. All these factors adversely affect the level of trust between Baku and Ankara, and cause concern about the future of the jointly implemented strategic projects, such as the TANAP gas pipeline, which the Turkish minister of foreign affairs suggested could be connected with the Russian Turkish Stream project after President Erdogan’s visit to Moscow (9 August).
However, Azerbaijan views Russia’s strengthening position in the post-Soviet area as the greatest threat. This is manifested in the Caucasus for example in the growing role played by pro-Russian political groupings in Georgia, a key country for Azerbaijan’s energy projects. Baku also fears the fact that the Kremlin is prepared to launch aggressive operations in other countries (Ukraine, Syria) and openly enter into conflict with the West (NATO). Azerbaijan’s traditional enemy, Iran, has been strengthening its position on the international arena (and this process rapidly gained momentum following the partial lifting of sanctions in January 2016) and this is equally dangerous to the Azerbaijani regime. Even though the Caucasus is not a priority direction in Teheran’s policy, the Iranian expansion in this region (for example, the projects offered to Armenia and Georgia in the energy and transport sector[4]) does not allow Baku to continue its previous isolationist policy, and forces it to open up to cooperation. The Azerbaijani regime also traditionally fears possible interference by Iran and Russia with its domestic situation by using radical Shiites or Salafis, or ethnic minorities (the Talysh or Lezgian people). Russia’s ability to interfere with the political processes taking place in Azerbaijan also causes concern: initially, the opposition’s candidate for president in 2013 was a Russian citizen of ethnic Azerbaijani background[5], while at present Moscow, at least indirectly, supports the idea of holding a referendum on amending the constitution to reinforce the position of the president in Azerbaijan[6].
The country’s domestic policy is influenced by the falling oil prices which generate around 90% of the income from exports and the continuing economic and social crisis provoked in part by the decrease in oil prices followed by the 50% devaluation of the manat in December 2015 (this provoked numerous spontaneous protests in January this year). Symptoms of struggle for financial assets and disloyalty among the political elite have also been observed (for example, the dismissals of the ministers in charge of communications and national security last autumn).
New calculations
Given these difficult conditions, the regime in Azerbaijan has been focusing on securing power and its own interests, using a tactic of adjusting to the changeable reality and thus minimising the risks to state security and stability. The most important tasks for President Aliyev include maintaining internal stability, keeping the governing clans united and consolidating public support. This, in turn, requires an active domestic and foreign policy, i.e. a neutralisation of the potential threats originating from these two directions.
As regards internal issues, the government has responded by tightening its grip on society and repressing circles which it views as being dangerous (i.e. pro-Western circles, radical Shiites raising political and social issues[7], and groups linked to Fethullah Gulen[8], who Ankara has accused of attempting to stage a military coup), getting rid of individuals who pose a potential threat to the regime (the tacit agreement allowing radicalised Salafis to leave for Syria). The government has also taken provisional action to improve public sentiment (for example, lifting VAT on bread and flour, and raising pensions) and to strengthen its legitimacy both through holding events for propaganda purposes (such as the Formula 1 race in June this year) and real successes in the area of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (in the Four-Day War in April).
As regards international relations, Baku initially attempted to manoeuvre between the interests of the individual actors engaged in the Southern Caucasus, but in the end it drifted towards Russia. When compared to Iran, Turkey and the West, the Kremlin began to be perceived as a predictable partner interested in the stability of the cooperative regime. Relations have intensified, especially since President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku in August 2013. They cover the economic sphere[9], including the energy sector (for example, agreements were signed on gas imports from Russia in 2015; negotiations concerning Azerbaijan’s purchase of up to 5 billion m3 of gas annually from Gazprom are underway). As regards social issues, cooperation has been enhanced in the area of education (for example, opening a branch of the Moscow State Medical University[10]). Azerbaijan also continues buying weapons from Russia (in 2015, 85% of weapons imported by Azerbaijan originated from Russia[11]). Closer cooperation with Russia was accompanied by increasing pragmatism and the adoption of an approach focused solely on deriving maximum benefit from relations with Turkey and the West[12], sticking to an anti-Western narrative in line with that of Russia[13]. Furthermore, Azerbaijan is increasingly open to cooperation with Iran[14] and has positioned itself as a bridge between Moscow and Teheran.
A breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh?
The new dynamic, advantageous to Azerbaijan, in the area of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a consequence of the closer cooperation with Russia. In addition to that, it is also a kind of consummation of this trend. During the so-called ‘Four-Day War’ (3–5 April 2016), Azerbaijan, most likely acting with Russia’s consent[15], managed to regain minimal strips of territories previously controlled by Armenia. This success, while symbolic in a territorial sense, was of key significance for an Azerbaijan plunged in a political[16] and social[17] crisis. It caused widespread euphoria and a consolidation of the public around the government. It also strengthened President Aliyev’s legitimacy, removed the trauma of the defeat in the war of 1991–1994, and distracted public attention away from the economic slump (a 3% drop in GDP year-on-year, and an inflation rate reaching 10.6% between January and July).
The escalation in April was nevertheless a logical consequence of the tension which had been intensifying over the past few years on the frontline, Azerbaijan’s consistent armament policy (financed by oil exports to the West), military reform conducted by the new minister Zakir Hasanov (he took the post in autumn 2013) and the rhetoric of war used by the government continuously for years.
In the wider context, the Four-Day War marked the beginning of the game around Nagorno-Karabakh which was initiated by Russia and better serves the interests of Azerbaijan than those of Armenia. From Moscow’s perspective, its dominance over Armenia in the areas of politics, security and the economy is so strong that it can disregard the interests of both the Armenian political elites and the public[18]. However, the Russian initiative for a peaceful resolution to the crisis (the so-called ‘Lavrov Plan’)[19] provoked a sudden and unexpected public resistance among the Armenian public and a political conflict between Yerevan and Moscow. It also led to a crisis between the government and the public in Armenia which will be difficult to overcome[20].
Armenia’s stance contrasts with that of Azerbaijan since the latter is showing off its optimal relations with Russia[21], positively evaluates Russian efforts and has adopted a wait-and-see stance until the negotiations end. Paradoxically, Armenia’s unwillingness to accept Russian proposals makes it unnecessary for Azerbaijan to articulate its objection against the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict area, which would be disadvantageous to both parties. A solution of this kind would make Armenia and Azerbaijan even more dependent on Russia, would strengthen Russia against Iran (which is launching an expansion in the Caucasus) and Turkey, and would also allow Moscow to demonstrate its effectiveness in conflict management. This would also be another stage in the reconstruction of Russia’s dominance in the post-Soviet area and in subordinating the Caucasus.
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, Armenia is clearly on the defensive during the talks and is coming under pressure from the Kremlin; this situation perfectly suits the regime in Baku. Azerbaijan also views the continuing crisis in Armenia as an advantage; this is further escalated by such factors as Azerbaijan’s ostentatiously good relations with Russia. Baku may treat the intensification of the domestic crisis in Armenia as an opportunity to launch an offensive and regain those territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh which are the subject of the negotiations using the fait accomplimethod (this scenario will become more appealing should there be an escalation of economic problems in Azerbaijan). However, this option would require consent from Russia, which would use the war to impose the solutions it has been pushing both parties far (above all, the engagement of Russian peacekeeping forces). The current dynamic of the situation is positively evaluated by Baku; therefore Aliyev’s regime is most likely to adopt a wait-and-see tactic in the coming months until the talks end. It will also continue to ostentatiously develop relations with Russia in order to put pressure on Armenia.
Possible developments – stick with the stronger
As seen by Azerbaijan, the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh remains unstable, and this carries the risk of destabilisation provoked by external factors. In turn, the dynamics of the developments in the country are dangerous because there is no chance for an increase in oil prices and a positive stimulus to the economy. Given this situation, Azerbaijan will try to enhance cooperation with the countries it perceived until recently as dangerous, above all with Russia and to a lesser extent Iran. Cooperation with Russia, from the point of view of the governing regime, is at present the best way to protect itself from the risk of a possible domestic destabilisation and from Iran’s expansionist policy. In turn, opening up to cooperation with both of these countries is a way to neutralise the threats posed by the Russian-Iranian rapprochement. One example of this policy was the unprecedented summit of the presidents of Iran and Russia held in Baku on President Ilham Aliyev’s initiative[22] (on 9 August). This tactic adopted by the regime brings at least temporary benefits, as proven by the dynamics of the talks on the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which are now favourable to Azerbaijan.
