"Russia Watchers Blogs" bundle created by Mike Nova
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65 feeds included in this bundle
- Алекс
- Александр Кынев, политический аналитик
- Beware of Putin
- Блог Джона Байерли
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia
- Da Russophile
- RUSSIA and THE WEST - РОССИЯ и ЗАПАД
- East and West-feed
- Eurasia Lift - Terrorism/ Extremism/ Human rights
- Russia - Publication
- Publications and Events
- Russia and Eurasia Program
- The Oil and the Glory - Steve LeVine
- Robert Amsterdam
- Sean's Russia Blog
- Russia and Caucasus - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Foreign Policy BlogsRussia | Foreign Policy Blogs
- Global Voices » Russia
- Heritage Russia
- In Moscow's Shadows
- Dances With Bears
- La Russophobe
- Владимир Прибыловский
- Майкл Макфол
- Навальный
- The Onion Dome
- Ariel Cohen-Heritage Fn-Russia
- Inside Russia and Eurasia - home
- Articles: Kim Zigfeld Archives
- Putinania
- Putin Watcher
- Russia! magazine
- Global Voices по-русски
- JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST
- Russian Military Reform
- THE RUSSIAN FRONT
- Russian Defense Policy
- Russian History Blog
- RUSSIAN SPHINX
- Siberian Light
- Steve LeVine
- The Russia Monitor
- opendemocracyru
- Twitter / robertamsterdam
- Блог Олега Козловского
- WindowonEurasia
- Window on Eurasia -- New Series
- AEI.Org: Leon Aron
- Kafkasya Forumu
- Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia
- Chatham House Publications
- EU-RussiaCentre
- Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation
- North Caucasus Analysis - The Jamestown Foundation
- openDemocracy - oD Russia
- The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty
- Robert Amsterdam
- Russia Blog
- Russia: Other Points of View
- Russia Profile.org
- Soviet Roulette
- Johnson's Russia List's Facebook Wall
- Russia Blog's Facebook Wall
- Russia Profile -Russian Politics, Russian business, Russian current affairs's Facebook Wall
- Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall
via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 3/13/13
PHOTO OF THE DAY - Russian President Vladimir Putin and American actor Steven Seagal during the opening of sport center 'Sambo-70' in Moscow
Source: Alexei Nikolsky / RIA Novosti
http://rbth.ru/23825
Photo of the day 2013
Source: Alexei Nikolsky / RIA Novosti
http://rbth.ru/23825
Photo of the day 2013
via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 3/13/13
Anybody fancies some Yandex shares?
Yandex SPO going at a discount | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
Company launches new offering as shares are down, but still trading near nine month highs
Yandex SPO going at a discount | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
Company launches new offering as shares are down, but still trading near nine month highs
via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 3/13/13
UK Foreign Secretary William Hague spoke to Kommersant before the today's 2+2 meeting in London:
Russian, British ministers meet in 2+2 format in London | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
A UK–Russia meeting involving ministers of foreign affairs and defense is intended to further promote positive relations between the two countries
Russian, British ministers meet in 2+2 format in London | Russia Beyond The Headlines
rbth.ru
A UK–Russia meeting involving ministers of foreign affairs and defense is intended to further promote positive relations between the two countries
via Russia Beyond the Headlines's Facebook Wall by Russia Beyond the Headlines on 3/13/13
A few days ago something very unusual happened in the RBTH newsroom...
Harlem Shake at RBTH
Credit: rbth Read more about Russia: rbth.ru
Harlem Shake at RBTH
Credit: rbth Read more about Russia: rbth.ru
via Russian Military Reform by Dmitry Gorenburg on 3/13/13
I’m still swamped with various projects, so in the meantime, here’s another Oxford Analytica brief. This one is from mid-December…
—-
Although China and the United States have focused greater attention on Central Asia in recent years, Russia remains the dominant power in the region. Its size and the cultural, political and economic connections that remain from the Soviet period are such that Central Asian countries are reluctant to take any actions that would antagonise Moscow. For Russian leaders, Central Asia serves as a buffer zone that protects Russia’s southern border from potential threats.
Impacts:
Russia’s various initiatives in Central Asia are shaped by three interest groups with widely divergent interests that often work at cross-purposes to each other:
Throughout the last decade, Russia sought to maintain its energy-transit monopoly on the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia giving it control over transit fees. Russia’s monopoly over natural gas transit to Europe also gave it political and economic leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for domestic consumption.
The construction of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy-producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of shale gas extraction in the United States has increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in demand for natural gas.
These factors decreased Russia’s ability to set prices and to use its control of energy supply for political ends, thus reducing the importance of future Caspian pipeline transit. Russia is now likely to focus on energy production in the Caspian Sea region and has already begun to develop several oil and gas fields that it controls jointly with Kazakhstan.
Keeping China at bay
China has sought to increase its economic and political influence in Central Asia without alienating Russia for a number of reasons. For example:
Russian leaders fear that their country’s position in Central Asia is gradually being displaced as China’s political influence and economic power grow. To maintain its sway in Central Asia, Russia has focused on ‘tying’ China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member.
In the security realm, Russia has combined participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). While the SCO provides a neutral forum where Russia can discuss security and plan joint operations and exercises with China, the CSTO allows Russia to address Central Asian security issues without China’s participation. At the same time, Russia has sought to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia by setting up the Customs Union, which, in 2014, is expected to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Recent discussions concerning the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2015 are also part of the effort to cement Central Asian economic ties to Russia.
Ensuring political stability
Although most of the regimes in the region have endured for over 20 years, Central Asia is now entering a period of potential political instability.
These concerns have led Russia to provide various forms of security assistance to the region’s more vulnerable states. In the last year alone Russia has:
CONCLUSION: Russia’s security relations with Central Asian states will strengthen as they face the consequences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. At the same time, Moscow’s efforts to remain the dominant economic partner of the region’s key players will likely falter as China strengthens its position as the main recipient of Central Asian energy exports and a key supplier of imported consumer products.
—-
Although China and the United States have focused greater attention on Central Asia in recent years, Russia remains the dominant power in the region. Its size and the cultural, political and economic connections that remain from the Soviet period are such that Central Asian countries are reluctant to take any actions that would antagonise Moscow. For Russian leaders, Central Asia serves as a buffer zone that protects Russia’s southern border from potential threats.
Impacts:
- Increasing Chinese economic presence in Central Asia will curtail Russia’s efforts to limit China’s regional political influence.
- After NATO’s exit from Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states will cooperate to prevent radical Islam from destabilising the region.
- Shifting patterns of energy demand and supply will reduce Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool for political influence.
Russia’s various initiatives in Central Asia are shaped by three interest groups with widely divergent interests that often work at cross-purposes to each other:
- The military and defence industry is focused on the role of great power competition in the region; it seeks to promote arms sales and to increase Russia’s military presence.
- The energy industry focuses on securing exclusive rights to gas transit from Central Asia to Europe.
- The security services concentrate on the transnational threats to Russia from radical Islam, terrorism and drug smuggling.
Throughout the last decade, Russia sought to maintain its energy-transit monopoly on the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia giving it control over transit fees. Russia’s monopoly over natural gas transit to Europe also gave it political and economic leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for domestic consumption.
The construction of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy-producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of shale gas extraction in the United States has increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in demand for natural gas.
These factors decreased Russia’s ability to set prices and to use its control of energy supply for political ends, thus reducing the importance of future Caspian pipeline transit. Russia is now likely to focus on energy production in the Caspian Sea region and has already begun to develop several oil and gas fields that it controls jointly with Kazakhstan.
Keeping China at bay
China has sought to increase its economic and political influence in Central Asia without alienating Russia for a number of reasons. For example:
- Central Asia has become one of China’s primary energy suppliers;
- Central Asia serves as a security buffer zone between China and both Russia and the United States; and
- China seeks to prevent Uighur separatists in Xinjiang from using Central Asia as a safe haven.
Russian leaders fear that their country’s position in Central Asia is gradually being displaced as China’s political influence and economic power grow. To maintain its sway in Central Asia, Russia has focused on ‘tying’ China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member.
In the security realm, Russia has combined participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). While the SCO provides a neutral forum where Russia can discuss security and plan joint operations and exercises with China, the CSTO allows Russia to address Central Asian security issues without China’s participation. At the same time, Russia has sought to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia by setting up the Customs Union, which, in 2014, is expected to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Recent discussions concerning the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2015 are also part of the effort to cement Central Asian economic ties to Russia.
Ensuring political stability
Although most of the regimes in the region have endured for over 20 years, Central Asia is now entering a period of potential political instability.
- Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are all bracing for a potential resurgence of Islamist radicalism in the aftermath of the likely US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
- Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — both states ruled by authoritarian presidents in their mid-1970s — are highly vulnerable to succession risks.
- Kyrgyzstan is still recovering from two episodes of violent regime collapse in the last decade.
These concerns have led Russia to provide various forms of security assistance to the region’s more vulnerable states. In the last year alone Russia has:
- extended leases on military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
- sold weapons to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan;
- sought to persuade Uzbekistan to re-engage with the CSTO; and
- agreed to provide 1.3 billion dollars to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to modernise their military forces and ensure their security after the departure of Western troops.
CONCLUSION: Russia’s security relations with Central Asian states will strengthen as they face the consequences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. At the same time, Moscow’s efforts to remain the dominant economic partner of the region’s key players will likely falter as China strengthens its position as the main recipient of Central Asian energy exports and a key supplier of imported consumer products.
via Window on Eurasia -- New Series by paul goble on 3/13/13
Paul Goble
Staunton, March 13 – Ten days ago, OMON troops broke into a Surgut bar frequented by workers from Central Asia and the south Caucasus, detained some of them and forced others to shave their beards, Interfax-Religion reported yesterday, an incident that had received little notice before then but that is now sparking outrage on many Muslim websites.
The Russian news agency report is straightforward. It says that heavily armed OMON troops entered a bar near the mosque in the Khanty-Mansiisk republic city because of reports that there was a fight there, detained several for a day or two, and forced three to shave or at least trim their beards (interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=50331).
Faizulo Aminov, the head of the Tajik diaspora in Surgut, told the news service that he had spoken with Aleksandr Yerokhov, the city’s chief of police, who acknowledged that the incident had taken place, that the officers were his subordinates and offered his apologies. Yerokhov added that “the guilty party” had been “found and punished.”
But the Interfax report not only led to more reports by mainstream Russian news services (see, for example, lenta.ru/news/2013/03/12/surgut/) but also sparked interest in regional and local outlets (ura.ru/content/khanti/12-03-2013/news/1052154665.html, nr2.ru/yamal_ugra/428464.htmland sitv.ru/arhiv/news/incidents/56054/).
These outlets, while adding some interesting details – the OMON troops involved were from a unit that had carried out the attack in the Latvian capital on January 20, 1991) and the gastarbeiters involved were from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan – generally repeated the Interfax report.
Islamic and Caucasian sites, however, were more critical of what took place, featuring photographs of some of those involved which clearly show that the men involved may have been forced to trim their beards but certainly did not shave them off entirely as the Interfax report had implied (kavpolit.com/surgutskie-ciryulniki/ and ansar.ru/rfsng/2013/03/12/38560).
And these sites gave more prominence to reports that the “OMON raid” was connected with the recent wave of arrests in various places in the Russian Federation of “members of one of the extremist groups of Salafis” rather than being something of only local interest.
Consequently, this story is likely to be picked up by other media outlets in the Caucasus and Central Asia and generate anger among Muslims there and by outlets in the Russian blogosphere which are likely to present the behavior of the OMON as heroic or at least entirely justified.
Those differing interpretations in turn will only raise the temperature of relations between Muslim gastarbeiters and Russian residents and could trigger more such events elsewhere, yet another example of the way the new media are playing an ever greater role in inter-ethnic relations in the Russian Federation.
via Articles: Kim Zigfeld Archives on 3/13/13
The page http://www.americanthinker.com/kim_zigfeld/ is monitored for updates. There are no changes detected since 03/13/13 06:45:14.
via Russia on 3/13/13
The page http://www.heritage.org/places/russia-and-eurasia/russia is monitored for updates. There are no changes detected since 03/13/13 06:35:55.
via Kafkasya Forumu by CF Admin on 3/11/13
With just under a year to go until the Sochi Winter Olympic Games, Reporters Without Borders activists gathered outside the Russian embassy in Paris today and unfurled a 70-metre-long banner showing the Olympic rings transformed into a bloody knuckleduster to draw attention to the impunity largely enjoyed by those who have attacked and killed journalists in Russia.
We are doing this in order to renew our support for Russia’s journalists, bloggers and human rights defenders at a crucial moment for freedom of information in that country,” Reporters Without Borders secretary-general Christophe Deloire said.
Twenty-eight journalists have been murdered in connection with their work since 2000. The fight against impunity for those who attack and kill journalists is unfortunately still absolutely essential. But, as cracks begin to appear in the Putin regime, monstrous new laws are placing civil society under permanent threat. The authorities now have a repressive legislative arsenal ready to be used when the time comes.
“We have no desire to deny Russia the right to project the image of a proud, dynamic and modern country, but we must not be deceived by the universal consensus that surrounds Olympic events. The real events are not those that will be taking place on the ski slopes and, in this other struggle, Russian civil society has more need than ever of our help.
Mike Nova's starred items
Mike Nova's starred items
via Russia Blogs's Facebook Wall by Russia Blogs on 3/13/13
Любимый байкер Путина получил орден Почета за «патриотическое воспитание»
Глава российского мотоклуба Александр Залдостанов, более известный под прозвищем "Хирург", награжден орденом Почета.
Любимый байкер Путина получил орден Почета за «патриотическое воспитание»
Глава российского мотоклуба Александр Залдостанов, более известный под прозвищем "Хирург", награжден орденом Почета.
Любимый байкер Путина получил орден Почета за «патриотическое воспитание»
via Russia Blogs's Facebook Wall by Russia Blogs on 3/13/13
Most-Wanted Militants Reported Killed In Chechnya
Eleven suspected militants reportedly have been killed in Russia’s Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said the two most-wanted Islamic insurgent leaders — the …
Most-Wanted Militants Reported Killed In Chechnya
Eleven suspected militants reportedly have been killed in Russia’s Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said the two most-wanted Islamic insurgent leaders — the …
Most-Wanted Militants Reported Killed In Chechnya
via Навальныйon 3/13/13
Во-первых, это прекрасно, посмотрите.
Про нашу старую подругу:
http://youtu.be/JU234BNv33I
Во-вторых, (и это совершенно не прекрасно) "басманный" "судья" "Артур" "Карпов" сегодня снова доказал, что не зря его внесли в "список Магнитского" - отказал в удовлетворении нашей жалобы на СК, отказывающийся расследовать преступление Бастрыкина.
То есть, даже не в возбуждении уголовного дела отказано, а даже в проведении первичной проверки. То, что сам Бастрыкин преступлением не считает, таковым и не является, типа. Удобно.
В-третьих, (и это снова прекрасно) если ещё не читали, то обязательно прочитайте о докладе Центра проблемного анализа и государственно-управленческого проектирования, содержащего анализ прошедших выборов в ГосДуму:
Первое место заняла КПРФ с 25–30%; второе место — «Единая Россия» с 20–25%; третье место — «Справедливая Россия» с 15–20%. Реальная явка составляла около 50%. Избирательная система, установившаяся в стране, масштабно фальсифицирует результат выборов.
Второе, и это также выявлено, что уровень фальсифицируемости в этой системе устойчиво растет. Основной вид фальсификации — это переписывание протоколов на всех трех уровнях, включая уровень ЦИК. Родилось политическое явление делегитимизации центрального правящего режима, наблюдаемое уже в нескольких регионах страны. Политически можно вполне уверенно говорить, что итоги работы правящей партии оценены электоратом как негативные. Ей отказано в правящей позиции.
Важнейший момент: автор доклада С. Сулакшин - совершенно никакой там не либеральный, прозападный деятель и антипутинец.
Вовсе даже наоборот. Например, в соавторстве с Якуниным из РЖД, он был автором весьма адской книжки «Западня. Новые технологии борьбы с российской государственностью».
В 2010 Якунин в соавторстве с профессорами В.Багдасаряном и С.Сулакшиным выпустил книгу «Западня. Новые технологии борьбы с российской государственностью», ISBN 978-5-699-43369-8, изд-во ЭКСМО АЛГОРИТМ, М., 2010., тираж 3 тыс., в которой задолго до событий на Болотной площади и проспекте Сахарова (2011—2012) подробно проанализировал новые сетевые технологии разрушения российской государственности, в том числе посредством вербовки деструктивных масс через социальные сети Интернета.
отсюда
Это как раз про то, что везде ЦРУ, просовывающее через фейсбук щупальца в неокрепшие мозги россиян и заставляющее пить колу вместо кваса и кулебячьего взвара.
Так что, дядечка весьма консервативно настроенный и на протестные митинги явно не ходит.
Просто штука в том, что ЛЮБОЙ (консерватор/либерал/центрист) , кто станет анализировать выборы с научной и непредвзятой точки зрения, будет вынужден признать очевидную ведь: выборы были сфальсифицированы в такой степени, что эту Думу признать легитимной невозможно, а охламонов-единороссов, сидящих в здании на Охотном Ряду, никак нельзя считать представителями народа. Это самозванцы.
