The singer writes a forceful letter to Russia and Vladimir Putin following a recent visit to Moscow – read the full letter here
• Elton John condemns Russia's 'vicious' anti-gay legislation - news
• Elton John condemns Russia's 'vicious' anti-gay legislation - news
One month after performing in the Russian cities of Moscow and Kazan, Sir Elton John has published a letter on his website, eltonjohn.com, calling for Russia to drop its "homosexual propaganda" law and change the way it treats its citizens. Here the singer recalls the stories of Russian fans who had been threatened, insulted and attacked for being gay:
I am deeply grateful for the support of the Russian people who have welcomed and accepted me in their country ever since I first visited in 1979.
On my last visit, in December 2013, I wondered whether the new legislation banning "homosexual propaganda" might have changed that. It hadn't. I still felt the same warmth and welcome from the audiences that I have felt every time I have been in Russia.
On that trip I met with members of the LGBT community in Moscow. Although I was still welcomed as an openly gay foreigner, I wanted to really understand at first-hand what difference the legislation had made to Russian LGBT in their own country. What I heard reinforced all the media stories that have been circling since the propaganda bill became federal law: that vicious homophobia has been legitimised by this legislation and given extremists the cover to abuse people's basic human rights.
The people I met in Moscow – gay men and lesbians in their 20′s, 30′s and 40′s - told me stories about receiving threats from vigilante groups who would 'cure' them of homosexuality by dousing them with urine or beating them up. One young man was stalked outside a gay club by someone posing as a taxi driver who tried to garrotte him with a guitar string because he was a "sodomite". Everyone shared stories of verbal and physical abuse – at work, in bars and restaurants or in the street – since the legislation came into force last June. And, some of the vital work providing HIV prevention information to the gay community has been labelled "homosexual propaganda" and shut down.
It was very clear to me that, although foreigners like myself who are visiting Russia are not affected by this new law (and President Putin has recently confirmed this), it is a very different story for those living inside the country. As Maria Maksakova told her fellow Russian MPs last month: "We are seeing extremely negative consequences as a result of this law, with the growth of hate crimes."
President Putin asserts that this was not the intention, but it is undoubtedly the effect that this law has had by promoting misunderstanding and ignorance. In particular, it is very disappointing that the law explicitly links homosexuality with child sex abuse, which countless studies have shown to be conclusively wrong.
The people I met in Moscow were decent, kind, patriotic men and women who had no thought of forcing their sexuality on anyone. Whatever the intention of Russia's homosexuality and paedophilia propaganda laws, I am absolutely clear from my own personal experience that it is proving deeply dangerous to the LGBT community and deeply divisive to Russian society. I would welcome the opportunity to introduce President Putin to some Russians who deserve to be heard, and who deserve to be treated in their own country with the same respect and warm welcome that I received on my last visit.
Elton John
Visit Elton John's website here: eltonjohn.com
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· · · ·
Russia’s Supreme Court ruled to reduce Platon Lebedev’s sentence to the time he has already served, a move urged by human rights advocates
Some £300m in illegal substances and other assets seized in an investigation into exchange houses that fund terrorist activities.
Расследование дела о хищениях в "Росатоме" завершено и передано в суд. Следственные действия были завершены еще в августе 2011 года. Однако обвиняемые и их адвокаты затягивали завершение расследования. По делу проходят, в частности, экс-заместитель главы госкорпорации Евгений Евстратов. Он отпущен под залог в 5 миллионов рублей.
Троим активистам Евромайдана, раненным при столкновениях с силовиками, удалили по глазу, еще одному ампутировали кисть руки. Общее число раненых с обеих сторон - около 200 человек. МВД угрожает лидерам оппозиции уголовными делами, за то что они якобы вооружают активистов. На улице Грушевского строят катапульту.
Прокуратура в Казани проведет проверку в отношении экс-проректора местной духовной семинарии Кирилла (Илюхина), уволенного за домогательства воспитанников. В связи с чем назначена проверка, не уточняется. Протодьякон Андрей Кураев, предавший широкой огласке скандал в семинарии, был уволен из Московской духовной академии.