In turn, cooperation with Turkey covers the economic and financial spheres(implementation of the already initiated projects) ; and this is true to an even larger extent with the West (access to loans and assistance in the reform process). Turkey remains Azerbaijan’s most important partner but it is losing significance to Russia and to a lesser extent to Iran. This means in fact a reversal of the previous development strategy based on cooperation with the West and Turkey. At the same time, Azerbaijan is becoming more and more hostage to the development of relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey and the West, and its room for political manoeuvre is shrinking.
On the regional level, the most serious threats to the regime are linked to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, i.e. to the risk that Armenia may wage a preventive war as a remedy to its continuing crisis. It is also possible that Baku has made a miscalculation concerning the possibility of a diplomatic resolution or military victory in the conflict. In the geopolitical context, the greatest risk is posed by possible tensions in the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle or in the relations these countries have with the West, and the possibility that Azerbaijan will end up being the place where this tension is discharged (as is now the case with Syria). In each of these scenarios Azerbaijan is more an object than a subject of the game, and it will have no other choice than to keep manoeuvring and adjusting itself to stronger, dangerous players. This offers fewer options to President Aliyev’s regime to play on the West’s desire to secure its own interests, for example in the energy sector, and reduces its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. In exchange, the regime gains the possibility to maintain political stability at home. The consequences of this policy may include Azerbaijan drifting towards the emerging bloc of countries at conflict with the West (Russia, Turkey and Iran) and concessions in the energy sector (for example, as regards the implementation of the TANAP gas pipeline). This policy strengthens the authoritarian political system, reduces the possibility of the modernisation of the state, and will in the longer term exacerbate socio-political problems.
Notes
[1] Western states are the main recipients of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas; the UK-based firm BP holds the largest stakes in Azerbaijan’s most important gas and oil fields (Shah-Deniz and Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli) which, in the opinion of the then president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, would strengthen state security. Azerbaijan’s troops also participated in NATO’s missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
[2] Azerbaijan pinned its hopes, for example, on the successful operation of the OSCE Minsk Group established in 1992 in which Western countries predominate (its members are: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Holland, Sweden, Finland, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and which is co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA.
[3] Other manifestations of this policy include support for the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring (2011), Turkey’s engagement in Syria against Assad, the conflict with Kurds (2015) and shooting down the Russian bomber (2015).
[4] Iran is interested, for example, in cooperation with Georgia in the area of Internet connections (Georgia owns a cable running along the seabed providing Internet access in the Caucasus), gas exports and electricity production. From Georgia’s point of view, cooperation with Iran (especially in the gas sector) will provide a counterweight to relations with Azerbaijan (the main gas supplier). In turn, Iran and Armenia have struck a deal on increasing gas supplies from Iran to Armenia in exchange for increased electricity supplies from Armenia to Iran. Iran is also interested in a railway connection with Armenia, which sees this cooperation as an alternative to transport corridors running through Georgia. It will also allow it to reduce its dependence on Russia. Georgia and Armenia introduced a visa-free regime with Iran this year.
[5] The person concerned is Rustam Ibragimbekov, a well-known scriptwriter and playwright. The formal reason why he was rejected as a candidate by the Central Election Commission was the fact that he held double citizenship: Russian and Azerbaijani.
[6] <a href="http://www.today.az/news/politics/153503.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.today.az/news/politics/153503.html</a>
[7] The pacifications of the conservative Shia town of Nardaran in November and December 2015.
[8] Closing the network of schools linked to Gulen in 2014 following the unsuccessful July coup in Turkey: the Caucasus University and Azerbaijan’s first independent television channel ANS, which was planning to broadcast an interview with Gulen, were closed; <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-shuts-tv-station-gulen-interview-turkey/27888826.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-shuts-tv-station-gulen-interview-turkey/27888826.html</a>
[9] Russia has been the main supplier of goods imported by Azerbaijan since 2013.