Ещё один аргумент в пользу того, что сейчас каждый честный русский (и не только) человек имеет полное моральное право брать за шкирку собак-единороссов и вытаскивать их из здания Думы, бросая под колёса многотонных грузовиков и снегоуборочной техники, мчащейся по улице. А потом пить квас и кулебячьий взвар, всмехаясь в русые усы.
Только с депутатом Валуевым так не получится. Его из Думы надо постепенно едой выманивать.
Про нашу старую подругу:
http://youtu.be/JU234BNv33I
Во-вторых, (и это совершенно не прекрасно) "басманный" "судья" "Артур" "Карпов" сегодня снова доказал, что не зря его внесли в "список Магнитского" - отказал в удовлетворении нашей жалобы на СК, отказывающийся расследовать преступление Бастрыкина.
То есть, даже не в возбуждении уголовного дела отказано, а даже в проведении первичной проверки. То, что сам Бастрыкин преступлением не считает, таковым и не является, типа. Удобно.
В-третьих, (и это снова прекрасно) если ещё не читали, то обязательно прочитайте о докладе Центра проблемного анализа и государственно-управленческого проектирования, содержащего анализ прошедших выборов в ГосДуму:
Первое место заняла КПРФ с 25–30%; второе место — «Единая Россия» с 20–25%; третье место — «Справедливая Россия» с 15–20%. Реальная явка составляла около 50%. Избирательная система, установившаяся в стране, масштабно фальсифицирует результат выборов.
Второе, и это также выявлено, что уровень фальсифицируемости в этой системе устойчиво растет. Основной вид фальсификации — это переписывание протоколов на всех трех уровнях, включая уровень ЦИК. Родилось политическое явление делегитимизации центрального правящего режима, наблюдаемое уже в нескольких регионах страны. Политически можно вполне уверенно говорить, что итоги работы правящей партии оценены электоратом как негативные. Ей отказано в правящей позиции.
Важнейший момент: автор доклада С. Сулакшин - совершенно никакой там не либеральный, прозападный деятель и антипутинец.
Вовсе даже наоборот. Например, в соавторстве с Якуниным из РЖД, он был автором весьма адской книжки «Западня. Новые технологии борьбы с российской государственностью».
В 2010 Якунин в соавторстве с профессорами В.Багдасаряном и С.Сулакшиным выпустил книгу «Западня. Новые технологии борьбы с российской государственностью», ISBN 978-5-699-43369-8, изд-во ЭКСМО АЛГОРИТМ, М., 2010., тираж 3 тыс., в которой задолго до событий на Болотной площади и проспекте Сахарова (2011—2012) подробно проанализировал новые сетевые технологии разрушения российской государственности, в том числе посредством вербовки деструктивных масс через социальные сети Интернета.
отсюда
Это как раз про то, что везде ЦРУ, просовывающее через фейсбук щупальца в неокрепшие мозги россиян и заставляющее пить колу вместо кваса и кулебячьего взвара.
Так что, дядечка весьма консервативно настроенный и на протестные митинги явно не ходит.
Просто штука в том, что ЛЮБОЙ (консерватор/либерал/центрист) , кто станет анализировать выборы с научной и непредвзятой точки зрения, будет вынужден признать очевидную ведь: выборы были сфальсифицированы в такой степени, что эту Думу признать легитимной невозможно, а охламонов-единороссов, сидящих в здании на Охотном Ряду, никак нельзя считать представителями народа. Это самозванцы.
Ещё один аргумент в пользу того, что сейчас каждый честный русский (и не только) человек имеет полное моральное право брать за шкирку собак-единороссов и вытаскивать их из здания Думы, бросая под колёса многотонных грузовиков и снегоуборочной техники, мчащейся по улице. А потом пить квас и кулебячьий взвар, всмехаясь в русые усы.
Только с депутатом Валуевым так не получится. Его из Думы надо постепенно едой выманивать.
via Навальныйon 3/11/13
В среду в Басманном суде у нас будет довольно любопытное разбирательство со Следственным комитетом из-за одного преступника.
Помните же случай, из-за которого все журналисты стояли неделю на ушах: чешский шпион и по совместительству глава СК Бастрыкин вытащил в лес (буквально) журналиста "Новой Газеты" и там угрожал убить его (тоже буквально).
Вообще, конечно, на ушах должны были стоять не только журналисты, а вообще все жители страны.
Всё-таки это глава СК и (в теории) главный борец с преступностью, коррупцией и злоупотреблениями. Его должность и красивые золотые погоны никак не предполагают, что онбудет нажираться как свинья, а потом грозить журналистам убийством.
Представьте себе ситуацию, в которой вы (будучи начальником, должностным лицом, с охраной, пистолетами и мерседесами) выводите кого-то в лесополосу и говорите ему: "Тебе отрежут голову, а ноги будут в другом месте. Никто не найдёт, а если и найдут, то я же и расследовать буду".
Если это не преступление, предусмотренное ст. 119 УК РФ, то что тогда ещё "угроза убийством"? Только уже достать пистолет и стрелять под ноги, как в фильмах про ковбоев.
Конечно, журналисту нельзя было не воспринимать эту угрозу реально, ведь общеизвестен и другой факт из жизни пана Бастрыкина:
То есть, это чувак, которому дали погоны и пистолет, и который любит вытащить пистолет, чтобы погрозить кому-то, а потом использовать погоны, чтобы отмазаться.
Ну так вот, как и положено законопослушному гражданину, узнав о совершенном преступлении, я обратился с заявлением об этом самом преступлении.
И ожидал, что заявление моё будет проверено в установленном порядке. А дальше либо возбуждение дела, либо отказ в его возбуждении.
Это было в июле прошлого года.
Было понятно, что раз преступление Бастрыкина должны расследовать подчинённые Бастрыкина, то они будут изворачиваться, как могут.
Но реальность превзошла ожидания:
То есть, не то, что даже "проверили и обнаружили, что преступления нету", а просто-таки "и регистрировать не будем, это на преступление не похоже".
Мы, конечно же, сразу пошли в суд, обжаловать такую писульку от пана Бастрыкина.
Жалоба попала к судье Карпову, фигуранту списка Магнитского, известного также тем, что активно вместе с СК стряпает "Болотное дело" и выносит незаконные решения об арестах.
Карпов этот принялся защищать Бастрыкина на свой манер: СК не регистрировал наше заявление, а Карпов тупо отказался рассматривать жалобу на действия СК. Сказал "непонятно, где именно было совершено возможное преступление, поэтому и обжалуйте его где-то, непонятно где".
Мурыжил он нас так несколько месяцев, пока 28 января 2013 мы не грохнули его в Мосгорсуде - постановление Карпова о возвращении жалобы отменили.
За эту волокиту, кстати, мы нажаловались на Карпова председателю МосГорСуда и в ККС Москвы.
А ещё записали заявление на тему вынесения заведомо неправосудного решения.
28 февраля 2013 состоялось заседание в Басманном суде у Карпова же (к сожалению) о рассмотрении жалобы по существу.
Заседание отложено на 13 марта в 09.30
Вот в среду и узнаем, является ли такая мелочь, как вывезти в лес журналиста и пообещать ему "отрежут голову, а я буду расследовать" основанием для проведения проверки в нашей стране.
Или раз всё равно "а я буду расследовать", то, значит, не может совершить преступления пан Бастрыкин на этой одной седьмой части суши.
Помните же случай, из-за которого все журналисты стояли неделю на ушах: чешский шпион и по совместительству глава СК Бастрыкин вытащил в лес (буквально) журналиста "Новой Газеты" и там угрожал убить его (тоже буквально).
Вообще, конечно, на ушах должны были стоять не только журналисты, а вообще все жители страны.
Всё-таки это глава СК и (в теории) главный борец с преступностью, коррупцией и злоупотреблениями. Его должность и красивые золотые погоны никак не предполагают, что он
Представьте себе ситуацию, в которой вы (будучи начальником, должностным лицом, с охраной, пистолетами и мерседесами) выводите кого-то в лесополосу и говорите ему: "Тебе отрежут голову, а ноги будут в другом месте. Никто не найдёт, а если и найдут, то я же и расследовать буду".
Если это не преступление, предусмотренное ст. 119 УК РФ, то что тогда ещё "угроза убийством"? Только уже достать пистолет и стрелять под ноги, как в фильмах про ковбоев.
Конечно, журналисту нельзя было не воспринимать эту угрозу реально, ведь общеизвестен и другой факт из жизни пана Бастрыкина:
То есть, это чувак, которому дали погоны и пистолет, и который любит вытащить пистолет, чтобы погрозить кому-то, а потом использовать погоны, чтобы отмазаться.
Ну так вот, как и положено законопослушному гражданину, узнав о совершенном преступлении, я обратился с заявлением об этом самом преступлении.
И ожидал, что заявление моё будет проверено в установленном порядке. А дальше либо возбуждение дела, либо отказ в его возбуждении.
Это было в июле прошлого года.
Было понятно, что раз преступление Бастрыкина должны расследовать подчинённые Бастрыкина, то они будут изворачиваться, как могут.
Но реальность превзошла ожидания:
То есть, не то, что даже "проверили и обнаружили, что преступления нету", а просто-таки "и регистрировать не будем, это на преступление не похоже".
Мы, конечно же, сразу пошли в суд, обжаловать такую писульку от пана Бастрыкина.
Жалоба попала к судье Карпову, фигуранту списка Магнитского, известного также тем, что активно вместе с СК стряпает "Болотное дело" и выносит незаконные решения об арестах.
Карпов этот принялся защищать Бастрыкина на свой манер: СК не регистрировал наше заявление, а Карпов тупо отказался рассматривать жалобу на действия СК. Сказал "непонятно, где именно было совершено возможное преступление, поэтому и обжалуйте его где-то, непонятно где".
Мурыжил он нас так несколько месяцев, пока 28 января 2013 мы не грохнули его в Мосгорсуде - постановление Карпова о возвращении жалобы отменили.
За эту волокиту, кстати, мы нажаловались на Карпова председателю МосГорСуда и в ККС Москвы.
А ещё записали заявление на тему вынесения заведомо неправосудного решения.
28 февраля 2013 состоялось заседание в Басманном суде у Карпова же (к сожалению) о рассмотрении жалобы по существу.
Заседание отложено на 13 марта в 09.30
Вот в среду и узнаем, является ли такая мелочь, как вывезти в лес журналиста и пообещать ему "отрежут голову, а я буду расследовать" основанием для проведения проверки в нашей стране.
Или раз всё равно "а я буду расследовать", то, значит, не может совершить преступления пан Бастрыкин на этой одной седьмой части суши.
via Майкл Макфолon 3/1/13
Стоит только послушать самые громкие речи на тему российско-американских отношений, как у вас может сложиться впечатление, будто русские и американцы всегда только спорят и никогда не сотрудничают. В действительности сотни, если не тысячи, россиян и американцев работают в совместных проектах, представляющих взаимный интерес. Это изучение новых возможностей для энергетики в Арктике и поиск совместных решений проблем с распространением оружия массового поражения в Северной Корее, развитие образовательных учреждений и поиск новых возможностей для бизнеса в области высоких технологий, согласование наших подходов в группе Р5+1 по Ирану и обеспечение надёжных маршрутов поставок в Афганистан, совместные культурные проекты и проведение совместных научных исследований. Идёт сотрудничество и в космосе – на международной космической станции, и в таких местах, как Биробиджан, где расположена одна из 21 школы, в которых США поддерживают программу по преподаванию английского языка для малообеспеченных школьников.
В своей собственной работе я ежедневно занимаюсь развитием сотрудничества между нашими правительствами и обществами по широкому кругу вопросов. Когда я встречаюсь с официальными лицами в Министерстве иностранных дел, или в Кремле, или в Белом доме, или же с представителями бизнеса, депутатами, или с лидерами гражданского общества в Спасо-Хаусе, я всегда обнаруживаю, что большая часть моего рабочего дня уходит на обсуждение прагматических вопросов, представляющих общий интерес для обеих сторон. И ведь почти все эти дискуссии проходят в атмосфере взаимного уважения.
У нас есть разногласия с российскими властями. Иногда мы пытаемся наладить сотрудничество в таких областях, где оно не идёт. Наши деловые начинания и контакты с общественностью также иногда ведут к разногласиям и заканчиваются ничем. Но это нормально, особенно для стран с таким диапазоном интересов, как у России и Соединённых Штатов. Такие случаи разногласий между нами привлекают основное внимание, в то время как спокойная ежедневная работа по важнейшим направлениям сотрудничества остаётся незаметной.
Чтобы обеспечить большую сбалансированность и помочь исправить возникшие недоразумения, посольство США в Москве и наши консульства в России решили посвятить месяц февраль освещению некоторых областей, в которых идёт сотрудничество между нашими странами.Каждый день в течение месяца, используя хэштэг #СШАиРФ, мы размещали в твиттере по одному сообщению, иллюстрирующему примеры такого сотрудничества. Ниже приводится полный список этих сообщений. Этот список, конечно, как и предполагалось, не является исчерпывающим. Однако я надеюсь, что он даст вам представление о широком спектре направлений сотрудничества между нашими странами. Некоторые из приведённых примеров сотрудничества хорошо известны, другие же примеры известны только тем, кто принимает непосредственное участие в этих программах. Я полагаю, что каждый пример сотрудничества сам по себе очень важен, потому что каждый такой пример сближает наши страны и наши народы, а все вместе эти примеры показывают, как много можно сделать, если работать совместно, и заставляют нас искать новые пути сотрудничества.
28 твитов о сотрудничестве:
1. США и Россия недавно отметили конец 2-го года инспекций в рамках Нового Договора по СНВ. Прекрасный пример сотрудничества! #СШАиРФ
2.@DowChemical подписали соглашение с @rosnano_ru и HCC по производству в России композитных материалов: #СШАиРФ сотрудничают по инновациям
3. #СШАиРФ 7 американских специалистов-преподавателей проводят в российских вузах программы повышения квалификации преподавателей
4. США инвестирует в энергоэффективность в РФ; $100 млн. кредит @OPICgov для Virgin Green Fund даст беспроигрышные результаты для #СШАиРФ
5. Официальные лица #СШАиРФ встретились вчера в Вашингтоне для обсуждения вступления России в @OECD.
6. Ученые из США и России проведут инвентаризацию выбросов сажи из дизельных двигателей в Мурманске #СШАиРФ
7.В Вашингтоне прошла 1-я встреча рабочей группы #СШАиРФ по взаимодействию в правоохр. сфере; большой шаг на пути к взаимному сотрудничеству
8.С/х предст-во США познакомило поставщиков продуктов из РФ с > 65 экспортерами из США: www.usda.ru #СШАиРФ
9.Школьники #СШАиРФ изучают вопросы безопасной утилизации ядерных отходов в совместном онлайн проекте: http://goo.gl/s6jzG
10. В 2012 г. @USEmbRu отправило 200 россиян в США для участия в образовательных и профессиональных программах обмена. #СШАиРФ
11. Двустор ком #СШАиРФ: @ENERGY и @MinenergoGov продвигают партнерство в сфере енергоеффективности, чистых технологий, и энергобезопасности
12. 22 января #СШАиРФ присоединились к резолюции 2087 Совбеза #ООН, осуждающей запуск ракеты #КНДР и усиливающей санкции.
13.#СШАиРФ сопредседатели ГИБАЯТ, партнерства 82 стран, готовых совместно действовать против угрозы ядерного терроризма http://go.usa.gov/4PjP
14. #СШАиРФ сотрудничают по гармонизации тех.стандартов продукции для торговли и интеграции в #ВТО. #СШАиРФ http://go.usa.gov/4EJT
15. Молодежные программы спорт.обмена: благодаря минспорту РФ и @StateDept 71 спортсмен и тренер тренировались заграницей в 2012 г. #СШАиРФ
16.@MarsCuriosity изучает #Марс с помощью прибора ДАН (Россия) http://ow.ly/htiWH в рамках научного сотрудничества #СШАиРФ в области космоса
17.На выставках в РФ в 2012 с/х торгпредство США познакомило 53 человек с новой продукцией www.usda.ru #СШАиРФ
18.#СШАиРФ вместе с межд. партнерами работают над решением регион. конфликтов. Хороший пример–сегодняшние переговоры «5+2» по Приднестровью.
19.В 2012 мы выдали на 23% больше туристических и бизнес виз в РФ по сравнению с 2011, установив таким образом рекорд всех времён. #СШАиРФ
20. Россия и США совместно оснастили все пограничные пункты РФ технологией против контрабанды ядерных материалов. #СШАиРФ
21. 4 февраля #СШАиРФ подтвердили согласие сотрудничать по поставкам в Афганистан в 2013 году для безопасности и стабильности региона.
22. Сотрудничество #СШАиРФ на борту #МКС длится более десятилетия, внося свой вклад на благо всего мирового сообщества http://ow.ly/ht1Py
23. Генконсульство США в СПб организовало визит племенных старейшин Аляски для помощи Кунсткамере в исследовании артефактов 19 века #СШАиРФ
24. #СШАиРФ 460 старшеклассников из малообеспеченных семей занимаются дополнительно английским языком в рамках программы Госдепартамента.