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 Московский комсомолец |
Начальники генштабов России и США обсудили проблемы безопасности Зимней Олимпиады
Московский комсомолец «Я думаю, у нас есть возможность для развития наших отношений в областях, где наши интересы сходятся», — сказал генерал Демпси. Он подчеркнул, что Москва является важным партнером, предоставляющим коммуникационные линии для миссии НАТО в Афганистане. Россия ... План военного сотрудничества России и США предусматривает учения всех видов войскИТАР-ТАСС all 27 news articles » |
Georgia had a difficult year in 2013 by any standards. The conflict-ridden period of co-habitation between President Mikhail Saakashvili and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili lasted until October 2013 and fundamentally destabilized the country’s fragile political and economic system. Co-habitation ended as Georgia elected Giorgi Margvelashvili as its new, constitutionally much weakened president on October 27 and switched to the parliamentary system under the new constitution. By winning the presidency, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) coalition entirely pushed the United National Movement (UNM) out of power. To that point, the hold of UNM over the executive branch (the administration of Mikheil Saakashvili) kept GD united. Now that this political rivalry is gone, 2014 may witness the beginning of the disintegration of the highly eclectic GD. Indeed, the year 2013 already provided the first signs of this as some allies left the coalition (info9.ge, August 2, 2013) and others were demoted (Channel 1, January 23; presa.ge, November 17, 2013).
Furthermore, throughout the past year, the government was shaken by scandal after scandal as high-ranking GD parliamentarians and bureaucrats purchased luxury service cars using government funds and took five- and, in some cases, six-digit government bonuses. Moreover, nepotism has been widespread as high- and medium-level GD members packed various government and administrative offices with their family members, relatives and friends, building extensive patronage networks. The culmination of the scandals of 2013 was the resignation of Chief Prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze in December 2013, after the opposition revealed that he had a criminal record in Germany in 2001 (civil.ge, December 30, 2013). Judging by the trends of the past year, it is more than likely that high-level government scandals will continue in 2014.
Moreover, the government’s economic record in 2013 has been dismal. Although, the government subsidies in agriculture helped thousands of peasants to cultivate their lands, overall, last year’s economic showings have been alarming. The government initially forecasted 6 percent GDP growth for 2013, but the growth for the first 11 months was just 2.6 percent (civil.ge, December 31, 2013). Moreover, the Georgian lari began to fall against the US dollar since early November, breaking a two-year record when it reached 1.67 points already in the first week of November (bpn.ge, November 26, 2013). It then kept falling further, reaching 1.73 points in the first week of December. Furthermore, as the government increased social spending, the 2013 budget revenue shortfall hit 700 million Georgian lari ($400.6 million) (liberali.ge, December 20, 2013). In addition, GD’s electoral promise of dramatically cheaper utility prices never materialized.
Against the GD’s failed promises of improved socio-economic conditions, the prosecution of former high-ranking UNM officials dragged on as courts failed to reach final verdicts. These trials increasingly began to resemble hypocritical shows to appease the wider public, angry with Saakashvili’s rule and deeply disappointed with the new government. These never-ending trials are likely to continue in 2014 as the government will try to divert the public’s attention from persisting socio-economic problems in the country.
Foreign policy has not been highly successful either. In 2013, the new Georgian government continued its rapprochement with Moscow. Such a policy has not resulted in any progress in the de-occupation of the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia did, however, begin to reopen its markets for the export of Georgian wines, mineral waters and agricultural products. Nonetheless, taking into consideration Russia’s long record of intimidating Georgia and other trading partners, it is quite likely that the Kremlin will use threats of a renewed trade embargo against Georgia this year to bend Tbilisi to Moscow’s political will.
Such a scenario is even more likely against the background of Georgia’s much-anticipated signing of the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union. Georgia initialed the AA with the EU in November 2013 and is expected to sign the agreement in September 2014 (Channel 1; Rustavi 2; Imedi TV, November 28, 2013). So far, Moscow has not expressed its outright hostility toward the Georgian-EU AA. Yet, this may change once Russia safely puts behind the February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and can once again direct its attention elsewhere. For this purpose, Moscow may well use a renewed trade embargo on Georgian exports. However, a trade embargo alone will not be enough to force Tbilisi into submission as Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia is arguably not as large as that of Ukraine, another country that backed off from signing an AA with Europe as a result of Moscow’s intimidation. Thus, the Kremlin may further use the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to stage provocations along the occupation lines to apply pressure on the government. Sometime by late winter or early spring of this year, Georgia is highly likely to begin feeling this extra coercion from Russia. It remains to be seen, however, how much pressure Georgia and its current government will be able and willing to withstand for the sake of securing a Georgian-EU Association Agreement.