[10] This is the second time a Russian higher education facility opened a branch in Azerbaijan. The new branch was established instantly, only four months after the decree was signed by President Ilham Aliyev. Other examples include: the establishment of the Azerbaijani-Russian Association of Higher Education Facilities (the memorandum was signed in 2015).
[11] <a href="http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72581" rel="nofollow">http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72581</a>
[12] The decision not to sign an association agreement in 2014, forcing the OSCE mission to leave Baku in 2014, preventing the OSCE from observing the election in 2015, getting rid of independent media (e.g. RFERL), imposing restrictions on NGOs’ cooperation with foreign sponsors.
[13] For example, the anti-Western manifesto by the head of the Presidential Administration, Ramiz Mekhdiyev, full of accusations about the West. Azerbaijani politicians (including the president) condemning the EU’s policy on the refugee crisis and accusing the West of using double standards.
[14] Relations with Iran have improved since Hasan Rouhani became president. The development of cooperation has been manifested in enhancing the legislative base, improving the availability of border checkpoints, intensified political dialogue (Aliyev’s two visits to Iran since 2014, Rouhani’s visit to Baku in August) and joint infrastructural projects (railroads) which Azerbaijan is ready to finance. Azerbaijan’s determination to build a railway connection to Iran results from its desire to derail a similar project offered by Iran to Armenia.
[15] Indirect proof of this include: the immediate reaction from Russia to the resumption of clashes, Moscow’s reactions limited to toned down appeals to both parties to refrain from using violence, the unexpected publication by Russian sources of information on a ceasefire, statements from Russian politicians (including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev) concerning a Russian-Azerbaijani strategic partnership immediately after the conflict, the ostentatiously warm atmosphere of the talks with the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, in Baku (7 April).
[16] For more information, see: <a href="http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-10-28/azerbaijan-a-major-purge-ahead-parliamentary-election" rel="nofollow">http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-10-28/azerbaijan-a-major-purge-ahead-parliamentary-election</a>
[17] For more information, see: <a href="http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-01-20/azerbaijan-rage-people" rel="nofollow">http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-01-20/azerbaijan-rage-people</a>
[18] This approach is illustrated perfectly by the fact that, during his visit to Moscow in September 2013, President Serzh Sargsyan was forced to withdraw from the plan for Armenia to sign the association agreement with the EU at the Vilnius summit.
[19] The so-called ‘Lavrov Plan’ has never been revealed, but it can be assumed on the basis of comments from participants of the talks publicised by the media that it envisages Armenia handing back the five territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, postponing the issue of determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the deployment of international (in fact dominated by Russia) peacekeeping forces.
[20] For more information, see: <a href="http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-07-27/threat-chaos-armenia" rel="nofollow">http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-07-27/threat-chaos-armenia</a>
[21] The new quality of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia is well illustrated by the frequency of mutual visits. An Iranian-Azerbaijani-Russian summit on the presidential level was held in Baku, Azerbaijan’s defence minister, Zakir Hasanov visited Moscow, and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Shoygu paid a return visit to Baku – and all this happened during just one week in August (9–16).
[22] Iran made air bases available in its territory to Russian bomber aircraft engaged in the military operation in Syria a few days after this meeting.
About the Author
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz is a senior fellow with the Department for the Turkey, Caucasus and Central Asia at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW).
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Putin Likely to Expand Russian Invasion of Ukraine in January, Felgengauer Says by paul goble (noreply@blogger.com)
Paul Goble
Staunton, October 13 – Rumors and fears about the possibility of a third world war between Russia and the West have become so overwhelming that many have begun to forget that Vladimir Putin is still involved in an aggressive war in Ukraine and that it is far more likely that he will expand that conflict than that he will risk a nuclear exchange with the West.
The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine is anything but holding, and consequently, it is useful to consider what Putin, the Russian military and the Moscow-controlled militias in the occupied portions of Ukraine, including Crimea, might do next lest Ukraine get lost in the noise of Moscow’s rhetoric about World War III.