25. Благодаря сотрудничеству @StateDept и @MFA_Russia россияне могут получить трёхгодичную визу в США всего за $160. #СШАиРФ
26. Голоса #СШАиРФ были ключевыми по рез.1929 Совбеза #ООН по #Ирану, мы остаемся партнерами в переговорах «шестерки» по его ядер программе
27.Вместе с партнерами по Арктическому совету #СШАиРФ разработали комплексный план по реагированию и предотвращению разлива нефти в Арктике.
28.Раб.группа #СШАиРФ по морским млекопитающим встретится 2-10марта в Сиэттле для дискуссии по охране моржей и др видов http://go.usa.gov/4zDF
28 Days of Cooperation: #USandRF
If you only listened to some of the loudest rhetoric on U.S.-Russian relations, you might get the impression that Americans and Russians only argue, and never work together. In fact, dozens if not hundreds of Russians and Americans wake up every day and continue to cooperate on projects of mutual interest, be it exploring new energy prospects in the Arctic Sea, seeking joint solutions for addressing our mutual proliferation concerns about North Korea, developing educational institutions and business opportunities in the high-tech industry, coordinating our positions in the P5+1 in dealing with Iran, playing music together, ensuring that supply routes to Afghanistan continue to work efficiently, or conducting research together. Cooperation happens in outer space, as part of joint missions at the international space station; and it happens in places like Birobidjan, which is home to one of the 21 schools where the U.S. supports English-language instruction for disadvantaged teenagers.
In my own work here in Russia every day, I am developing and maintaining cooperation between our two governments and societies on a wide range of issues. Whether I am meeting with government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kremlin, and the White House, or meeting with business people, Duma deputies, and civil society leaders at Spaso House, I find that most of the hours in my day are consumed by pragmatic conversations about common interests. And almost all of these discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect.
We do have differences with the Russian government. Sometimes we pursue areas of cooperation that do not end up working out. And our business ventures and societal contacts also sometimes lead to disagreements and dead ends. That is normal, especially for two countries with the range of interests that the United States and Russia both have. Yet, these instances of differences between us seem to get the bulk of the attention, while the quiet, everyday yet vitally important spheres of cooperation go unnoticed.
To provide more balance and help correct such misperceptions, we at the U.S. Embassy and Consulates decided to dedicate the month of February to highlighting some of the many areas where our countries are cooperating. Every day in February, we posted to our Twitter feed one example of this cooperation, using the hashtag #USandRF. The complete list of these examples is below. The list is by no means exhaustive, and is not meant to be. I hope, though, that it gives you an idea of the broad spectrum of areas in which our two countries are working closely together. Some of the examples we cited on our Twitter feed are well known, but I imagine others were known only to those directly involved. I believe, though, that each and every example is important in its own way. Individually, they bring our countries and people together, and collectively, they demonstrate how much can be accomplished when we cooperate, impelling us to look for more ways of doing so.
1. The US and Russia recently marked the end of year 2 of on-site inspections under New START Treaty.Great example of cooperation! #USandRF
2.@DowChemical signed agreemnt w/@rusnano_en&HCC for production in Russia of advanced composite materials;part of #USandRF innovation agenda
3. #USandRF Currently 7 English Language Fellows are working with Russian institutions of higher education on teacher training projects in Russia
4. US invests in energy efficiency in Russia;$100mil @OPICgov loan in support of Virgin Green Fund will leverage win-win outcomes for #USandRF
5. US and Russian officials met yesterday in Washington regarding Russia’s @OECD accession #USandRF
6. US, Russian scientists inventory black carbon emissions from diesel engines in Murmansk. http://go.usa.gov/4QBF #USandRF
7.#USandRF Law Enforcement Working Group met for the 1st time in DC; a big step forward in cooperation on criminal cases of mutual interest.
8. FAS matched Russian food and cattle companies with 65+ U.S. exporters #USandRF www.usda.ru
9.Students from #USandRF jointly investigate control of nuclear spent fuel in an online project: http://goo.gl/s6jzG
10. In 2012, the US Embassy sent 200 Russians to the U.S. to participate in academic and professional exchange programs. #USandRF
11. #USandRF BPC Energy WG chaired by @ENERGY and Minenergo advances policy and partnerships in energy efficiency, clean tech, and security.
12.On Jan.22 #USandRF joined the #UNSC in passing Res2087, condemning #NorthKorea’s launch of a ballistic missile & strengthening sanctions.
13.#USandRF co-chair GICNT, a partnership of 85 nations implementing shared nuclear security principles. http://go.usa.gov/4PjP
14.Harmonizing product tech. standards–good for trade&WTO integration. @CommerceGov&RF Ministries cooperate. #USandRF http://go.usa.gov/4EJT
15. Youth Sports Exchanges: 71 high school athletes & coaches trained abroad in 2012, thanks to @StateDept & Russian MinSport. #USandRF
16. @MarsCuriosity exploring the red planet with Russia’s DAN instrument http://goo.gl/aB9Oi; continuing #USandRF space science cooperation
17. Ag Trade Office assisted 53 Russians looking for new food products at U.S. trade shows in 2012 #USandRF www.usda.ru
18. #USandRF, with intl partners, work together to solve regional conflicts. Good example-today’s 5+2 talks on Transnistria settlement.
19.In 2012, we issued 23% more visas to Russian tourists & business travelers than in 2011, setting an all time record. #USandRF
20. Russia and U.S. jointly equipped all Russian border crossings with technology to stop nuclear and radiological smuggling. #USandRF
21. On Feb4 #USandRF recommitted to cooperating on transporting supplies and personnel for security and stability of Afghanistan in 2013
22.Over a decade of #USandRF manning #ISS, our int’l cooperation bringing benefits to all mankind http://ow.ly/ht106
23. St Pete Consulate arranges visit by Alaskan tribal elders to assist Kunstkamera research rare 19th century Alaskan artifacts.#USandRF
24.#USandRF The US Government offers access to extra English instruction to around 460 Russian teenagers from disadvantaged families
25. Thanks to @StateDept & @MFA_Russia cooperation, Russians can now apply for a 3-year US visa for business/tourism for just $160. #USandRF
26. #USandRF supported key vote #UNSC Res1929 on #Iran and continue to be partners in the P5+1 talks
27.With our partners on the Arctic Council, #USandRF developed a comprehensive oil spill prevention and response plan for the Arctic.
28. #USandRF Marine Mammal Working Group meets March 2-10 in Seattle to protect walrus, sea otter, other species http://go.usa.gov/4zDF
В своей собственной работе я ежедневно занимаюсь развитием сотрудничества между нашими правительствами и обществами по широкому кругу вопросов. Когда я встречаюсь с официальными лицами в Министерстве иностранных дел, или в Кремле, или в Белом доме, или же с представителями бизнеса, депутатами, или с лидерами гражданского общества в Спасо-Хаусе, я всегда обнаруживаю, что большая часть моего рабочего дня уходит на обсуждение прагматических вопросов, представляющих общий интерес для обеих сторон. И ведь почти все эти дискуссии проходят в атмосфере взаимного уважения.
У нас есть разногласия с российскими властями. Иногда мы пытаемся наладить сотрудничество в таких областях, где оно не идёт. Наши деловые начинания и контакты с общественностью также иногда ведут к разногласиям и заканчиваются ничем. Но это нормально, особенно для стран с таким диапазоном интересов, как у России и Соединённых Штатов. Такие случаи разногласий между нами привлекают основное внимание, в то время как спокойная ежедневная работа по важнейшим направлениям сотрудничества остаётся незаметной.
Чтобы обеспечить большую сбалансированность и помочь исправить возникшие недоразумения, посольство США в Москве и наши консульства в России решили посвятить месяц февраль освещению некоторых областей, в которых идёт сотрудничество между нашими странами.Каждый день в течение месяца, используя хэштэг #СШАиРФ, мы размещали в твиттере по одному сообщению, иллюстрирующему примеры такого сотрудничества. Ниже приводится полный список этих сообщений. Этот список, конечно, как и предполагалось, не является исчерпывающим. Однако я надеюсь, что он даст вам представление о широком спектре направлений сотрудничества между нашими странами. Некоторые из приведённых примеров сотрудничества хорошо известны, другие же примеры известны только тем, кто принимает непосредственное участие в этих программах. Я полагаю, что каждый пример сотрудничества сам по себе очень важен, потому что каждый такой пример сближает наши страны и наши народы, а все вместе эти примеры показывают, как много можно сделать, если работать совместно, и заставляют нас искать новые пути сотрудничества.
28 твитов о сотрудничестве:
1. США и Россия недавно отметили конец 2-го года инспекций в рамках Нового Договора по СНВ. Прекрасный пример сотрудничества! #СШАиРФ
2.@DowChemical подписали соглашение с @rosnano_ru и HCC по производству в России композитных материалов: #СШАиРФ сотрудничают по инновациям
3. #СШАиРФ 7 американских специалистов-преподавателей проводят в российских вузах программы повышения квалификации преподавателей
4. США инвестирует в энергоэффективность в РФ; $100 млн. кредит @OPICgov для Virgin Green Fund даст беспроигрышные результаты для #СШАиРФ
5. Официальные лица #СШАиРФ встретились вчера в Вашингтоне для обсуждения вступления России в @OECD.
6. Ученые из США и России проведут инвентаризацию выбросов сажи из дизельных двигателей в Мурманске #СШАиРФ
7.В Вашингтоне прошла 1-я встреча рабочей группы #СШАиРФ по взаимодействию в правоохр. сфере; большой шаг на пути к взаимному сотрудничеству
8.С/х предст-во США познакомило поставщиков продуктов из РФ с > 65 экспортерами из США: www.usda.ru #СШАиРФ
9.Школьники #СШАиРФ изучают вопросы безопасной утилизации ядерных отходов в совместном онлайн проекте: http://goo.gl/s6jzG
10. В 2012 г. @USEmbRu отправило 200 россиян в США для участия в образовательных и профессиональных программах обмена. #СШАиРФ
11. Двустор ком #СШАиРФ: @ENERGY и @MinenergoGov продвигают партнерство в сфере енергоеффективности, чистых технологий, и энергобезопасности
12. 22 января #СШАиРФ присоединились к резолюции 2087 Совбеза #ООН, осуждающей запуск ракеты #КНДР и усиливающей санкции.
13.#СШАиРФ сопредседатели ГИБАЯТ, партнерства 82 стран, готовых совместно действовать против угрозы ядерного терроризма http://go.usa.gov/4PjP
14. #СШАиРФ сотрудничают по гармонизации тех.стандартов продукции для торговли и интеграции в #ВТО. #СШАиРФ http://go.usa.gov/4EJT
15. Молодежные программы спорт.обмена: благодаря минспорту РФ и @StateDept 71 спортсмен и тренер тренировались заграницей в 2012 г. #СШАиРФ
16.@MarsCuriosity изучает #Марс с помощью прибора ДАН (Россия) http://ow.ly/htiWH в рамках научного сотрудничества #СШАиРФ в области космоса
17.На выставках в РФ в 2012 с/х торгпредство США познакомило 53 человек с новой продукцией www.usda.ru #СШАиРФ
18.#СШАиРФ вместе с межд. партнерами работают над решением регион. конфликтов. Хороший пример–сегодняшние переговоры «5+2» по Приднестровью.
19.В 2012 мы выдали на 23% больше туристических и бизнес виз в РФ по сравнению с 2011, установив таким образом рекорд всех времён. #СШАиРФ
20. Россия и США совместно оснастили все пограничные пункты РФ технологией против контрабанды ядерных материалов. #СШАиРФ
21. 4 февраля #СШАиРФ подтвердили согласие сотрудничать по поставкам в Афганистан в 2013 году для безопасности и стабильности региона.
22. Сотрудничество #СШАиРФ на борту #МКС длится более десятилетия, внося свой вклад на благо всего мирового сообщества http://ow.ly/ht1Py
23. Генконсульство США в СПб организовало визит племенных старейшин Аляски для помощи Кунсткамере в исследовании артефактов 19 века #СШАиРФ
24. #СШАиРФ 460 старшеклассников из малообеспеченных семей занимаются дополнительно английским языком в рамках программы Госдепартамента.
25. Благодаря сотрудничеству @StateDept и @MFA_Russia россияне могут получить трёхгодичную визу в США всего за $160. #СШАиРФ
26. Голоса #СШАиРФ были ключевыми по рез.1929 Совбеза #ООН по #Ирану, мы остаемся партнерами в переговорах «шестерки» по его ядер программе
27.Вместе с партнерами по Арктическому совету #СШАиРФ разработали комплексный план по реагированию и предотвращению разлива нефти в Арктике.
28.Раб.группа #СШАиРФ по морским млекопитающим встретится 2-10марта в Сиэттле для дискуссии по охране моржей и др видов http://go.usa.gov/4zDF
28 Days of Cooperation: #USandRF
If you only listened to some of the loudest rhetoric on U.S.-Russian relations, you might get the impression that Americans and Russians only argue, and never work together. In fact, dozens if not hundreds of Russians and Americans wake up every day and continue to cooperate on projects of mutual interest, be it exploring new energy prospects in the Arctic Sea, seeking joint solutions for addressing our mutual proliferation concerns about North Korea, developing educational institutions and business opportunities in the high-tech industry, coordinating our positions in the P5+1 in dealing with Iran, playing music together, ensuring that supply routes to Afghanistan continue to work efficiently, or conducting research together. Cooperation happens in outer space, as part of joint missions at the international space station; and it happens in places like Birobidjan, which is home to one of the 21 schools where the U.S. supports English-language instruction for disadvantaged teenagers.
In my own work here in Russia every day, I am developing and maintaining cooperation between our two governments and societies on a wide range of issues. Whether I am meeting with government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kremlin, and the White House, or meeting with business people, Duma deputies, and civil society leaders at Spaso House, I find that most of the hours in my day are consumed by pragmatic conversations about common interests. And almost all of these discussions take place in an atmosphere of mutual respect.
We do have differences with the Russian government. Sometimes we pursue areas of cooperation that do not end up working out. And our business ventures and societal contacts also sometimes lead to disagreements and dead ends. That is normal, especially for two countries with the range of interests that the United States and Russia both have. Yet, these instances of differences between us seem to get the bulk of the attention, while the quiet, everyday yet vitally important spheres of cooperation go unnoticed.
To provide more balance and help correct such misperceptions, we at the U.S. Embassy and Consulates decided to dedicate the month of February to highlighting some of the many areas where our countries are cooperating. Every day in February, we posted to our Twitter feed one example of this cooperation, using the hashtag #USandRF. The complete list of these examples is below. The list is by no means exhaustive, and is not meant to be. I hope, though, that it gives you an idea of the broad spectrum of areas in which our two countries are working closely together. Some of the examples we cited on our Twitter feed are well known, but I imagine others were known only to those directly involved. I believe, though, that each and every example is important in its own way. Individually, they bring our countries and people together, and collectively, they demonstrate how much can be accomplished when we cooperate, impelling us to look for more ways of doing so.
1. The US and Russia recently marked the end of year 2 of on-site inspections under New START Treaty.Great example of cooperation! #USandRF
2.@DowChemical signed agreemnt w/@rusnano_en&HCC for production in Russia of advanced composite materials;part of #USandRF innovation agenda
3. #USandRF Currently 7 English Language Fellows are working with Russian institutions of higher education on teacher training projects in Russia
4. US invests in energy efficiency in Russia;$100mil @OPICgov loan in support of Virgin Green Fund will leverage win-win outcomes for #USandRF
5. US and Russian officials met yesterday in Washington regarding Russia’s @OECD accession #USandRF
6. US, Russian scientists inventory black carbon emissions from diesel engines in Murmansk. http://go.usa.gov/4QBF #USandRF
7.#USandRF Law Enforcement Working Group met for the 1st time in DC; a big step forward in cooperation on criminal cases of mutual interest.
8. FAS matched Russian food and cattle companies with 65+ U.S. exporters #USandRF www.usda.ru
9.Students from #USandRF jointly investigate control of nuclear spent fuel in an online project: http://goo.gl/s6jzG
10. In 2012, the US Embassy sent 200 Russians to the U.S. to participate in academic and professional exchange programs. #USandRF
11. #USandRF BPC Energy WG chaired by @ENERGY and Minenergo advances policy and partnerships in energy efficiency, clean tech, and security.
12.On Jan.22 #USandRF joined the #UNSC in passing Res2087, condemning #NorthKorea’s launch of a ballistic missile & strengthening sanctions.
13.#USandRF co-chair GICNT, a partnership of 85 nations implementing shared nuclear security principles. http://go.usa.gov/4PjP
14.Harmonizing product tech. standards–good for trade&WTO integration. @CommerceGov&RF Ministries cooperate. #USandRF http://go.usa.gov/4EJT
15. Youth Sports Exchanges: 71 high school athletes & coaches trained abroad in 2012, thanks to @StateDept & Russian MinSport. #USandRF
16. @MarsCuriosity exploring the red planet with Russia’s DAN instrument http://goo.gl/aB9Oi; continuing #USandRF space science cooperation
17. Ag Trade Office assisted 53 Russians looking for new food products at U.S. trade shows in 2012 #USandRF www.usda.ru
18. #USandRF, with intl partners, work together to solve regional conflicts. Good example-today’s 5+2 talks on Transnistria settlement.