The year 2013 has been difficult for Georgia. And 2014 does not promise to be any better, as more domestic and foreign policy challenges loom ahead. But it is still unclear how well the Georgian government, shaken by high-level scandals and rapidly growing public disappointment, will tackle the myriad of problems that the country is facing.
Furthermore, throughout the past year, the government was shaken by scandal after scandal as high-ranking GD parliamentarians and bureaucrats purchased luxury service cars using government funds and took five- and, in some cases, six-digit government bonuses. Moreover, nepotism has been widespread as high- and medium-level GD members packed various government and administrative offices with their family members, relatives and friends, building extensive patronage networks. The culmination of the scandals of 2013 was the resignation of Chief Prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze in December 2013, after the opposition revealed that he had a criminal record in Germany in 2001 (civil.ge, December 30, 2013). Judging by the trends of the past year, it is more than likely that high-level government scandals will continue in 2014.
Moreover, the government’s economic record in 2013 has been dismal. Although, the government subsidies in agriculture helped thousands of peasants to cultivate their lands, overall, last year’s economic showings have been alarming. The government initially forecasted 6 percent GDP growth for 2013, but the growth for the first 11 months was just 2.6 percent (civil.ge, December 31, 2013). Moreover, the Georgian lari began to fall against the US dollar since early November, breaking a two-year record when it reached 1.67 points already in the first week of November (bpn.ge, November 26, 2013). It then kept falling further, reaching 1.73 points in the first week of December. Furthermore, as the government increased social spending, the 2013 budget revenue shortfall hit 700 million Georgian lari ($400.6 million) (liberali.ge, December 20, 2013). In addition, GD’s electoral promise of dramatically cheaper utility prices never materialized.
Against the GD’s failed promises of improved socio-economic conditions, the prosecution of former high-ranking UNM officials dragged on as courts failed to reach final verdicts. These trials increasingly began to resemble hypocritical shows to appease the wider public, angry with Saakashvili’s rule and deeply disappointed with the new government. These never-ending trials are likely to continue in 2014 as the government will try to divert the public’s attention from persisting socio-economic problems in the country.
Foreign policy has not been highly successful either. In 2013, the new Georgian government continued its rapprochement with Moscow. Such a policy has not resulted in any progress in the de-occupation of the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia did, however, begin to reopen its markets for the export of Georgian wines, mineral waters and agricultural products. Nonetheless, taking into consideration Russia’s long record of intimidating Georgia and other trading partners, it is quite likely that the Kremlin will use threats of a renewed trade embargo against Georgia this year to bend Tbilisi to Moscow’s political will.
Such a scenario is even more likely against the background of Georgia’s much-anticipated signing of the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union. Georgia initialed the AA with the EU in November 2013 and is expected to sign the agreement in September 2014 (Channel 1; Rustavi 2; Imedi TV, November 28, 2013). So far, Moscow has not expressed its outright hostility toward the Georgian-EU AA. Yet, this may change once Russia safely puts behind the February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and can once again direct its attention elsewhere. For this purpose, Moscow may well use a renewed trade embargo on Georgian exports. However, a trade embargo alone will not be enough to force Tbilisi into submission as Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia is arguably not as large as that of Ukraine, another country that backed off from signing an AA with Europe as a result of Moscow’s intimidation. Thus, the Kremlin may further use the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to stage provocations along the occupation lines to apply pressure on the government. Sometime by late winter or early spring of this year, Georgia is highly likely to begin feeling this extra coercion from Russia. It remains to be seen, however, how much pressure Georgia and its current government will be able and willing to withstand for the sake of securing a Georgian-EU Association Agreement.
The year 2013 has been difficult for Georgia. And 2014 does not promise to be any better, as more domestic and foreign policy challenges loom ahead. But it is still unclear how well the Georgian government, shaken by high-level scandals and rapidly growing public disappointment, will tackle the myriad of problems that the country is facing.
Read the whole story
· · ·
The pre-planned introduction of an extra-tough security regime around Sochi last Tuesday (January 7) has brought an escalation of concerns about safety at the 22nd Winter Olympic Games, which will open in this sub-tropical resort on February 7. While Russian mainstream media sticks to the official line of strictly choreographed joy, more skeptical Western views find their way to the less controlled Internet media—and then bounce back to the West in increasingly alarmist reflections (http://newsru.com/russia/08jan2014/sochi2014citadel.html). The sober warning issued by the US State Department and the announcement of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about sending some 30 agents to Moscow and Sochi were immediately picked up by Russian tabloids as proof positive of a high threat of terrorist attacks (Moskovsky Komsomolets, January 11). In fact, however, the athletes, journalists and the carefully screened fans will most probably be perfectly safe in Sochi. Nevertheless, the anxiously anticipated games can still be spoiled.