Independent Russian military analyst Pavel Felgengauer thus makes an important contribution with a discussion today of when and where the Kremlin leader is likely to direct his forces in Ukraine in the near future (apostrophe.ua/article/society/2016-10-13/desant-iz-kryima-kuda-poydet-putin-zakonchiv-pod-mariupolem/7732).
“Before the New Year or more precisely before the middle of January,” the analyst says, “a major war [in Ukraine] is improbable.” That doesn’t mean that there won’t be more local clashes intended to put pressure on Ukraine and that doesn’t mean that these actions are “the independent actions of the local militants.”
Opposite the areas controlled by Ukraine, Moscow has been forming a tank army consisting of two corps under Russian command. That is a major change from “’the Cossacks and brigands’” who were there before. This is “now something quite serious” that Kyiv and the West need to take into consideration.
Felgengauer says that he doesn’t think that attacks in the Mariupol direction are possible now, given the weather and the constraints Moscow faces given its recent military exercises and the change out of one group of draftees who are finishing their service with another cohort who are beginning theirs.
Moreover, the Russian army is reorganizing its forces. General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, has said that “the number of tactical battalion groups in these fall months will be sharply increased from 66 to 96. In the course of 2017, they will increase further to 115 and by 2018 6o 125 -- that is twice as many as now.”
For comparison, Felgengauer continues, Moscow sent 10 to 12 such groups across the Ukrainian border in August 2014, and NATO now has four such groups in Poland and the Baltic countries.
“Such a concentration of forces and resources in World War II fashion against the West is dangerous and against Ukraine as well,” the analyst argues. That will create a situation where the forces will be two to one or “even three to one.” Russia’s goal in this “is by any means not to allow the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and to achieve regime change in Kyiv.”
In the course of a new round of aggression, Russia is unlikely to choose Mariupol as its goal. Laying siege to that city, he says, would be “a long, bloody and difficult story because it is already prepared for defense. But Odessa is not very well prepared, nor are Kherson and Mykolayev.”
That makes an attack on Odessa more likely especially since “many in Russia consider it a Russian city” and because its “’liberation’” would trigger a patriotic explosion much like the annexation of Crimea. But the most compelling reason for thinking Moscow will move in that direction is that it can use its fleet and can achieve a link up with Transdniestria.
Another reason for thinking Moscow won’t move until January and then will move toward Odessa is to be found in the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who has suggested to Western diplomats that there is a short-term “window” for talking about Ukraine but that it won’t remain “open” forever.
But there are two more compelling reasons to think Moscow will move in January, Felgengauer says. On the one hand, such a move unlike doing something against the Baltic countries would not involve Russia in a suicidal clash with NATO. And on the other, many in Moscow now feel that things are so bad in relations with the West that they have nothing to lose.
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Trump Supporters Disgusted by Lewd Tape, But Still in His Corner by webdesk@voanews.com (Jim Malone)
Less than a month before Election Day, Republican Donald Trump is scrambling to recover momentum after the release of a damaging video tape, a steep drop in the polls and an increasingly bitter feud with party leaders. Despite his recent troubles, some of Trump’s most loyal supporters continue to stand with him, especially coal miners in West Virginia. Coal miner Chris Rose has been an enthusiastic Trump supporter from the beginning. “He speaks his mind. He’s not afraid to say what is on his mind. He’s got gall,” Rose said at his home outside Morgantown recently. But Rose and his wife, Amber, were clearly put off by the release of the “Access Hollywood” videotape that contains Trump’s vulgar language about women. Rose said he and his wife were “extremely disappointed and disgusted” with the tape, and he added that Trump will have to “try hard to convince” voters that he has “changed his view on women and marriage.” Despite the tape, Rose said they are sticking by Trump. “I hope the American people will remember that this is just a flash in the pan compared to all the scandals the Clinton’s have been in throughout the years.” Rose added that he found Clinton “crooked, deceitful, lying.” Rose is 26 and has been mining for eight years. The coal mining industry is crucial in West Virginia, and Rose decided long ago he wanted to be part of it. “I mean, people you grow up with, family members, everybody works in the coal mine. So it is a way of life, a brotherhood.” Hard times