19.In 2012, we issued 23% more visas to Russian tourists & business travelers than in 2011, setting an all time record. #USandRF
20. Russia and U.S. jointly equipped all Russian border crossings with technology to stop nuclear and radiological smuggling. #USandRF
21. On Feb4 #USandRF recommitted to cooperating on transporting supplies and personnel for security and stability of Afghanistan in 2013
22.Over a decade of #USandRF manning #ISS, our int’l cooperation bringing benefits to all mankind http://ow.ly/ht106
23. St Pete Consulate arranges visit by Alaskan tribal elders to assist Kunstkamera research rare 19th century Alaskan artifacts.#USandRF
24.#USandRF The US Government offers access to extra English instruction to around 460 Russian teenagers from disadvantaged families
25. Thanks to @StateDept & @MFA_Russia cooperation, Russians can now apply for a 3-year US visa for business/tourism for just $160. #USandRF
26. #USandRF supported key vote #UNSC Res1929 on #Iran and continue to be partners in the P5+1 talks
27.With our partners on the Arctic Council, #USandRF developed a comprehensive oil spill prevention and response plan for the Arctic.
28. #USandRF Marine Mammal Working Group meets March 2-10 in Seattle to protect walrus, sea otter, other species http://go.usa.gov/4zDF
via Блог Олега Козловскогоon 3/11/13
Я, впрочем, − продолжал болтать Коровьев, − знавал людей, не имевших никакого представления не только о пятом измерении, но и вообще ни о чем не имевших никакого представления и тем не менее проделывавших чудеса в смысле расширения своего помещения. Так, например, один горожанин, как мне рассказывали, получив трехкомнатную квартиру на Земляном валу, без всякого пятого измерения и прочих вещей, от которых ум заходит за разум, мгновенно превратил ее в четырехкомнатную, разделив одну из комнат пополам перегородкой. Засим эту он обменял на две отдельных квартиры в разных районах Москвы − одну в три и другую в две комнаты. Согласитесь, что их стало пять. Трехкомнатную он обменял на две отдельных по две комнаты и стал обладателем, как вы сами видите, шести комнат, правда, рассеянных в полном беспорядке по всей Москве. Он уже собирался произвести последний и самый блистательный вольт, поместив в газете объявление, что меняет шесть комнат в разных районах Москвы на одну пятикомнатную квартиру на Земляном валу, как его деятельность, по не зависящим от него причинам, прекратилась. Возможно, что он сейчас и имеет какую-нибудь комнату, но только, смею вас уверить, что не в Москве.
via Алексon 2/12/13
http://grani.ru/Society/Xenophobia/m.211482.html
Огромное спасибо участникам за принципиальность и поддержку... В позиции: "За нашу и вашу свободу" первая часть - ожидаема и естественна, а вторая заслуживает особого уважения. Любой из нас прекрасно знает, что выступать за равенство для ЛГБТ-людей, за их гражданские права в России - означает подставлять себя под потоки грязи, оскорблений и агрессии.
Для гея бороться с гомофобией - естественная вещь. Но не каждый, кто относит себя к "большинству", готов оказаться в среде гомофобной ненависти. Поэтому (ещё раз) респект авторам проекта за человечную позицию.
К сожалению, гомофобия в России - часть государственной политики. Власть нуждается в церкви, в качестве идеологического института, который обеспечил бы "вертикали" легитимность. Гомофобия - это плата, которую режим платит РПЦ (в которой сегодня особенно нуждается). К тому же, травля "меньшинств" - отличный метод консолидации путинского "большинства" против "внутреннего врага"
Когда-то борьба с расизмом в Штатах была общей задачей национального выживания; сегодня в России борьба с гомофобией - это не только борьба за равные права для "меньшинств", но одновременно (что важнее) и борьба за право людей из "большинства" оставаться людьми...
via Алексon 2/18/13
Сначала цитата. "...Меня очень поэтому несколько вещей напрягает. Во-первых, это агрессивное требование равенства со стороны современного ЛГБТ-сообщества, которое фактически требует от государства того, что не может им обеспечить природа. Вот, как-то Эпаминонд и Пелопид не выходили друг за друга замуж...".
Занятная логика. А борьба суфражисток Латынину не напрягает? В конце-концов, женщины древней Эллады не требовали избирательных прав и политического голоса были лишены. Как и Эпаминонд с Пелопидом - брачных возможностей. Возьмём это за образец?
Я бы предложил Латыниной пойти дальше и усомниться в равенстве для инвалидов. Им природа тоже не может обеспечить физического равенства, поэтому давайте отберём у них и равенство правовое: запретим браки, например. Или уберём пандусы с улиц: если природа тебя чего-то лишила, то задача государства - никак этому не противоречить.
Во-вторых, чего именно "природа" "не может обеспечить" гей-парам? Полноценного брачного союза? Рождения детей? Не очень понятно.
Вообще, идея Латыниной, что государство должно следовать за мифической "природой" и выводить право из природной данности, - "напрягает" меня не меньше. Уж слишком дико это звучит в устах современного журналиста.
http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1012634-echo/
Занятная логика. А борьба суфражисток Латынину не напрягает? В конце-концов, женщины древней Эллады не требовали избирательных прав и политического голоса были лишены. Как и Эпаминонд с Пелопидом - брачных возможностей. Возьмём это за образец?
Я бы предложил Латыниной пойти дальше и усомниться в равенстве для инвалидов. Им природа тоже не может обеспечить физического равенства, поэтому давайте отберём у них и равенство правовое: запретим браки, например. Или уберём пандусы с улиц: если природа тебя чего-то лишила, то задача государства - никак этому не противоречить.
Во-вторых, чего именно "природа" "не может обеспечить" гей-парам? Полноценного брачного союза? Рождения детей? Не очень понятно.
Вообще, идея Латыниной, что государство должно следовать за мифической "природой" и выводить право из природной данности, - "напрягает" меня не меньше. Уж слишком дико это звучит в устах современного журналиста.
http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1012634-echo/
via Алексon 3/6/13
Для блога на "Эхе" - http://echo.msk.ru/blog/alexalexxx/1025538-echo/
Корреспондент "Эха" Алексей Голубев решил горячо вступиться за консервативное "большинство" и его право на гомофобию. ("Просвети меня. О геях, православных и православных геях" - http://echo.msk.ru/blog/al_golubev/1025026-echo/). Разумеется, самое время, - поскольку государство с его гомофобной политикой (очевидно) не справляется с задачей без помощи нашего автора...
Хочу поблагодарить Алексея Голубева: у него получился прекрасный символичный текст, который смело можно назвать "энциклопедией гомофобных штампов". Все стереотипы и мифы "консервативного большинства", касающиеся гей-сообщества, автор умудрился "впихнуть" в свою статью. Которая, впрочем, рисует не столько образ ЛГБТ, сколько даёт представление о типаже гомофоба (с подтасовками, оскорблениями, ложью и пристрастием к "постельному" взгляду на жизнь). Попробуем разгрести пласты "аргументации".
Тема "нормы", разумеется, становится основной, поскольку под ненависть к "гомосекам" должна быть подведена хоть какая-то научно-медицинская база. Современному российскому гомофобу всегда чрезвычайно важно придать обоснованию дискриминации ЛГБТ-сообщества цивилизованный, наукообразный формат.
Здесь всё очень просто: рамки медицинской "нормы" определяются бытовым решением большинства. Это компетенция "колхозного схода", РПЦ, "православного большинства", "родительского собрания", - но никак не медицинской науки. "Большинство" (видимо) не нуждается в нормативах ВОЗ, МКБ-10 ("Международной классификации болезней") или в нормативах "Всемирной ассоциации психиатров" (включая Россию). "Я не считаю гомосексуальность нормальной" - этого вполне достаточно для изобретения "патологий" и самостоятельной постановки "диагноза".
Хотя диагностика "патологий" с позиций церкви, "греховности" и "Левита" - такой же нонсенс, как и суждение о "бозоне Хиггса" с точки зрения Ветхого Завета.
Гомофобу не важно, что депатологизация гей-ориентации в медицинской науке - это событие прошлого века. А МКБ-10 (базовый документ ВОЗ для всех стран-членов организации) - квалифицирует гомосексуальность и бисексуальность как "варианты сексуальной нормы".
Разумеется, г-н Голубев может считать гомосексуальность чем угодно: "извращением", "патологией", "ненормальностью" (флаг ему в руки). Важно только честно оговаривать свою позицию: "на мой ЛИЧНЫЙ взгляд, который не совпадает со стандартами современной медицины".
Это честнее, чем играть в "доктора", рассуждать о "девиациях" и изобретать параллели с "зоофилией", "педофилией" и прочими патологиями, не будучи компетентным в медицине.
Странная вещь: автор почему-то не планирует вмешиваться в нормативы современной хирургии, не отрицает томографии, генного анализа или антибиотиков, он желает лечиться по стандартам ХХI века, но познания о сексуальной ориентации своих сограждан он будет упорно черпать из советского учебника по психиатрии 1953 года издания.
И здесь мы сталкиваемся со второй поразительной особенностью гомофобной аргументации. Для гомофоба сексуальная ориентация - это исключительно сфера "постели" и "секса".
Словно речь идёт не о людях, не о душе и не о чувствах друг к другу, а о "случке" и "животном сексе". Поразительное умение гомофоба сводить мир человеческих чувств к "постели" и "телесному низу" - постоянно поражает воображение. Если г-н Голубев не видит принципиальной разницы между скотами и людьми, - сравнивая гомосексуальность с "зоофилией", - то я ему искренне сочувствую.
Спешу разочаровать г-на Голубева: чувства однополых партнёров друг к другу ничем не отличаются от чувств гетеросексуалов. А социальная значимость одних ничем не отличается от ценности других. Абсолютно ничем. Природа человеческих чувств едина, - разнятся только сексуальные техники.
Но кроме секса (удивлю гомофоба) в человеке есть ещё много чего, - и хорошо бы не забывать, что ЛГБТ-граждане - прежде всего люди, с правами, чувствами, социальными проблемами и человеческим достоинством. Крики о том, что российское гей-сообщество "тащит постельные темы на улицу" - банальная ложь тех, для которых семья, любовь и семейный союз (разнополый или однополый) исчерпывается "постелью".
Любой семейный союз двух людей (а также их право на любовь) - не может быть "социальной тайной", которой стыдятся на улице или в публичном пространстве. Любая секретность в вопросах брака - унизительна для человеческого достоинства. А именно секретности и требуют гомофобы.
Как типичный представитель гомофобной мифологии, Голубев "не понимает", что борьба ЛГБТ за РАВЕНСТВО прав - это не "сексуальная", а СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ задача. Впрочем, если вместо человеческих проблем гей-сообщества автору сподручнее рассуждать про "собак", "случку" и "постель"- я глубоко сочувствую уровню его убогого взгляда на мир.
Наконец, пора напомнить автору, что врать нехорошо. Излюбленной темой гомофоба в России является тезис о том, что "никто у нас гомосеков не притесняет". (И вообще, "что им надо? Каких ещё прав не хватает?")
Голубев может не знать, - тогда я напомню, что у гей-сообщества нет политических прав на свободу собраний (гарантированных 31 статьёй Конституции). Исключительно все мирные акции гей-активистов (выходивших с социальными лозунгами и радужными флагами) запрещались в Москве с 2006 года. Шествия, пикеты, собрания, кинофестивали - под запретом. Причём речь идёт о гражданских правах людей, а не о "парадах" и "карнавалах" (фотографии которых так фальшиво приведены в посте Голубева). Лучше бы он опубликовал российские кадры разгонов и избиений мирных акций, когда сам факт принадлежности к ЛГБТ - достаточное условие для ареста.
Голубев против права "меньшинств" на мирные собрания? За отмену Конституции для одной социальной группы? Тогда и надо об этом прямо говорить: на геев гражданские права не распространяются. Это будет честнее, чем городить дешёвую ложь про отсутствие дискриминации. Гомофобы (конечно) имеют право на собственную позицию, - просто не надо при этом врать.
И последнее, в виде пожелания гомофобному комьюнити (называющему себя "подавляющим большинством"). Хватит тешить себя фантазиями про "постели" и "секс". ЛГБТ-активисты требуют только одного: соблюдайте вашу Конституцию, уважайте гражданские права ВСЕХ социальных групп, прекратите дискриминацию по признаку ориентации.
Вот и всё. А про "интим" поговорим дома. Сексуальная ориентация - это не "постельный", а СОЦИАЛЬНЫЙ феномен (как и для любого вменяемого гетеросексуала, - брак, семья и любовь - это не только "секс", но и органичная часть социальной жизни), вот и соблюдайте РАВЕНСТВО социальных прав. Минимальное требование, не так ли?
Если гетеросексуалы живут в браке и играют свадьбы публично, если они появляются на публике в качестве супругов (а не прячут свой "грязный секс" в стенах квартиры), то и ЛГБТ-граждане не должны делать из своих браков социальную тайну.
Отлично, что гражданское общество в России всё лучше понимает позорность гомофобной ненависти к согражданам. (Как и лжи в их адрес). Проекты "Афиши", "Граней.ру", и другие важные инициативы СМИ по вытеснению гомофобии из области нормального человеческого общения, - это не только защита "меньшинств" от лжи и агрессии, - но и защита "большинства". Точно так же, как движение в Штатах за равенство чернокожих - спасало не только их, но и американское общество в целом - от печального расистского удела.
Ну а судьба идейных гомофобов очевидна: продолжать врать про "патологию", выдумывать "диагнозы", путать чувства людей с "зоофилией", плевать на человеческое достоинство и всячески лгать, что у нас "никого не притесняют".
Корреспондент "Эха" Алексей Голубев решил горячо вступиться за консервативное "большинство" и его право на гомофобию. ("Просвети меня. О геях, православных и православных геях" - http://echo.msk.ru/blog/al_golubev/1025026-echo/). Разумеется, самое время, - поскольку государство с его гомофобной политикой (очевидно) не справляется с задачей без помощи нашего автора...
Хочу поблагодарить Алексея Голубева: у него получился прекрасный символичный текст, который смело можно назвать "энциклопедией гомофобных штампов". Все стереотипы и мифы "консервативного большинства", касающиеся гей-сообщества, автор умудрился "впихнуть" в свою статью. Которая, впрочем, рисует не столько образ ЛГБТ, сколько даёт представление о типаже гомофоба (с подтасовками, оскорблениями, ложью и пристрастием к "постельному" взгляду на жизнь). Попробуем разгрести пласты "аргументации".
Тема "нормы", разумеется, становится основной, поскольку под ненависть к "гомосекам" должна быть подведена хоть какая-то научно-медицинская база. Современному российскому гомофобу всегда чрезвычайно важно придать обоснованию дискриминации ЛГБТ-сообщества цивилизованный, наукообразный формат.
Здесь всё очень просто: рамки медицинской "нормы" определяются бытовым решением большинства. Это компетенция "колхозного схода", РПЦ, "православного большинства", "родительского собрания", - но никак не медицинской науки. "Большинство" (видимо) не нуждается в нормативах ВОЗ, МКБ-10 ("Международной классификации болезней") или в нормативах "Всемирной ассоциации психиатров" (включая Россию). "Я не считаю гомосексуальность нормальной" - этого вполне достаточно для изобретения "патологий" и самостоятельной постановки "диагноза".
Хотя диагностика "патологий" с позиций церкви, "греховности" и "Левита" - такой же нонсенс, как и суждение о "бозоне Хиггса" с точки зрения Ветхого Завета.
Гомофобу не важно, что депатологизация гей-ориентации в медицинской науке - это событие прошлого века. А МКБ-10 (базовый документ ВОЗ для всех стран-членов организации) - квалифицирует гомосексуальность и бисексуальность как "варианты сексуальной нормы".
Разумеется, г-н Голубев может считать гомосексуальность чем угодно: "извращением", "патологией", "ненормальностью" (флаг ему в руки). Важно только честно оговаривать свою позицию: "на мой ЛИЧНЫЙ взгляд, который не совпадает со стандартами современной медицины".
Это честнее, чем играть в "доктора", рассуждать о "девиациях" и изобретать параллели с "зоофилией", "педофилией" и прочими патологиями, не будучи компетентным в медицине.
Странная вещь: автор почему-то не планирует вмешиваться в нормативы современной хирургии, не отрицает томографии, генного анализа или антибиотиков, он желает лечиться по стандартам ХХI века, но познания о сексуальной ориентации своих сограждан он будет упорно черпать из советского учебника по психиатрии 1953 года издания.
И здесь мы сталкиваемся со второй поразительной особенностью гомофобной аргументации. Для гомофоба сексуальная ориентация - это исключительно сфера "постели" и "секса".