The heavy rain in Moscow last week served as a reminder that capricious weather might ruin the outdoor competitions in Sochi, which has never been associated with winter sports. Moreover, the massive deployment of security personnel of every imaginable kind—from air defense units to Cossack patrols—may inevitably result in dangerous cases of miscommunication, since any minor incident might trigger an entirely disproportionate response. Indeed, the psychological stress of a long-lasting high-security alert increases the possibility of false alarms, which could interrupt the heavily loaded schedule of ceremonies. Sochi has been so fortified by high fences, check-points and “no-go” zones that it resembles a besieged fortress, except that no standing army is actually besieging (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/svetlana_sochi/1233912-echo/). Any attempt to stage a micro-protest, for instance in support of gay rights, is certain to be treated with extreme prejudice. The atmosphere may, therefore, be even more oppressive than it was at the Moscow Olympics in 1980, when Vladimir Putin was running his first errands as a KGB lieutenant
(http://grani.ru/opinion/abarinov/m.223213.html).
This time around, it is even more important to isolate the Olympic “safe haven” from the rest of the country because many angry rebels see the games as a unique opportunity to make a heavy impact on this top-priority political project. Putin hoped to use the games to demonstrate that the war in the North Caucasus was brought to an end, but an average week in this zone of non-stop “special operations” results in 15 casualties in armed clashes and explosions (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236256/). After the double attack in Volgograd on December 29 and 30, the security apparatus was geared toward preventing new suicide bombings, but terrorists simply staged a different kind of attack—and in a different place. Four abandoned (and crudely mined) cars with six bodies were found in Stavropol Kray on January 8, and the police first took it for a criminal shoot-out, so the counter-terrorist alert was sounded too late and brought no result (http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/01/10/stavropol/). It is impossible to predict what tactics the rebels will opt for this week and where will they strike the week after. But it is nonetheless clear that the more security resources and manpower are concentrated in Sochi and in Moscow, the less secure the rest of the country becomes.
Besides the resonance from terrorist strikes, the festivities in Sochi are also affected by the reaction in the traumatized communities across the country. Russians’ fears of further attacks by networks of Islamist extremists invariably also expands into dark suspicions against all “migrants” from the North Caucasus. These grassroots tensions are fanned into ugly xenophobia by the officially demonstrated devotion to the Christian Orthodox Church, which translates into huge lines of worshipers in front of the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow (http://slon.ru/russia/mngochasovaya_ochered_k_daram_volkhvov-1041727.xhtml). The more President Putin propagates his ideology of “conservatism,” which rejects such liberal Western values as tolerance or secularism, the deeper run the schisms in the fragmented society. Consequently, Muslims feel discriminated against while liberals become alienated from the resolutely anti-modern politics (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=24072). The loud fanfare of propaganda regarding Sochi produces more irritation and angst within the Russian Federation than the desired feeling of national unity.
This irritation is exacerbated by the exorbitant expenses devoted to staging this enormously hyped event, increasingly seen as a manifestation of Putin’s vanity. The stagnating economy, in which even government economists cannot find sources of growth, provides a depressing background for the big business of the Olympic Games, particularly since the scope of stealing has set a world record (Kommersant, January 8). The feeding frenzy of embezzlement has caused massive delays in construction projects. Meanwhile, the continuing rush to make everything picture perfect and plaster over the faulty structures creates a high risk of technical failures and accidents, which could become yet another spoiler for the corrupted exploitation of sport achievements for ignoble political purposes (http://svpressa.ru/society/article/80344/?mra=1). The Olympic expenditures will not bankrupt Russia. But they do heavily contribute to fears of economic decline and underpin the perception that the best opportunity to put Russia back on track has been wasted on ludicrous self-aggrandizement.