for miners But the coal mining industry has fallen on hard times in West Virginia in recent years. A group that monitors the coal industry called Workforce West Virginia reports that about 11,500 miners have lost their jobs since March of 2012. The miners blame government regulations and many of them are enthusiastically embracing Donald Trump for president. Rose said Trump does need to make some changes, adding that “he does need to learn to make it (his campaign) a little more presidential.” But Rose also argued that West Virginia miners have welcomed his support for the coal industry and are suspicious of what Clinton would do as president. He also said voters want change. “They are fed up with the Clintons. They are fed up with the Bushes. It’s time to run an outsider. Time to give someone else a chance.” 'He kind of disgusts me' A few miles away, on the campus of West Virginia University in Morgantown, Trump is also the subject of discussion, but this time it’s by members of the Young Democrats club. Sophomore Angel Mullen is, to put it mildly, not a fan. “Donald Trump, he kind of disgusts me. And I feel bad saying that, but as a woman and a minority, I don’t feel very comfortable with him. I don’t feel comfortable with him handling women’s rights.” Mullen is supporting Democrat Hillary Clinton for president, and says even though Trump remains a heavy favorite to win West Virginia on election day, it is still important to get Democrats to turn out to vote. “And even if (the) state overall votes for Trump, it is still really important for those Hillary supporters to go out there, and for us to see those numbers and to see how many people actually really support her.” Fellow Young Democrat Emma Harrison said she is inspired by Clinton whose candidacy gives her hope that women can aspire to high office. “Well for me, I really want to run for office some day, and to have her break the ultimate glass ceiling of (becoming) president, hopefully, that would just mean the world to me.” Harrison added that, in her view, there is no comparison between Trump and Clinton. “I mean, she is the most qualified. And she is level-headed, she is strong-willed. I just think she is the perfect candidate for the job.” Looking for a savior Known as the ‘Mountain State’, West Virginia ranks as one of the poorest states in the country. Its aging and predominantly white population is looking to Trump as a savior, according to Patrick Hickey, an assistant professor of political science at West Virginia State University. “Trump’s message really resonates here because part of his message is that the global economy has left American workers behind, and I think nowhere is that felt more, or very few places is that felt more, than in West Virginia.” West Virginia last voted for a Democrat in a presidential election 20 years ago, when voters supported Bill Clinton’s re-election bid in 1996. Since then, the state has taken a sharp turn toward the Republicans, in part because Democrats nationally are not seen as supportive of the coal industry. “We had a strong Democratic tradition, a strong union tradition, but as the mining jobs have gone away and some of those union jobs have gone away, we have seen the state increasingly turn Republican,” said Hickey. Trump has been an outspoken supporter of the coal industry in West Virginia going back to the primaries earlier this year, and Hickey said he still retains a lot of support. “West Virginia really sets up well for Trump. We are an older state, we are a whiter state, and so some of these statements that Trump has made that are really concerning to folks elsewhere are maybe not as concerning to folks here.” West Virginia looks to be Trump country come Election Day. Voters here seem ready to overlook his faults in the hope of bringing change to a state with an uncertain future. “We are not getting any younger here in terms of the state in general,” Hickey added. “We are not getting any more diverse in terms of racial diversity here in the state, and so again, demographically, West Virginians are the folks being left behind by this more multi-cultural and globalized society.”
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International Business Times UK |
Vladimir Putin: 'Brics will settle conflicts and ensure international information security'
International Business Times UK Vladimir Putin assures Brics nations are committed to ensuring 'international informationsecurity'. Speaking ahead of the Brics Summit the Russian leader said member countries 'reject the policy of coercive pressure'. By Lara Rebello. October 13, 2016 ... BRICS relevant due to Western unilateralism: Vladimir PutinTimes of India Putin: BRICS Countries Looking for New Cooperation FormatsSputnik International |
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Pope Francis is urging Lutherans to set aside doctrinal differences and work with Catholics to care for the poor, the sick and refugees as he lays out his vision for greater communion ahead of his visit to Sweden later this month.
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