Словно речь идёт не о людях, не о душе и не о чувствах друг к другу, а о "случке" и "животном сексе". Поразительное умение гомофоба сводить мир человеческих чувств к "постели" и "телесному низу" - постоянно поражает воображение. Если г-н Голубев не видит принципиальной разницы между скотами и людьми, - сравнивая гомосексуальность с "зоофилией", - то я ему искренне сочувствую.
Спешу разочаровать г-на Голубева: чувства однополых партнёров друг к другу ничем не отличаются от чувств гетеросексуалов. А социальная значимость одних ничем не отличается от ценности других. Абсолютно ничем. Природа человеческих чувств едина, - разнятся только сексуальные техники.
Но кроме секса (удивлю гомофоба) в человеке есть ещё много чего, - и хорошо бы не забывать, что ЛГБТ-граждане - прежде всего люди, с правами, чувствами, социальными проблемами и человеческим достоинством. Крики о том, что российское гей-сообщество "тащит постельные темы на улицу" - банальная ложь тех, для которых семья, любовь и семейный союз (разнополый или однополый) исчерпывается "постелью".
Любой семейный союз двух людей (а также их право на любовь) - не может быть "социальной тайной", которой стыдятся на улице или в публичном пространстве. Любая секретность в вопросах брака - унизительна для человеческого достоинства. А именно секретности и требуют гомофобы.
Как типичный представитель гомофобной мифологии, Голубев "не понимает", что борьба ЛГБТ за РАВЕНСТВО прав - это не "сексуальная", а СОЦИАЛЬНАЯ задача. Впрочем, если вместо человеческих проблем гей-сообщества автору сподручнее рассуждать про "собак", "случку" и "постель"- я глубоко сочувствую уровню его убогого взгляда на мир.
Наконец, пора напомнить автору, что врать нехорошо. Излюбленной темой гомофоба в России является тезис о том, что "никто у нас гомосеков не притесняет". (И вообще, "что им надо? Каких ещё прав не хватает?")
Голубев может не знать, - тогда я напомню, что у гей-сообщества нет политических прав на свободу собраний (гарантированных 31 статьёй Конституции). Исключительно все мирные акции гей-активистов (выходивших с социальными лозунгами и радужными флагами) запрещались в Москве с 2006 года. Шествия, пикеты, собрания, кинофестивали - под запретом. Причём речь идёт о гражданских правах людей, а не о "парадах" и "карнавалах" (фотографии которых так фальшиво приведены в посте Голубева). Лучше бы он опубликовал российские кадры разгонов и избиений мирных акций, когда сам факт принадлежности к ЛГБТ - достаточное условие для ареста.
Голубев против права "меньшинств" на мирные собрания? За отмену Конституции для одной социальной группы? Тогда и надо об этом прямо говорить: на геев гражданские права не распространяются. Это будет честнее, чем городить дешёвую ложь про отсутствие дискриминации. Гомофобы (конечно) имеют право на собственную позицию, - просто не надо при этом врать.
И последнее, в виде пожелания гомофобному комьюнити (называющему себя "подавляющим большинством"). Хватит тешить себя фантазиями про "постели" и "секс". ЛГБТ-активисты требуют только одного: соблюдайте вашу Конституцию, уважайте гражданские права ВСЕХ социальных групп, прекратите дискриминацию по признаку ориентации.
Вот и всё. А про "интим" поговорим дома. Сексуальная ориентация - это не "постельный", а СОЦИАЛЬНЫЙ феномен (как и для любого вменяемого гетеросексуала, - брак, семья и любовь - это не только "секс", но и органичная часть социальной жизни), вот и соблюдайте РАВЕНСТВО социальных прав. Минимальное требование, не так ли?
Если гетеросексуалы живут в браке и играют свадьбы публично, если они появляются на публике в качестве супругов (а не прячут свой "грязный секс" в стенах квартиры), то и ЛГБТ-граждане не должны делать из своих браков социальную тайну.
Отлично, что гражданское общество в России всё лучше понимает позорность гомофобной ненависти к согражданам. (Как и лжи в их адрес). Проекты "Афиши", "Граней.ру", и другие важные инициативы СМИ по вытеснению гомофобии из области нормального человеческого общения, - это не только защита "меньшинств" от лжи и агрессии, - но и защита "большинства". Точно так же, как движение в Штатах за равенство чернокожих - спасало не только их, но и американское общество в целом - от печального расистского удела.
Ну а судьба идейных гомофобов очевидна: продолжать врать про "патологию", выдумывать "диагнозы", путать чувства людей с "зоофилией", плевать на человеческое достоинство и всячески лгать, что у нас "никого не притесняют".
Mike Nova's starred items
via Window on Eurasia -- New Series by paul goble on 3/11/13
Paul Goble
Staunton, March 11 – The “main mistake” of the Russian opposition in the past has been its focus that on Moscow rather than on the regions, but clashes between demonstrators and the authorities in Russia’s regions are prompting them to redirect their attention, a shift that will generate “a wave of effective actions,” according to one activist.
Writing for the Kasparov.ru site on Saturday, Igor Artyomov, head of the Russia Be Liberated by Our Forces movement and a member of the opposition’s coordinating council, notes that “the most impressive event” of the last weekend was a case of popular activism provoked by the authorities in Novokuznetsk (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=513842C35E1F1).
Because of the over-reaction of the authorities, he continues, many people who are in every way “very far from Russian nationalism and Orthodoxy” were drawn “into the ranks of the protesters” whose initial cause was opposition to the construction of a third mosque in that western Siberian city.
Given that spring and a new protest season are coming, Artyomov continues, opposition leaders have expressed two points of view on how they should proceed. According to the first, they will simply have to wait for “the next rise” in protest activity. But according to the second, they must bring into Moscow “supporters from other cities” and organize events there.
The truth is somewhere in between: the opposition needs to recognize that “all our largest ‘street’ successes” have occurred unexpectedly when society is “’boiling’ but the authorities were not prepared, did not know in advance the place, time and format of our actions.” That combination should dictate the opposition’s strategy, Artyomov says.
Moreover, opposition leaders need to recognize that change will come to Russia not by their will along but rather “when several factors come together … when society will beat htepeak of mass dissatisfaction, when the opposition will have a network and mobile structure throughout the entire country, and when the authorities will commit mistakes and land in a crisis.
“When will that happen?” Artyomov asks. “It is senseless to predict,” but the opposition needs “to be prepared.” And to do that, it must overcome its “main mistake” of the past: its “Moscow-centrism” and recognize that while the final act of any political drama will be in the capital, the lead up to that can come from elsewhere.
The activist suggests that the opposition start focusing on its potential allies “in all major cities of more than 100,000,” assemble activists in each, and carry out “joint regional actions” on any subject in order to develop the country-wide network he believes is necessary. At first, these actions can be local, but then, on the basis of them, broader events can take place.
Variety is of the essence, Artyomov says. “People are tired of one and the same message being delivered by ‘the liberals;’ they want to express themselves and they want to be heard.” Indeed, it may be useful to have “several” different messages being delivered at one and the same meeting to add interest and increase “horizontal” ties.
And in looking beyond Moscow, he argues, activists should not forget the enormous value of posters and signs put on buildings. At first the authorities will take them down, but if there are enough “Vova, Go Home!’ signs and slogans put up, they won’t be able to and the opposition will gain new recruits.
All of this, Artyomov concludes, “is of course not at end in itself. These are “steps to the creation of a structure which will have the chance to free Russia in a peaceful and unforced manner. That such a liberation is necessary and inevitable is understood today by a large number of people” – and not just those in the Russian capital.
via Window on Eurasia -- New Series by paul goble on 3/13/13
Paul Goble
Staunton, March 13 – Mosques in Russian cities have become a communications hub for illegal migrants, some Russians say, and consequently, “the more mosques” that are permitted, “the more illegal migrants” there will be, an argument that is certain to intensify opposition to the construction of Islamic facilities across the country.
Given that the Russian authorities admit there are 3.3 million illegals in the Russian Federation already and the likelihood that the real number is far greater than that, these Russians say, the construction of any new mosques should be put off until Moscow is able to restore law and order in this area.
Such attitudes, especially if they become widespread, are likely to prompt the Russian authorities not only to oppose any new construction for their growing Muslim population but also to monitor more closely and perhaps even raid mosques in the name of the politically popular idea of fighting illegal immigration.
According to an article on the “Osobaya bukhva” this week, mosques currently serve as a place where illegal immigrants can learn “various methods” of avoiding Russia’s official migration services and thus by their nature contribute to an increase in their number and their illegality (specletter.com/obcshestvo/2013-03-11/s-chuzhim-ustavom-iz-svoei-mecheti.html).
The article, which is based on the weekly program “Kirillov Says,” reports on the views of some Russians who say that they might not oppose the construction of new mosques if the problem with illegal immigration were brought under control, although many of those with whom Kirill spoke appear to be against mosques as such.
In reporting on these comments, Kirillov says that he is “not asserting that every imam is some kind of local variant of the Dikkensian Fagin,” who is deploying immigrants to engage in illegal activities, but rather that mosques in Russian cities are places where illegals assemble and learn how to arrange their lives out of sight of the authorities.
Because the mosques help the illegal immigrants, he continues, that means “the more mosques, the more illegals there will be.” And he insists that this will be the case until “a new visa regime is established with the countries of Central Asia,” an approach now favored even by the Coordinating Council of the Opposition.
Kirillov relates the conversation he had with Sergey “Spider” Troitsky about this and about how the latter would cope with the problem of illegal immigrants in the Russian Federation. Troitsky’s comments are disturbing, but they likely reflect the attitudes of many others.
Troitsky suggested that “in order to struggle with the wild quantity of Caucasians who are now occupying Russia,” there is only one appropriate measure: “all the gastarbeiters must be put under the control of the Emergency Situations Ministry,” which will “purchase” the necessary workers in Central Asia or China and then ensure that they work only where they are wanted.
In his city of Zhukovsky, Troitsky continued, such an arrangement would allow for the creation of “a labor army,” with military discipline and whose members would serve only in positions out of the public eye and not in stores or supermarkets so that they would not offend the sensibilities of the local Russian population.
He said he opposes the construction of any mosque there, “not because” he is against Muslims, but because there should not be any new religious buildings lest after the erection of a mosque, demands would arise for a Baptist church or a Satanist one. “We will not permit that,” he concluded.
via Window on Eurasia -- New Series by paul goble on 3/13/13
Paul Goble
Staunton, March 13 – Ten days ago, OMON troops broke into a Surgut bar frequented by workers from Central Asia and the south Caucasus, detained some of them and forced others to shave their beards, Interfax-Religion reported yesterday, an incident that had received little notice before then but that is now sparking outrage on many Muslim websites.
The Russian news agency report is straightforward. It says that heavily armed OMON troops entered a bar near the mosque in the Khanty-Mansiisk republic city because of reports that there was a fight there, detained several for a day or two, and forced three to shave or at least trim their beards (interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=50331).
Faizulo Aminov, the head of the Tajik diaspora in Surgut, told the news service that he had spoken with Aleksandr Yerokhov, the city’s chief of police, who acknowledged that the incident had taken place, that the officers were his subordinates and offered his apologies. Yerokhov added that “the guilty party” had been “found and punished.”
But the Interfax report not only led to more reports by mainstream Russian news services (see, for example, lenta.ru/news/2013/03/12/surgut/) but also sparked interest in regional and local outlets (ura.ru/content/khanti/12-03-2013/news/1052154665.html, nr2.ru/yamal_ugra/428464.htmland sitv.ru/arhiv/news/incidents/56054/).
These outlets, while adding some interesting details – the OMON troops involved were from a unit that had carried out the attack in the Latvian capital on January 20, 1991) and the gastarbeiters involved were from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan – generally repeated the Interfax report.
Islamic and Caucasian sites, however, were more critical of what took place, featuring photographs of some of those involved which clearly show that the men involved may have been forced to trim their beards but certainly did not shave them off entirely as the Interfax report had implied (kavpolit.com/surgutskie-ciryulniki/ and ansar.ru/rfsng/2013/03/12/38560).
And these sites gave more prominence to reports that the “OMON raid” was connected with the recent wave of arrests in various places in the Russian Federation of “members of one of the extremist groups of Salafis” rather than being something of only local interest.
Consequently, this story is likely to be picked up by other media outlets in the Caucasus and Central Asia and generate anger among Muslims there and by outlets in the Russian blogosphere which are likely to present the behavior of the OMON as heroic or at least entirely justified.
Those differing interpretations in turn will only raise the temperature of relations between Muslim gastarbeiters and Russian residents and could trigger more such events elsewhere, yet another example of the way the new media are playing an ever greater role in inter-ethnic relations in the Russian Federation.
via THE RUSSIAN FRONT by DStone on 6/19/11
Not particularly Russian, but this does have some military history relevance . . .
In summer travels, I found myself stuck without a wide selection of reading material, but came across an old Modern Library edition of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West. Since that’s a book far more often referenced than read, and I didn’t have lots of other options, I decided to plow through it.
The book lived down to my expectations. It’s positively Hegelian in its grand rhetorical flights of fancy about capital-H History, and in its impenetrable style. On the bright side, once you get the hang of what Spengler is up to, the book’s easy to skim through very quickly. I may comment on some of his substantive arguments anon, what struck me was a single line on p. 387 in the chapter on “Philosophy of Politics”:
. . . to find to my surprise that the quotation is widely attributed to Marcus Aurelius (for example, here, here, here, and here), both in collections of military quotation and especially in business books. One organization even made it their official slogan, complete with a bust of Marcus Aurelius on the home page.
To add insult to injury, Marcus Aurelius wins the citation wars by a ratio of about 5:1 over Spengler.
The problem is that there’s no evidence that Marcus Aurelius ever uttered or wrote the words in question. It’s nowhere in his Meditations, and no one ever gives a real citation. The dubious prize for earliest misattribution to Marcus Aurelius (at least according to google books) goes to Jay Levinson and David Perry’s Guerrilla Marketing for Job Hunters.
Of course, in terms of the popularity of the quotation, Marcus Aurelius is a lot better than Spengler. The one is a philosophical emperor, one of the last good one the Romans had. The other was an obscurantist pessimist, and while not the Nazi he’s often painted as being, was no friend to democracy, capitalism, or liberalism. It’s tough to imagine management theorists being quite so eager to Spengler for inspiration.
In summer travels, I found myself stuck without a wide selection of reading material, but came across an old Modern Library edition of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West. Since that’s a book far more often referenced than read, and I didn’t have lots of other options, I decided to plow through it.
The book lived down to my expectations. It’s positively Hegelian in its grand rhetorical flights of fancy about capital-H History, and in its impenetrable style. On the bright side, once you get the hang of what Spengler is up to, the book’s easy to skim through very quickly. I may comment on some of his substantive arguments anon, what struck me was a single line on p. 387 in the chapter on “Philosophy of Politics”:
The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious.Thanks to a youthful flirtation with alternative rap, I recognized this as a line from PM Dawn’s 1991 song “Comatose.” I was pretty sure Spengler hadn’t stolen from PM Dawn, but I found it only slightly less surprising that PM Dawn was citing Spengler. To google I turned . . .
. . . to find to my surprise that the quotation is widely attributed to Marcus Aurelius (for example, here, here, here, and here), both in collections of military quotation and especially in business books. One organization even made it their official slogan, complete with a bust of Marcus Aurelius on the home page.
To add insult to injury, Marcus Aurelius wins the citation wars by a ratio of about 5:1 over Spengler.
The problem is that there’s no evidence that Marcus Aurelius ever uttered or wrote the words in question. It’s nowhere in his Meditations, and no one ever gives a real citation. The dubious prize for earliest misattribution to Marcus Aurelius (at least according to google books) goes to Jay Levinson and David Perry’s Guerrilla Marketing for Job Hunters.
Of course, in terms of the popularity of the quotation, Marcus Aurelius is a lot better than Spengler. The one is a philosophical emperor, one of the last good one the Romans had. The other was an obscurantist pessimist, and while not the Nazi he’s often painted as being, was no friend to democracy, capitalism, or liberalism. It’s tough to imagine management theorists being quite so eager to Spengler for inspiration.
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 2/12/13
Is Putin's inner circle thinking about life after Putin?
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 2/14/13
Vladimir Putin seems intent on not only undoing Dmitry Medvedev's legacy, but humiliating him in the process. But the causes of the "Medvedev thaw" still remain.
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 2/15/13
Medvedevism Is Dead! Long Live Medvedevism! Vladimir Putin wants to eradicate all traces Dmitry Medvedev's thaw. Can he?
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 2/19/13
For somebody facing multiple criminal probes, Aleksei Navalny seems to be having the time of his life.
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 2/27/13
Last week's resignations from the State Duma appear to be a warm-up for a wholesale reset of Russia's political system.