Putin still imagines that the Olympic triumph will continue the series of his foreign policy successes opened by the game-changing initiative on Syria’s chemical disarmament. However, each score in this series—like, for instance, “dissuading” the Ukrainian leadership from signing an association agreement with the European Union by offering a surprisingly sizeable aid package—has exposed the gap between escalating ambitions and shrinking regime durability. The Sochi Games have already brought a lot of attention to shameless corruption and gross violations of human rights in Russia, all the while revealing the deterioration of state institutions. Thus, as a political prestige-boosting enterprise, the 2014 Winter Olympics are already a failure. The heavy-handedly enforced safety of the ski races and hockey matches inside the security perimeter will only further illuminate the deepening insecurity outside it. Putin’s games will probably make a special entry in the Olympic annals, but the shadows around this celebration of “Citius, Altius, Fortius” (the Olympic motto of “Faster, Higher, Stronger”) are darkening.
The heavy rain in Moscow last week served as a reminder that capricious weather might ruin the outdoor competitions in Sochi, which has never been associated with winter sports. Moreover, the massive deployment of security personnel of every imaginable kind—from air defense units to Cossack patrols—may inevitably result in dangerous cases of miscommunication, since any minor incident might trigger an entirely disproportionate response. Indeed, the psychological stress of a long-lasting high-security alert increases the possibility of false alarms, which could interrupt the heavily loaded schedule of ceremonies. Sochi has been so fortified by high fences, check-points and “no-go” zones that it resembles a besieged fortress, except that no standing army is actually besieging (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/svetlana_sochi/1233912-echo/). Any attempt to stage a micro-protest, for instance in support of gay rights, is certain to be treated with extreme prejudice. The atmosphere may, therefore, be even more oppressive than it was at the Moscow Olympics in 1980, when Vladimir Putin was running his first errands as a KGB lieutenant
(http://grani.ru/opinion/abarinov/m.223213.html).
This time around, it is even more important to isolate the Olympic “safe haven” from the rest of the country because many angry rebels see the games as a unique opportunity to make a heavy impact on this top-priority political project. Putin hoped to use the games to demonstrate that the war in the North Caucasus was brought to an end, but an average week in this zone of non-stop “special operations” results in 15 casualties in armed clashes and explosions (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236256/). After the double attack in Volgograd on December 29 and 30, the security apparatus was geared toward preventing new suicide bombings, but terrorists simply staged a different kind of attack—and in a different place. Four abandoned (and crudely mined) cars with six bodies were found in Stavropol Kray on January 8, and the police first took it for a criminal shoot-out, so the counter-terrorist alert was sounded too late and brought no result (http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/01/10/stavropol/). It is impossible to predict what tactics the rebels will opt for this week and where will they strike the week after. But it is nonetheless clear that the more security resources and manpower are concentrated in Sochi and in Moscow, the less secure the rest of the country becomes.
Besides the resonance from terrorist strikes, the festivities in Sochi are also affected by the reaction in the traumatized communities across the country. Russians’ fears of further attacks by networks of Islamist extremists invariably also expands into dark suspicions against all “migrants” from the North Caucasus. These grassroots tensions are fanned into ugly xenophobia by the officially demonstrated devotion to the Christian Orthodox Church, which translates into huge lines of worshipers in front of the Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow (http://slon.ru/russia/mngochasovaya_ochered_k_daram_volkhvov-1041727.xhtml). The more President Putin propagates his ideology of “conservatism,” which rejects such liberal Western values as tolerance or secularism, the deeper run the schisms in the fragmented society. Consequently, Muslims feel discriminated against while liberals become alienated from the resolutely anti-modern politics (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=24072). The loud fanfare of propaganda regarding Sochi produces more irritation and angst within the Russian Federation than the desired feeling of national unity.
This irritation is exacerbated by the exorbitant expenses devoted to staging this enormously hyped event, increasingly seen as a manifestation of Putin’s vanity. The stagnating economy, in which even government economists cannot find sources of growth, provides a depressing background for the big business of the Olympic Games, particularly since the scope of stealing has set a world record (Kommersant, January 8). The feeding frenzy of embezzlement has caused massive delays in construction projects. Meanwhile, the continuing rush to make everything picture perfect and plaster over the faulty structures creates a high risk of technical failures and accidents, which could become yet another spoiler for the corrupted exploitation of sport achievements for ignoble political purposes (http://svpressa.ru/society/article/80344/?mra=1). The Olympic expenditures will not bankrupt Russia. But they do heavily contribute to fears of economic decline and underpin the perception that the best opportunity to put Russia back on track has been wasted on ludicrous self-aggrandizement.
Putin still imagines that the Olympic triumph will continue the series of his foreign policy successes opened by the game-changing initiative on Syria’s chemical disarmament. However, each score in this series—like, for instance, “dissuading” the Ukrainian leadership from signing an association agreement with the European Union by offering a surprisingly sizeable aid package—has exposed the gap between escalating ambitions and shrinking regime durability. The Sochi Games have already brought a lot of attention to shameless corruption and gross violations of human rights in Russia, all the while revealing the deterioration of state institutions. Thus, as a political prestige-boosting enterprise, the 2014 Winter Olympics are already a failure. The heavy-handedly enforced safety of the ski races and hockey matches inside the security perimeter will only further illuminate the deepening insecurity outside it. Putin’s games will probably make a special entry in the Olympic annals, but the shadows around this celebration of “Citius, Altius, Fortius” (the Olympic motto of “Faster, Higher, Stronger”) are darkening.
Read the whole story
· · · ·
The nationalism of one nation almost inevitably comes into conflict with the nationalisms of others, precisely because its celebration of its uniqueness and even superiority inevitably offends those who have the same feelings about their own but different nations. Yet, Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to position himself as a defender of traditional values at home, by promoting a nationalism of a very particular kind, as well as abroad, by allying himself with nativist, traditionalist, and nationalist groups who may have influence but do not yet have the power that would make them a threat to Moscow.
But however skillfully such a policy may be conducted, it risks blowing up in his face domestically and abroad. Domestically, it requires the imposition of a definition of Russian nationalism that many Russians find demeaning, even as they can see that the Kremlin is reaching out to nationalists in Europe and elsewhere who offer versions of nationalism for their peoples that many in the Russian Federation would find preferable. And internationally, it puts Moscow in bed with figures many in the mainstream consider extremists or worse, thus reducing the value of such links for the Russian government at least over the long term.
Like most leaders in Moscow, Putin has long recognized that the promotion of ethnic-Russian nationalism at home, however valuable it may be in the short term, represents a long-term threat to his power for two important reasons. First, it exacerbates relations between the ethnic Russians and the one quarter of the Russian Federation’s population that consists of other nations. Second, it challenges the nature of the legitimacy of his power. Nevertheless, he currently sees an opening that he believes will offer him advantages both at home and abroad.
That opening involves the promotion of what he and his regime call not nationalism but the defense of “traditional values”—a loosely defined congeries of ideas, including opposition to secularism, homosexuality and gender equality; support for hierarchical power relations; deference to authority; as well as social discipline. Putin is promoting these ideas in his speeches and through a program designed to fund efforts across the country, even though polls show that while a majority of Russians back some of these ideas, many—especially the more educated, urban and well off—do not want to live in a society defined by such values and even fear that the promotion of these values will leave them isolated from the modern West (nazaccent.ru/content/10336-v-minregione-sozdali-komissiyu-dlya-otbora.html).
But it is Putin’s effort to use these “traditional” values abroad that is both the more interesting and problematic. Angry at the West’s defense of homosexual rights, the Russian president is seeking to reach out to more traditionalist elements abroad who, he is convinced, share his distaste for the extension of rights to formerly excluded groups like gays and who, properly encouraged, will look to Moscow as a defender of their values and thus help the Russian government bring pressure on their countries. That effort, described last week in a major article in “Vedomosti” (vedomosti.ru/politics/news/21197421/eksport-duhovnyh-skrep), has already brought Moscow some strange bedfellows abroad and seems set to create more problems for Putin’s regime at home.
The program has helped Putin to impose a new and tighter ideological control on Russian media directed abroad, a control not seen since the early years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule. But more interestingly, it has led Russian officials to establish close contacts with and elicit expressions of support from some of the more notorious far-right politicians in Europe, including Marie le Pen of France, anti-immigrant activist Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, British National Party leader (and Holocaust denier) Nick Griffin, and Mateusz Piskorski, an openly anti-Semitic leader of Poland’s populist agrarian and nationalist Samoobrona (Self-Defense) party.
These nationalist politicians have been given royal treatment by Russian leaders like Dmitry Rogozin, who himself has promoted right-wing views for some time, and in response have offered Moscow the backing the Kremlin craves. These and others of their number, for example, have praised Russia’s deeply flawed electoral system as “more democratic” than that of the United States and insisted that it is no business of any country to delve into the human rights situation in another. They further expressed concern that their countries, like Russia, are being “colonized by the former colonies” and lauded Putin’s anti-gay agenda as a necessary defense of the traditional family (imrussia.org/en/russia-and-the-world/645#.UtlProbY4T1.twitter).