Mike Nova's starred items
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 3/1/13
Vladimir Putin is changing the rules of the game for the Russian elite. What is the new deal? And what are its risks?
via The Power Vertical - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on 3/11/13
Vladimir Putin is offering the elite a new deal they can't refuse. And they don't like it.
via Sean's Russia Blog by Sean on 2/17/13
Here’s what we know so far:
A meteor disintegrated outside of the Ural city of Chelyabinsk. The space rock was 17 meters wide, weighed an estimated 10 kilotons, traveled at 30 to 50 kilometers per second, and, according to NASA, had an explosive force of half a megaton. That’s about thirty times the force of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The meteor’s shockwave injured over a thousand with 48 hospitalized, destroyed about 200,000 square meters of glass, damaged t3724 residences, 671 schools, 11 monuments, 69 cultural objects, and 6 sports complexes. The Twitter hashtag #метеорит shot up to number one in Russia. Fragments of the meteor have been found. And to top of all off, no one died.
Just so you don’t think the Russian government has been asleep at the wheel, the Emergency Management Agency has been mobilized into action. Today, dead Prime Minister walking Dmitry Medvedev named Dmitry Rogozin to head a task force to find ways to “predict and prevent disasters from space.” And the asteroid panic has even reached the US, where the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has announced that it will hold hearings to come up with ways to better identify asteroids and mitigate their threat. I just hope, I sincerely hope that the latest asteroid craze doesn’t spark the production of Armageddon II. Please spare us . . .
Yet despite all this, there are some in Russia, and by some I mean supposedly well-respected opposition journalists, politicians, and cultural figures who don’t think it was a meteor at all. For a selected few, the fireball that reigned terror on the citizens of Chelyabinsk signified something far more sinister.
I’ve already blogged about Yulia Latynina’s crazy rocket theory. It turns out, the critic of all things Putin was forced to comment about her deleted column on radio show Kod Dostupa. Here’s how she explained herself:
Unfortunately, rather than keep this idea [that the meteor was a rocket] to myself, I quickly informed Novaya gazeta readers. Well, of course, it’s nonsense because as soon as it became clear that they were talking about a kiloton explosion, I understood that this wasn’t a rocket at all, but that it was really a meteor.I’ll let the reader come up with their own conclusions in regard to this. However, I just want to emphasize that Latynina has admitted that she is paranoid. I’m sure that in her mind this gives her unmatched clairvoyance into Russian political life like some medieval holy fool. Nevertheless, I appreciate the candor. However, I’m sure if pressed, she’d blame her paranoia on Putin too.
This is all well and good. A coincidence, indeed. A meteorite flew to Chebarkul region. Well? It happens. But incidentally, for me personally,what happened to me is interesting. When paranoia emerges in a person, he immediately begins to have accept any logical confirmation of this paranoia. The fact that the [meteor] was flying on a straight trajectory and so on. And it is absolutely amazing that paranoia only emerges horribly logical. What separates life from paranoia is that it’s not logical. So given the fact that NASA didn’t detect the meteor, then [the fact that] GLONASS didn’t is forgivable.
But at least Latynina admitted that her theory was bunk. We can’t say the same for some others. Upon hearing news about the meteor on the radio, Russian rock icon Andrey Makarevich charged that the ball of fire was some kind of Kremlin PR magic to lull the masses.
And there it is a meteor! How timely! They’ll talk about it for three days minimum. Or else a week.Then there was Alfred Kokh ranting on his Novaya gazeta blog about how Russian satellites’ failure to detect the meteor’s rapid descent is indicative of a corrupt and decrepit system. This is more proof of what I call the omnipotent Putin syndrome. Namely, that even the opposition buys into the Putin myth to some extent. And when the super vozhd and all he represents slips, they are the first to scream, “Ah ha, you see!” as if they’re privy to some sacred knowledge unbeknown to the rest of us.
By the way, is it expensive to launch a meteor? For it to fall where needed, beautifully, and where it won’t maim very many people. Still it can [cost] a lot. Why not? It’s a good time. I think it’s considerable cheaper than the Olympics. And it works!
But at least Latynina, Makarevich, and Kokh can say their ejaculations were premature. Boris Nemtsov, on the other hand, has no excuse. He had all the confirming facts that this was indeed a meteor. Yet, he wrote this on his Facebook page:
Alfred Kokh is surprised why the search ended for the Chelyabinsk unidentified flying object, the explosive force of which was 20-30 atomic bombs [like those dropped on Hiroshima]. And why was Latynina’s version that it wasn’t a meteor, but our rocket that someone accidentally launched was ridiculed even in independent media.And this is one of the darlings of the United States Congress and the Western press?? A potential shining star of a Putin-less Russia??
It suggests to me that the discussion around a UFO is extremely dangerous and disadvantageous for the government. If this was a meteor, then why didn’t the satellites detect it? This large object with enormous destructive potential and silence . . . We don’t have a satellite detection system?? Where is it?? We waste a colossal sum on the army–more than two trillion rubles and by 2020 it will be 20 trillion. Where did this money go??? Was it stolen, embezzled? For who is such a discussion needed in light of the Oboronservice and Serdyukov affair. They definitely don’t need it. Latynina’s version is really bad for Putin and Shoigu. There is disorder in the army, rockets fly uncontrolled and what do Putin and his valiant Minister of Defense offer.
That it’s better to stop the search and quietly forget what they decide in the Kremlin. We await the increase the satellite budget and new embezzlers.
via Steve LeVine by Steve LeVine on 8/1/12
Posted by Steve LeVine
These companies are becoming an unintentional fifth column in Kurdistan’s march toward economic autonomy. On July 31, France’s Total became the third big oil company to break with Baghdad by signing an unsanctioned oil deal with Kurdistan. Baghdad, intent on full mastery over the nation’s massive petroleum revenue, forbids oil companies from dealing directly with Kurdistan and instead requires them to bid for projects through the Ministry of Oil and to ship their oil through Baghdad-controlled pipelines. However, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Total have now flouted Baghdad’s wishes, putting their oil deals in Iraq’s south at risk in the process. Their calculus is that despite the relative inferiority of Kurdistan’s oil reserves, the potential upside there outweighs the downside threat of possibly losing access to Iraq proper, according to oil company executives with whom I have spoken.
The pressure will now be on Baghdad to somehow stem what is looking like an oil-company rebellion. It’s yet another challenge for the Iraqi government, which is already struggling with rising violence and dropping oil revenue because of sagging global prices.
History has seen numerous states taken over by companies — one thinks, for instance, of the United Fruit Company’s activities in Latin America. But should this trend continue in Kurdistan, it would mark, as far as I recall, the first time that oil companies have been principal actors in a nation becoming effectively autonomous. Of course, it will be up to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to ensure that it is not swallowed up by the companies, which was the fate of some Central and South American countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
On the surface, the companies’ decision to spurn Baghdad seems foolish. Iraq is a huge prize in the oil business, with some 148 billion barrels of proven oil reserves — the second-largest conventional volume in the world. By comparison, the KRG claims to have another 45 billion barrels of oil under its own soil.
After Saddam Hussein’s overthrow in 2003, oil companies from around the world rushed in for the right to both rework old, debilitated fields, and to drill new ones. But Baghdad has exacted tight-fisted terms, signing only low-paying service contracts that effectively turn high-risk, high-return wildcatters into mere hired hands. Until recently, the world’s oil companies have bristled at the terms, but gone along in hopes of conventional production sharing agreements down the road. Now, the grumbling in the ranks is growing to a roar.
A fourth-round auction of oil properties in May showed both that Baghdad seems to have no intention of greater generosity — and also that the companies are fed up. Just three of 12 blocks on offer found successful takers.
In October, ordinarily ultraconservative Exxon uncharacteristically signaled the first sign of upheaval by signing an exploration deal with Kurdistan despite having an agreement to produce oil at Iraq’s West Qurna field. That seemed quite a gamble: West Qurna, after all, holds some 8.7 billion barrels of oil, and there was a distinct possibility that Baghdad would revoke the deal as punishment for Exxon’s opening to the Kurds. Now, Total’s decision — the purchase of a 35 percent stake in two exploration blocks in Kurdistan — makes what had been a gingerly tip-toeing toward the KRG look more like a headlong rush. Total did not respond to an email requesting comment.
Punishment has been meted out for the companies’ defiance: Exxon was barred from the latest auction, and Chevron, which has no current deal in the south, has been officially blacklisted from any future contracts. However, the companies don’t seem fazed in the least.
"We understand completely that if we enter into a contract in the north, we’re probably going to be blackballed in the south," an official from one of the companies told me on condition of anonymity. "So the question is, ‘Have we exhausted all our options for getting a deal in the south on terms that we would find acceptable?’"
The answer for companies headed for the door is yes, the official said. "I think that’s beginning to be borne out as a lot of companies are looking to renegotiate their terms," he told me.
"The terms in the north are much better. The government gets a stake, but the better you do, the more you get, and the terms are attractive," he said. Plus the overall conditions are "night and day better" in Kurdistan than in Baghdad, he said. "You fly into a very modern, efficient airport. There are good hotels, good infrastructure."
When combined with the Kurdish authorities’ already-existing plans to build independent oil and natural gas export pipelines out of Kurdistan that avoid the Arab regions of Iraq entirely, the oil deals look increasingly like a robust, commercial-led carving out of the region as a stand-alone entity. Some might call it another substantial piece of the puzzle toward the creation of the Kurds’ longstanding national dream — a state of their own.
Robin Mills, a former Shell geologist and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis who does private consulting on Iraq, said in a Twitter exchange that the Total news is a "big blow" for Baghdad. As for Total itself, the company seemed to be taking on sub-par fields in Kurdistan — "not a crown jewel in return for risk they’re taking with Baghdad" — but that "perhaps Total just doesn’t see any risk with Baghdad any more."
Can the embattled Iraqi central government get the rebellious oil companies back in line? Patrick Osgood, deputy editor of Oil & Gas Middle East magazine, suggested in a tweet that Baghdad could respond by making "a quick fire sale [of Total's fields] to Petrochina," the publicly traded arm of the state-controlled China National Petroleum Company. But even that may not solve Baghdad’s basic problem: "Can’t see it’s smart for Baghdad to be so reliant on Shell, BP, Russians & Chinese," Mills said.
Some messages that run counter to conventional wisdom stand out from this showdown: Oil companies, it turns out, will not pay any price for access to the biggest fields in the world, but in fact will seek greener pastures. Oil cannot be bottled up — it will find its market. And sometimes, a new state can take form without a shot fired or a single protester in the street.
Louisa Gouliamaki AFP/GettyImages
via Siberian Light by Andy on 4/7/12
I’m absolutely baffled by the story coming out of this week of a 20 million rouble ($660,000) lawsuit involving Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Russian church, and Yury Shevchenko, a former Russian health minister.The basic story is pretty straightforward, but so odd that there must be something going on below the surface that I just am not quite getting. If anyone could explain it to me, I’d be really grateful!
From what I can gather Shevchenko, who lives in an apartment on the floor below Patriarch Kirill, was having some kind of construction work done. As a result, some kind of undetermined substance (dust, sand, or harmful nanoparticles, depending on who you believe) was carried up and coated many of the surfaces in Patriarch Kirill’s apartment. Lidiya Leonova, who lives in the apartment, and is described in the media as it’s “keeper”, “discovered that all of the property, including the library, was covered in a thick layer of dust” and took it upon herself to sue Shevchenko for the damage caused to Patriarch Kirill’s apartment, including to some very valuable religious texts.
The case went to court and ultimately, after being barred from leaving the country by the court to treat his cancer abroad, the judgement went against Shevchenko and, again according to the media, he was forced to sell an apartment that he had bequeathed to his daughter in order to meet the bill.
Most of the reports in the English language media I’m reading seem to being fairly critical of Patriarch Kirill. The Moscow Times is laughing at the claims that the dust was harmful, pointing out that it was just sand and it would have been far more efficient to just hire a maid to vacuum it up. RFE/RL are taking a slightly different tack in also observing that the Partiarch has a very nice (and presumably very expensive) Swiss watch that, in order to substantiate his claim that he never wears it, has to be airbrushed out of official photos whenever the sleeves of his robe ride up and the world catches a glimpse of it.
Others, though, seem more supportive of the Patriarch. Pravda.ru says that any damages awarded will be donated to charity (which makes you wonder whether it is actually very expensive to clean up the damage) and that the Patriarch has reportedly pronounced that it would be “incorrect” to forgive Mr Shevchenko for his crime. RT points to a sustained anti-Church information campaign, of which this and the Pussy Riot demonstration are just examples.
I’m just so confused. Does anyone know what’s really going on here? If so, please could you explain it to me?
Picture courtesy of the Russian President’s website
via Sean's Russia Blog by Sean on 3/2/13
I’ve encountered a lot of interesting people in my seven years of blogging. But none have been as flamboyant as the infamous La Russophobe. Here’s an email that I received from Ms. Zigfeld this evening that proves why:
Dear Sean,In a recent blog post, you called for Yulia Latynina to lose her job. Not that, of course, you have even 10% of the kind of influence that would be needed to make that happen, or that she or her employer even know who you are, but I think that if you review these posts calmly you’ll perhaps see they are childish, bitter, petty and ought to be beneath you. They make both you and your university look bad. The mere fact that you have the time to devote to such drivel does so, to say nothing of the wretched content. Yulia risks her life exactly the way Politkovskaya did, and she is published by editors who are among the bravest and most important of any editors of any newspaper at any time in world history. Your comments are grossly disrespectful of their judgment and the risks she is taking. You are not qualified to pass judgment on them, to say the least. Worst of all, you didn’t even see fit to call for Zhirinovsky to lose his job, which clearly establishes that this is a personal thing you have with Yulia. She didn’t even make a factual mistake, she just expressed an opinion that turned out to be bogus, and she owned up to it. It’s not a basis for her to be fired, just that simple.So here’s what: I’m giving you one week to reconsider, apologize for going too far and admit she should not be fired. If you don’t, I’m going to call for you to be fired. In my view, I have more ammunition that you did in regard to Yulia. And I’m for sure way more powerful than you are.Regards,Kim
Here’s a screen shot as proof of the missive’s authenticity. I’ve removed our respective emails.
via Russian Military Reform by Dmitry Gorenburg on 1/22/13
Volume 59 Number 6 / November-December 2012 of Problems of Post-Communism is now available on the ME Sharpe web site at http://mesharpe.metapress.com.
This issue contains:
This issue contains:
| The 2012 Political Reform in Russia: The Interplay of Liberalizing Concessions and Authoritarian Corrections | p. 3 |
| Grigorii V. Golosov | |
| Modernization and Historical Memory in Russia: Two Sides of the Same Coin | p. 15 |
| Miguel Vázquez Liñán | |
| Reforming Post-Communist Welfare States: Family Policy in Poland, Hungary, and Romania Since 2000 | p. 27 |
| Tomasz Inglot, Dorottya Szikra, Cristina Raţ | |
| Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics?: An Examination of China’s Urban Homeowners’ Committees and Movements | p. 50 |
| Ngeow Chow Bing | |
| A Salute to Ronald Linden, Outgoing Associate Editor of Problems of Post-Communism and a Welcome to Sherrill Stroschein, Incoming Associate Editor of Problems of Post-Communism | p. 64 |
| Dmitry Gorenburg, Editor | |
via Russian Military Reform by Dmitry Gorenburg on 2/1/13
The Russian Navy has just concluded its largest exercise in the Mediterranean in many years. The ships involved represented all three of Russia’s European fleets and included the missile cruiser Moskva, the Udaloy-class destroyers Marshal Shaposhnikov and Severomorsk, the Yaroslav Mudriy and Smetliviy frigates, six large landing craft (the Kaliningrad, Novocherkassk, Alexandr Shabalin, Saratov, Nikolai Filchenkov, Azov), two submarines (one nuclear and one diesel-powered) and various support vessels. The total number of ships involved was over 20. In addition to the ships, the exercise included at least 20 aircraft. The exercise is being overseen by two senior MOD officials, deputy chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Postnikov and deputy Chief of the Navy Staff Leonid Sukhanov.
The timing and location of the exercise, as well as the heavy representation of amphibious ships, have raised questions about the Russian Navy’s goals in the Mediterranean. To my mind, this is another case of the Russian military trying to kill many birds with one stone. During the second half of the Cold War, the Soviet Navy had a virtually constant presence in the Mediterranean. Its squadron had a number of simultaneous tasks — ensuring the security of critical sea lanes to the Black Sea, deterring the United States Navy, ensuring continued access to the Suez canal for Soviet shipping, and engaging existing and potential allies in North Africa and the Middle East were probably the most significant of these. The Russian military has long sought to restore its presence in the region and has in the last 5-6 years taken numerous opportunities to send ships to the region to engage in exercises and conduct port visits. This exercise, first and foremost, is simply an expansion of this effort.
Second, the exercise is designed to prepare the navy for possible future operations in Syria. Discussions about the possibility of the Russian fleet seeking to have a deterrent effect on potential US or NATO intervention efforts in the Syrian civil war seem to me rather misguided. The assembled Russian forces are no match for the NATO forces that would be assembled in the region in the event of an intervention. The Soviet navy was always exceedingly cautious to only get involved in conflicts (even just with show of force operations) only in circumstances where the balance of forces was favorable. While those days were a long time ago, the current leaders of the navy were trained in that tradition and are unlikely to get involved in adventures of this type. Furthermore, the composition of the task force indicates that the navy wants to be prepared for a potential evacuation scenario. Such an evacuation may be focused on Russian citizens living in Syria, or (less likely) it may be part of a bid to rescue defeated Alawite leaders from their coastal stronghold down the road. The presence of a large number of surface combatants may be an indication that the navy wants to be prepared to undertake such an evacuation even in circumstances where its ships may come under fire from hostile forces (presumably the victorious Syrian rebels).