It is obvious that Putin sees tactical advantages in such alliances, but there are three reasons why these contacts are likely to backfire. First, such alliances will ultimately further undermine Putin’s reputation as a modernizer, thus limiting his ability to cut deals with governments actually in power. Second, these groups may agree with him on “traditional values,” but their nationalisms remain opposed to Russian nationalism. And third, many Russian nationalists inside Russia will view Putin’s cooperation with such radicals in the West as a signal that they are free to push similar ideas, a step that could trigger more violence there.
But however skillfully such a policy may be conducted, it risks blowing up in his face domestically and abroad. Domestically, it requires the imposition of a definition of Russian nationalism that many Russians find demeaning, even as they can see that the Kremlin is reaching out to nationalists in Europe and elsewhere who offer versions of nationalism for their peoples that many in the Russian Federation would find preferable. And internationally, it puts Moscow in bed with figures many in the mainstream consider extremists or worse, thus reducing the value of such links for the Russian government at least over the long term.
Like most leaders in Moscow, Putin has long recognized that the promotion of ethnic-Russian nationalism at home, however valuable it may be in the short term, represents a long-term threat to his power for two important reasons. First, it exacerbates relations between the ethnic Russians and the one quarter of the Russian Federation’s population that consists of other nations. Second, it challenges the nature of the legitimacy of his power. Nevertheless, he currently sees an opening that he believes will offer him advantages both at home and abroad.
That opening involves the promotion of what he and his regime call not nationalism but the defense of “traditional values”—a loosely defined congeries of ideas, including opposition to secularism, homosexuality and gender equality; support for hierarchical power relations; deference to authority; as well as social discipline. Putin is promoting these ideas in his speeches and through a program designed to fund efforts across the country, even though polls show that while a majority of Russians back some of these ideas, many—especially the more educated, urban and well off—do not want to live in a society defined by such values and even fear that the promotion of these values will leave them isolated from the modern West (nazaccent.ru/content/10336-v-minregione-sozdali-komissiyu-dlya-otbora.html).
But it is Putin’s effort to use these “traditional” values abroad that is both the more interesting and problematic. Angry at the West’s defense of homosexual rights, the Russian president is seeking to reach out to more traditionalist elements abroad who, he is convinced, share his distaste for the extension of rights to formerly excluded groups like gays and who, properly encouraged, will look to Moscow as a defender of their values and thus help the Russian government bring pressure on their countries. That effort, described last week in a major article in “Vedomosti” (vedomosti.ru/politics/news/21197421/eksport-duhovnyh-skrep), has already brought Moscow some strange bedfellows abroad and seems set to create more problems for Putin’s regime at home.
The program has helped Putin to impose a new and tighter ideological control on Russian media directed abroad, a control not seen since the early years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule. But more interestingly, it has led Russian officials to establish close contacts with and elicit expressions of support from some of the more notorious far-right politicians in Europe, including Marie le Pen of France, anti-immigrant activist Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, British National Party leader (and Holocaust denier) Nick Griffin, and Mateusz Piskorski, an openly anti-Semitic leader of Poland’s populist agrarian and nationalist Samoobrona (Self-Defense) party.
These nationalist politicians have been given royal treatment by Russian leaders like Dmitry Rogozin, who himself has promoted right-wing views for some time, and in response have offered Moscow the backing the Kremlin craves. These and others of their number, for example, have praised Russia’s deeply flawed electoral system as “more democratic” than that of the United States and insisted that it is no business of any country to delve into the human rights situation in another. They further expressed concern that their countries, like Russia, are being “colonized by the former colonies” and lauded Putin’s anti-gay agenda as a necessary defense of the traditional family (imrussia.org/en/russia-and-the-world/645#.UtlProbY4T1.twitter).
It is obvious that Putin sees tactical advantages in such alliances, but there are three reasons why these contacts are likely to backfire. First, such alliances will ultimately further undermine Putin’s reputation as a modernizer, thus limiting his ability to cut deals with governments actually in power. Second, these groups may agree with him on “traditional values,” but their nationalisms remain opposed to Russian nationalism. And third, many Russian nationalists inside Russia will view Putin’s cooperation with such radicals in the West as a signal that they are free to push similar ideas, a step that could trigger more violence there.
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