The final goal, for the navy, is just to increase preparedness. The Northern Fleet likes to send its ships to exercise in the Med during the winter months. The weather is nicer, allowing for more complicated maneuvers. Official reports indicate that the exercise covers a wide range of naval operations, including counter-piracy and convoy operations, ship defense from small boat attacks, coordination with both naval and long-range aviation, ASW, opposed amphibious landing, and search and rescue. The navy has conducted exercises in the Med pretty much annually since 2008. The fact that this is the largest is in part a reaction to the geopolitical circumstances in the region and in part an indication that the Russian navy is gradually gaining confidence and increasing its capabilities.
The timing and location of the exercise, as well as the heavy representation of amphibious ships, have raised questions about the Russian Navy’s goals in the Mediterranean. To my mind, this is another case of the Russian military trying to kill many birds with one stone. During the second half of the Cold War, the Soviet Navy had a virtually constant presence in the Mediterranean. Its squadron had a number of simultaneous tasks — ensuring the security of critical sea lanes to the Black Sea, deterring the United States Navy, ensuring continued access to the Suez canal for Soviet shipping, and engaging existing and potential allies in North Africa and the Middle East were probably the most significant of these. The Russian military has long sought to restore its presence in the region and has in the last 5-6 years taken numerous opportunities to send ships to the region to engage in exercises and conduct port visits. This exercise, first and foremost, is simply an expansion of this effort.
Second, the exercise is designed to prepare the navy for possible future operations in Syria. Discussions about the possibility of the Russian fleet seeking to have a deterrent effect on potential US or NATO intervention efforts in the Syrian civil war seem to me rather misguided. The assembled Russian forces are no match for the NATO forces that would be assembled in the region in the event of an intervention. The Soviet navy was always exceedingly cautious to only get involved in conflicts (even just with show of force operations) only in circumstances where the balance of forces was favorable. While those days were a long time ago, the current leaders of the navy were trained in that tradition and are unlikely to get involved in adventures of this type. Furthermore, the composition of the task force indicates that the navy wants to be prepared for a potential evacuation scenario. Such an evacuation may be focused on Russian citizens living in Syria, or (less likely) it may be part of a bid to rescue defeated Alawite leaders from their coastal stronghold down the road. The presence of a large number of surface combatants may be an indication that the navy wants to be prepared to undertake such an evacuation even in circumstances where its ships may come under fire from hostile forces (presumably the victorious Syrian rebels).
The final goal, for the navy, is just to increase preparedness. The Northern Fleet likes to send its ships to exercise in the Med during the winter months. The weather is nicer, allowing for more complicated maneuvers. Official reports indicate that the exercise covers a wide range of naval operations, including counter-piracy and convoy operations, ship defense from small boat attacks, coordination with both naval and long-range aviation, ASW, opposed amphibious landing, and search and rescue. The navy has conducted exercises in the Med pretty much annually since 2008. The fact that this is the largest is in part a reaction to the geopolitical circumstances in the region and in part an indication that the Russian navy is gradually gaining confidence and increasing its capabilities.
via Russian Military Reform by Dmitry Gorenburg on 2/11/13
In recent weeks, some analysts have started to argue that the military reform promulgated by Anatoly Serdiukov over the last four years is being systematically rolled back by his successor. Given the unremittingly hostile coverage of Serdyukov and the decisions he made during his tenure, this is not surprising. This perception is further strengthened by the rhetoric and stream of decisions emanating from the Russian Ministry of Defense itself. As one analyst recently noted, “[Defense Minister] Shoigu’s three-month tenure consists of little more than examining and questioning every decision made by Serdiukov.” If you listen to the statements coming out of the MOD and the vast majority of the commentary in the Russian press, you would certainly have the impression that every change that Serdiukov enacted during his years in office has either already been overturned or will be reversed in the near future.
I want to correct this impression. What we have right now is a situation with a number of potentially negative developments, but no real indications that the key aspects of the reform are about to be reversed. It is true enough that Shoigu has reversed a number of Serdyukov’s decisions. But (with the exception of defense procurement, which I’ll address separately) these changes have largely focused on relatively peripheral issues such as military education and medicine. In the education sphere, Shoigu has restored the old training system that has top officers in school for a total of eight years during their careers instead of Serdiukov’s Western-style system of one stint in a military academy followed by short courses to gain skills needed for specific positions. This is certainly a blow to modernization, and may well lead to an excessive number of graduates coming out of the military academies without positions available for them. This outcome could lead to pressure to increase the number of officers in active service, which would be a big blow to the reform effort. So it may be worth watching the number of students being admitted to the newly reformed academies in the next year or two. Similarly, the shift in control over military training from the military branches to the recently reformed Main Combat Training Directorate will leave the branch headquarters with little to do. Aleksandr Golts is concerned that they will start getting involved in commanding the troops, which used to be their bailiwick but is now under the Unified Strategic Commands. Again, a potentially negative development, but not one that has happened yet.
The one critical area where bad things have already happened is in military procurement. I’m of the school of thought that believes that one of the main reasons that Serdiukov was removed is that his policies were threatening the income streams of key players in the defense industry. It is therefore not at all surprising that one of the Shoigu-led MOD’s early acts was to essentially take imports of military technology from foreign sources off the table. As I’ve already written, this will ease pressure on domestic defense industry to improve quality of production while keeping prices from spiraling out of control. As a result, the procurement of a new generation of military equipment in the quantities needed for the military is likely to be imperiled.
Other than in procurement policy, the key structural elements of the reform remain untouched. These include the shift to a three-tiered organizational structure for the military with the brigade as the key unit, the establishment of unified strategic commands that are designed to enhance inter-service cooperation, the reduction in the number of officers, and the goal of shifting away from conscription to a primarily contract-based manning structure over time. As long as they remain in place, the Russian military will remain on track to be transformed away from the Soviet mobilization army to a more modern, more mobile, and more unified military force. According to Golts, all of these elements have recently been affirmed by the country’s top political leadership and by top officials at the MOD. Golts further argues that the new defense plan recently presented to the president by Shoigu and new Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, if it’s as comprehensive and thorough as described in the media, could only have been prepared under the direction of Serdiukov and Makarov. There simply has not been enough time to prepare anything serious in the three months since Serdiukov was fired.
It’s certainly possible, as Golts and other commentators have indicated, that Shoigu will come under increasing pressure from the old-school career generals to repeal those aspects of the reform that are, to me anyway, the core of transforming the military into a 21st century fighting force. Golts argues that because Shoigu has been made an army general, he will not be able to withstand the pressure to do whatever the generals want. An alternative (and not contradictory) argument, also made recently by Golts, is that Shoigu is likely to accede to the generals’ desires because he does not expect to the stay at the MOD for long and will therefore do whatever the generals ask of him. These are both possibilities. And the indications for the future of military reform, given Shoigu’s initial actions, are certainly not positive. But I have not yet seen anything definitive that would cause me to assume that Shoigu is going to reverse the structural aspects of the reform. I would therefore urge caution in reading any analyses that argue that Russian military reform is dead.
I want to correct this impression. What we have right now is a situation with a number of potentially negative developments, but no real indications that the key aspects of the reform are about to be reversed. It is true enough that Shoigu has reversed a number of Serdyukov’s decisions. But (with the exception of defense procurement, which I’ll address separately) these changes have largely focused on relatively peripheral issues such as military education and medicine. In the education sphere, Shoigu has restored the old training system that has top officers in school for a total of eight years during their careers instead of Serdiukov’s Western-style system of one stint in a military academy followed by short courses to gain skills needed for specific positions. This is certainly a blow to modernization, and may well lead to an excessive number of graduates coming out of the military academies without positions available for them. This outcome could lead to pressure to increase the number of officers in active service, which would be a big blow to the reform effort. So it may be worth watching the number of students being admitted to the newly reformed academies in the next year or two. Similarly, the shift in control over military training from the military branches to the recently reformed Main Combat Training Directorate will leave the branch headquarters with little to do. Aleksandr Golts is concerned that they will start getting involved in commanding the troops, which used to be their bailiwick but is now under the Unified Strategic Commands. Again, a potentially negative development, but not one that has happened yet.
The one critical area where bad things have already happened is in military procurement. I’m of the school of thought that believes that one of the main reasons that Serdiukov was removed is that his policies were threatening the income streams of key players in the defense industry. It is therefore not at all surprising that one of the Shoigu-led MOD’s early acts was to essentially take imports of military technology from foreign sources off the table. As I’ve already written, this will ease pressure on domestic defense industry to improve quality of production while keeping prices from spiraling out of control. As a result, the procurement of a new generation of military equipment in the quantities needed for the military is likely to be imperiled.
Other than in procurement policy, the key structural elements of the reform remain untouched. These include the shift to a three-tiered organizational structure for the military with the brigade as the key unit, the establishment of unified strategic commands that are designed to enhance inter-service cooperation, the reduction in the number of officers, and the goal of shifting away from conscription to a primarily contract-based manning structure over time. As long as they remain in place, the Russian military will remain on track to be transformed away from the Soviet mobilization army to a more modern, more mobile, and more unified military force. According to Golts, all of these elements have recently been affirmed by the country’s top political leadership and by top officials at the MOD. Golts further argues that the new defense plan recently presented to the president by Shoigu and new Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov, if it’s as comprehensive and thorough as described in the media, could only have been prepared under the direction of Serdiukov and Makarov. There simply has not been enough time to prepare anything serious in the three months since Serdiukov was fired.
It’s certainly possible, as Golts and other commentators have indicated, that Shoigu will come under increasing pressure from the old-school career generals to repeal those aspects of the reform that are, to me anyway, the core of transforming the military into a 21st century fighting force. Golts argues that because Shoigu has been made an army general, he will not be able to withstand the pressure to do whatever the generals want. An alternative (and not contradictory) argument, also made recently by Golts, is that Shoigu is likely to accede to the generals’ desires because he does not expect to the stay at the MOD for long and will therefore do whatever the generals ask of him. These are both possibilities. And the indications for the future of military reform, given Shoigu’s initial actions, are certainly not positive. But I have not yet seen anything definitive that would cause me to assume that Shoigu is going to reverse the structural aspects of the reform. I would therefore urge caution in reading any analyses that argue that Russian military reform is dead.
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via Russian Military Reform by Dmitry Gorenburg on 3/13/13
I’m still swamped with various projects, so in the meantime, here’s another Oxford Analytica brief. This one is from mid-December…
—-
Although China and the United States have focused greater attention on Central Asia in recent years, Russia remains the dominant power in the region. Its size and the cultural, political and economic connections that remain from the Soviet period are such that Central Asian countries are reluctant to take any actions that would antagonise Moscow. For Russian leaders, Central Asia serves as a buffer zone that protects Russia’s southern border from potential threats.
Impacts:
Russia’s various initiatives in Central Asia are shaped by three interest groups with widely divergent interests that often work at cross-purposes to each other:
Throughout the last decade, Russia sought to maintain its energy-transit monopoly on the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia giving it control over transit fees. Russia’s monopoly over natural gas transit to Europe also gave it political and economic leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for domestic consumption.
The construction of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy-producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of shale gas extraction in the United States has increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in demand for natural gas.
These factors decreased Russia’s ability to set prices and to use its control of energy supply for political ends, thus reducing the importance of future Caspian pipeline transit. Russia is now likely to focus on energy production in the Caspian Sea region and has already begun to develop several oil and gas fields that it controls jointly with Kazakhstan.
Keeping China at bay
China has sought to increase its economic and political influence in Central Asia without alienating Russia for a number of reasons. For example:
Russian leaders fear that their country’s position in Central Asia is gradually being displaced as China’s political influence and economic power grow. To maintain its sway in Central Asia, Russia has focused on ‘tying’ China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member.
In the security realm, Russia has combined participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). While the SCO provides a neutral forum where Russia can discuss security and plan joint operations and exercises with China, the CSTO allows Russia to address Central Asian security issues without China’s participation. At the same time, Russia has sought to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia by setting up the Customs Union, which, in 2014, is expected to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Recent discussions concerning the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2015 are also part of the effort to cement Central Asian economic ties to Russia.
Ensuring political stability
Although most of the regimes in the region have endured for over 20 years, Central Asia is now entering a period of potential political instability.
These concerns have led Russia to provide various forms of security assistance to the region’s more vulnerable states. In the last year alone Russia has:
CONCLUSION: Russia’s security relations with Central Asian states will strengthen as they face the consequences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. At the same time, Moscow’s efforts to remain the dominant economic partner of the region’s key players will likely falter as China strengthens its position as the main recipient of Central Asian energy exports and a key supplier of imported consumer products.
—-
Although China and the United States have focused greater attention on Central Asia in recent years, Russia remains the dominant power in the region. Its size and the cultural, political and economic connections that remain from the Soviet period are such that Central Asian countries are reluctant to take any actions that would antagonise Moscow. For Russian leaders, Central Asia serves as a buffer zone that protects Russia’s southern border from potential threats.
Impacts:
- Increasing Chinese economic presence in Central Asia will curtail Russia’s efforts to limit China’s regional political influence.
- After NATO’s exit from Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states will cooperate to prevent radical Islam from destabilising the region.
- Shifting patterns of energy demand and supply will reduce Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool for political influence.
Russia’s various initiatives in Central Asia are shaped by three interest groups with widely divergent interests that often work at cross-purposes to each other:
- The military and defence industry is focused on the role of great power competition in the region; it seeks to promote arms sales and to increase Russia’s military presence.
- The energy industry focuses on securing exclusive rights to gas transit from Central Asia to Europe.
- The security services concentrate on the transnational threats to Russia from radical Islam, terrorism and drug smuggling.
Throughout the last decade, Russia sought to maintain its energy-transit monopoly on the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia giving it control over transit fees. Russia’s monopoly over natural gas transit to Europe also gave it political and economic leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for domestic consumption.
The construction of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy-producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of shale gas extraction in the United States has increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in demand for natural gas.
These factors decreased Russia’s ability to set prices and to use its control of energy supply for political ends, thus reducing the importance of future Caspian pipeline transit. Russia is now likely to focus on energy production in the Caspian Sea region and has already begun to develop several oil and gas fields that it controls jointly with Kazakhstan.
Keeping China at bay
China has sought to increase its economic and political influence in Central Asia without alienating Russia for a number of reasons. For example:
- Central Asia has become one of China’s primary energy suppliers;
- Central Asia serves as a security buffer zone between China and both Russia and the United States; and
- China seeks to prevent Uighur separatists in Xinjiang from using Central Asia as a safe haven.
Russian leaders fear that their country’s position in Central Asia is gradually being displaced as China’s political influence and economic power grow. To maintain its sway in Central Asia, Russia has focused on ‘tying’ China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member.
In the security realm, Russia has combined participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). While the SCO provides a neutral forum where Russia can discuss security and plan joint operations and exercises with China, the CSTO allows Russia to address Central Asian security issues without China’s participation. At the same time, Russia has sought to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia by setting up the Customs Union, which, in 2014, is expected to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Recent discussions concerning the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2015 are also part of the effort to cement Central Asian economic ties to Russia.
Ensuring political stability
Although most of the regimes in the region have endured for over 20 years, Central Asia is now entering a period of potential political instability.
- Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are all bracing for a potential resurgence of Islamist radicalism in the aftermath of the likely US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
- Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — both states ruled by authoritarian presidents in their mid-1970s — are highly vulnerable to succession risks.
- Kyrgyzstan is still recovering from two episodes of violent regime collapse in the last decade.
These concerns have led Russia to provide various forms of security assistance to the region’s more vulnerable states. In the last year alone Russia has:
- extended leases on military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
- sold weapons to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan;
- sought to persuade Uzbekistan to re-engage with the CSTO; and
- agreed to provide 1.3 billion dollars to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to modernise their military forces and ensure their security after the departure of Western troops.
CONCLUSION: Russia’s security relations with Central Asian states will strengthen as they face the consequences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. At the same time, Moscow’s efforts to remain the dominant economic partner of the region’s key players will likely falter as China strengthens its position as the main recipient of Central Asian energy exports and a key supplier of imported consumer products.
via Russian History Blog by Andrew Jenks on 2/22/13
Our university is holding a Russian documentary film series. We showed one of the films that I reviewed here earlier (http://russianhistoryblog.org/author/andy/page/2/). Our next film is called Miss Gulag, produced in 2007 and directed by Maria Yatskova (for an interview with the director see Sean Guillory’s http://newbooksinrussianstudies.com/2011/06/03/maria-yatskova-miss-gulag-nienhause-yatskova-vodar-films-2007/).
This fascinating documentary tells the improbable tale of a beauty pageant set in a modern-day Russian prison, one of 35 women’s prisons across the Russian Federation. The story of this documentary is simple enough. A group of young women in a Siberian prison – all of whom have come of age in post-Soviet Russia – stage a beauty pageant.
These women grew up during the privatization and collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s. Unlike their parents, the last generation of Soviets, they had no clear career path, and even if they did they would have trouble finding a job. They grew up poor and hungry, witnessing a corrupt few get unbelievably wealthy while their own family’s standard of living collapsed. “I can’t say that freedom is any different from prison,” says an inmate who had been freed from prison. A former participant in the prison’s annual spring beauty pageant, she was now free and unemployed in a Siberian village, living with her desperately poor father, who weeps as he remembers the good life during Soviet times. Little wonder, then, that these women – part of an unprecedented wave of crime among women in post-Soviet Russia — turned to a life of violent crime, alcohol, and drugs.
The subjects of this film are the untold story about the victory of crony capitalism in Russia. It is a world in which the old communist ideals have collapsed, replaced by a society in which the poor and unlucky – many of them young women — have no protection and virtually no way to get out of poverty. The path from communism to post-Soviet Russia, at least in this documentary, leads to drug abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, and prison. Still, if the Siberian prison is a rough place, it seems no less humane than the world outside its walls. And to their credit, the prison administrators seem to care about rehabilitating the inmates for non-prison life.
The premise of the inmates’ rehabilitation seems to be that making them adhere to familiar ideals of feminine domesticity will turn them into upstanding, law-abiding citizens capable of adjusting to the demands of modern Russian society. The rehabilitation program involves discipline (play by the rules and you’ll get time off), sewing (stitching army uniforms for the all-male Russian army), and a beauty pageant. “I think this will help them in their future lives,” said a prison official, a woman, regarding the rehabilitative potential of the beauty pageant.
The standards for feminine beauty, as in the United States, come straight out of the lotion, shampoo, eyeliner, and lipstick commercials that dominate Russian television. The prison rehabilitation seems to be doing the work of Russian advertisers; it teaches Russian women to feel good about themselves when they look good. It tells them that beauty is skin deep. Judging by the documentary, many women accept this proposition. One contestant, who was cynical and forlorn at the beginning of the documentary, says by the end that she gained a sense of confidence from participating in the pageant that she lacked previously. Making her own costume, applying cosmetics, learning how to strut and preen before an audience, made her feel like a whole Russian woman. Of course, since the parole board sees participation in the pageant as grounds for early release, the contestants have a reason to invest themselves in the process. The system encourages them to trivialize their own sense of beauty.
The pageant is put on exclusively for the female inmates and mostly female administrators – with the exception of two male prison guards, one of whom carries a permanent grin on his face throughout the show. Unstated, yet clear from many shots in the documentary, is an undercurrent of lesbian relationships. The inmate who had earlier been freed from the prison returns at the end of the documentary as a special guest singer for the pageant. She is all gussied up – high heels, black stockings, and hot pants. She speaks to the camera about her intense relationship with an inmate left behind the bars who is also participating in the pageant. They hold hands and appear to embrace as lovers, as other inmates appear to do throughout the documentary. It is perhaps ironic that one of the participants in the pageant may be hoping to get early release – so she can continue her relationship with a former female inmate outside the confines of the prison. Though none of the prison officials say so, it seems clear that one of the reasons for the pageant is to combat the supposedly “abnormal” physical and emotional bonds between women that invariably result from the all-female environment of the prison. In the context of the prison, however, it is the heterosexual relationship that is “unnatural.” The beauty pageant provides a rite of passage out of the women’s prison, preparing the inmates for reentry into the heterosexual world. Once in that world, the prison officials hope, the women will turn away from the emotional and physical comforts of a homosexual relationship and away from the supposedly more male crimes that landed them in jail – armed assault, armed robbery, drug trafficking. Instead, they will find a decent, law-abiding, money-making man and cook and clean. They will look like the women in the TV ads. Rather than staging robberies and injecting heroin, they will take a powder and do their nails.
This fascinating documentary tells the improbable tale of a beauty pageant set in a modern-day Russian prison, one of 35 women’s prisons across the Russian Federation. The story of this documentary is simple enough. A group of young women in a Siberian prison – all of whom have come of age in post-Soviet Russia – stage a beauty pageant.
These women grew up during the privatization and collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s. Unlike their parents, the last generation of Soviets, they had no clear career path, and even if they did they would have trouble finding a job. They grew up poor and hungry, witnessing a corrupt few get unbelievably wealthy while their own family’s standard of living collapsed. “I can’t say that freedom is any different from prison,” says an inmate who had been freed from prison. A former participant in the prison’s annual spring beauty pageant, she was now free and unemployed in a Siberian village, living with her desperately poor father, who weeps as he remembers the good life during Soviet times. Little wonder, then, that these women – part of an unprecedented wave of crime among women in post-Soviet Russia — turned to a life of violent crime, alcohol, and drugs.
The subjects of this film are the untold story about the victory of crony capitalism in Russia. It is a world in which the old communist ideals have collapsed, replaced by a society in which the poor and unlucky – many of them young women — have no protection and virtually no way to get out of poverty. The path from communism to post-Soviet Russia, at least in this documentary, leads to drug abuse, alcoholism, prostitution, and prison. Still, if the Siberian prison is a rough place, it seems no less humane than the world outside its walls. And to their credit, the prison administrators seem to care about rehabilitating the inmates for non-prison life.
The premise of the inmates’ rehabilitation seems to be that making them adhere to familiar ideals of feminine domesticity will turn them into upstanding, law-abiding citizens capable of adjusting to the demands of modern Russian society. The rehabilitation program involves discipline (play by the rules and you’ll get time off), sewing (stitching army uniforms for the all-male Russian army), and a beauty pageant. “I think this will help them in their future lives,” said a prison official, a woman, regarding the rehabilitative potential of the beauty pageant.
The standards for feminine beauty, as in the United States, come straight out of the lotion, shampoo, eyeliner, and lipstick commercials that dominate Russian television. The prison rehabilitation seems to be doing the work of Russian advertisers; it teaches Russian women to feel good about themselves when they look good. It tells them that beauty is skin deep. Judging by the documentary, many women accept this proposition. One contestant, who was cynical and forlorn at the beginning of the documentary, says by the end that she gained a sense of confidence from participating in the pageant that she lacked previously. Making her own costume, applying cosmetics, learning how to strut and preen before an audience, made her feel like a whole Russian woman. Of course, since the parole board sees participation in the pageant as grounds for early release, the contestants have a reason to invest themselves in the process. The system encourages them to trivialize their own sense of beauty.
The pageant is put on exclusively for the female inmates and mostly female administrators – with the exception of two male prison guards, one of whom carries a permanent grin on his face throughout the show. Unstated, yet clear from many shots in the documentary, is an undercurrent of lesbian relationships. The inmate who had earlier been freed from the prison returns at the end of the documentary as a special guest singer for the pageant. She is all gussied up – high heels, black stockings, and hot pants. She speaks to the camera about her intense relationship with an inmate left behind the bars who is also participating in the pageant. They hold hands and appear to embrace as lovers, as other inmates appear to do throughout the documentary. It is perhaps ironic that one of the participants in the pageant may be hoping to get early release – so she can continue her relationship with a former female inmate outside the confines of the prison. Though none of the prison officials say so, it seems clear that one of the reasons for the pageant is to combat the supposedly “abnormal” physical and emotional bonds between women that invariably result from the all-female environment of the prison. In the context of the prison, however, it is the heterosexual relationship that is “unnatural.” The beauty pageant provides a rite of passage out of the women’s prison, preparing the inmates for reentry into the heterosexual world. Once in that world, the prison officials hope, the women will turn away from the emotional and physical comforts of a homosexual relationship and away from the supposedly more male crimes that landed them in jail – armed assault, armed robbery, drug trafficking. Instead, they will find a decent, law-abiding, money-making man and cook and clean. They will look like the women in the TV ads. Rather than staging robberies and injecting heroin, they will take a powder and do their nails.
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 2/22/13
Obama's bid to reduce the number of nuclear weapons globally requires an updated and comprehensive look at Russia's security needs to be successful. | Русский
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 2/21/13
Despite the recent rapid deterioration in relations, the United States and Russia need to continue talk to each other in order to preserve mutually beneficial cooperation.
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 3/4/13
A true de-Stalinization process in Russia will require no less than a reinvention of Russian nationhood based on a rejection of the traditional concept of the state, an end to the political and historical immunity of the secret police, and the emergence of a concept of "we, the people." | Русский
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 2/28/13
Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader responsible for the deaths of millions, still commands worryingly high levels of admiration in some post-Soviet countries. | Русский
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 3/5/13
Stalin is a figure not just of the past, but of the present.
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 3/8/13
The figure of Stalin still provokes many positive reactions in the former Soviet Union.
via Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Russia on 3/11/13
Protests in Russia and President Saakashvili's October defeat in Georgia's legislative elections have given new confidence to protesters throughout the South Caucasus.
Mike Nova's starred items
via Region Related Event Feeds by jdunton on 1/22/13
In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Terrorist bombings and acts of sabotage in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya are perceived as somehow intrinsic to the region.
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via Region Related Event Feeds by ian on 1/24/13
In Critical Questions 2013 CSIS's world class experts give their take on what they see as the most pressing challenges facing the world in 2013. Transitions in U.S. defense policy, regional flashpoints, and global-scale issues are likely to dominate what will be another year of international transformation.
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via oD Russia by Michael Cecire on 2/25/13
China’s steadily growing economic expansion throughout the world is a cause of concern for many governments. Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia are no longer so dependent on Moscow and China is quietly rolling out credit lines and investments in the region. Time to sit up and pay attention, says Michael CecireSince the end of the Cold War, the heartlands of the former Soviet Union have shifted from being the meeting point between the West and the Eastern bloc into a zone of contention. Despite Russia’s relative resurgence under Putin, Moscow no longer enjoys a monopoly of power over this vast area. Instead, the blurry post-communist regions where Eastern Europe and central Eurasia overlap have become a focal point of interest for a number of established and emerging powers: Russia, the E.U., Turkey the U.S., and, increasingly, Iran. China, which recently overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy after the United States, is increasingly showing itself to be a viable player in this far-flung region, well removed from its traditional spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific and Central Asia.
Diversification and geo-politics
China’s interest in the region stems from Beijing’s worldwide economic ambitions. With robust trade relations and investments spanning the globe - everything from copper mines in Africa to a newfound appreciation for North American pecans - Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia represent a final frontier for Chinese economic expansion. China now enjoys over $3.2 trillion in foreign currency reserves, and is looking to diversify its worldwide investment portfolio and shape a crucial link in the ‘New Silk Road’ trade artery from China to Europe. In the last decade, trade between China and Central and Eastern Europe has grown by a staggering 32 percent annually to $41.1 billion in 2010, a figure Beijing hopes to boost to $100 billion by 2015.
China is putting its money where its mouth is and has been going on an investment and lending spree. Belarus, largely isolated in Europe because of its authoritarian regime, has been well-served by Beijing’s largesse in the form of over $1.6 billion in recent loans. In Moldova, China outdid both the EU and Russia with a princely $1 billion low-interest loan. Ukraine has also benefited from a flurry of Chinese investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and energy projects. Even the Caucasus is drawing increased interest from China. Most impressive, perhaps, was Beijing’s establishment of a $10 billion credit line to support Chinese business investments in the region.
‘China currently has neither the resources nor the political will to move into Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia as an aspiring hegemon. But the strength of Beijing’s presence in the region is unlikely to remain purely economic indefinitely’China’s entrance into Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia does not appear to be geopolitical power play. At least not yet. At the same time, Chinese investments, generally free of the implicit demands relating to human rights and governments that usually bind Western dollars, can be controversial for their often opaque nature. More to the point, worldwide Chinese investments have sometimes served as loss leaders for the more intangible currencies of geopolitical influence and leverage.
In Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia, where regional power dynamics are highly multipolar, Beijing’s free-spending ways could set the stage for a genuine geopolitical role in the future. Other elements of China’s Eastern European interest could also be raising eyebrows. Defence technology cooperation with Russia may be on a downward trend, but Beijing has been able to keep itself informed of developments in Russian military hardware by cozying up to Eastern European states like Ukraine and Belarus. Meanwhile, China has shown an interest in flying its flag regionally, whether through surprise air force exercises or its navy’s increasingly regular cruises in the Mediterranean.
Of course, China currently has neither the resources nor the political will to move into Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia as an aspiring hegemon. However, the strength of Beijing’s presence in the region is unlikely to remain purely economic indefinitely. Indeed, given the region’s preponderance of strong states and groupings, China’s role there is bound to have international implications. As the Middle Kingdom’s stakes expand in the region, so too will its political role and a desire to act more directly in service of its interests. In the long view of things, economic investments now will be able to help shape the future of Chinese influence down the line, including in Eastern European capitals.
Credits, investments and autocracy
The growth of Beijing's role in the region will have another near-term effect besides economic development. With mounting investments in Eurasia, often with preferred terms or rates, China has the potential to be the creditor or investor of first resort. And with Beijing's robust resistance to US and EU stipulations such as performance metrics and democratic credentials, the West's already strained democratisation toolkit is likely to be further tested.
‘China's entry into the region has the potential to complicate matters by providing a fresh lifeline to autocratic regimes that have, until now, had to rely almost exclusively on Moscow or domestic sources of capital to avoid Western strings-attached funding.’‘Developing nations appear to appreciate the contracts provided by Beijing, especially when China offers investments that, other than recognition of its “one China” policy, impose no conditions,’ reads a mid-2012 policy brief from the German Marshall Fund, a think tank.
China's entry into the region has the potential to complicate matters still further by providing a fresh lifeline to autocratic regimes that have, until now, had to rely almost exclusively on Moscow or domestic sources of capital to avoid Western strings-attached funding. This could have major repercussions on the region: Western economic development programmes (at least ostensibly) aim to promote dispersed economic growth, whereas zero-strings funding will only help to entrench the status quo.
Worse still, regional states could fall into the pattern being played out across parts of Central Asia right now - where strongman regimes play Washington, Moscow, and Beijing off one another for the choicest investment and aid packages - with little hope of any genuine democratisation or liberalisation in the future. In some ways this is already happening, as the growing funding stream from Beijing seems to have roughly coincided with the stagnation of democracy development in the region.
China's growing role in post-communist Eurasia has many potential benefits, not least the possibility of stronger economic growth. But the frailty - or sometimes nonexistence - of democratic institutions in Eastern Europe and Eurasia make Chinese dollar diplomacy a worrying prospect. China's geopolitical leverage in the region may not appreciably develop for some time, but in terms of the West's democracy assistance agenda, it's well past time to start planning and retooling now for China's big splash.
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via oD Russia by Alexei Levinson on 3/5/13
On the 60th anniversary of Joseph Stalin’s death, with Russian and international TV news bulletins showing old footage of his life and his funeral, Alexei Levinson looks at how his legacy still divides Russians today.These are any number of reasons, for me the most important one is that we need to look closely at the Stalin era, at its rituals and its excesses, including the events surrounding Stalin’s funeral, to try to understand how much we are like the people in the photos, and how much we differ from them. Could the Russians of today behave like the crowds that thronged to Stalin’s funeral? Could the horrors of his reign be repeated, and if so, to what extent?
It is useful for people who ponder our society today to reassure themselves that some of the lessons of glasnost have been learnt. This was shown by the results of a nationwide survey of adult Russians conducted by the Levada Centre in February 2013. To the question, ‘What does Stalin’s death mean to you personally?’ more than half (55%) answered, ’The end of terror and mass repression, and the release from prison of millions of innocent people.’ Only 18% chose the answer ‘The loss of a great leader and teacher’ (13% of the youngest age group, 26% of the oldest – even among this group they are still in a minority).
'Public consciousness is not divided between those who are ‘pro-Stalin’ and those who are ‘anti-Stalin’; those who recognise his crimes and those who deny them. Today people ‘know everything’, but prefer ‘not to judge’, ‘not to condemn’ – in this they certainly differ from the Soviet citizens of Stalin’s own time.'The poll showed, however, that knowing about Stalin’s victims was still not enough to allow people to give a definite answer to the question ‘What role did Stalin play in the life of our country?’ Among respondents aged under forty, there were more ‘don’t knows’ than there were people choosing any more specific answer. And of those who did adopt a pro- or anti-Stalin position, only 10% on each side thought that Stalin’s role was ‘absolutely positive’ or ‘absolutely negative’. It is worth emphasising that even among respondents representing the opposite ends of the political spectrum in Russia, of [Communist] Zyuganov supporters less than 20% took this ‘stalinist’ line, and only about 10% of supporters of [free marketeer] Mikhail Prokhorov expressed the opposite, anti-stalin view. The majority of Russians – two thirds of those polled – chose ‘softer’ options on both sides of the divide, with 22% answering ‘more negative than positive’, and 40%, ‘more positive than negative’.
To sum up: public consciousness is not divided between those who are ‘pro-Stalin’ and those who are ‘anti-Stalin’; those who recognise his crimes and those who deny them. Today people ‘know everything’, but prefer ‘not to judge’, ‘not to condemn’ – in this they certainly differ from the Soviet citizens of Stalin’s own time. Today’s Russians are not looking for an all-powerful leader and don’t want anyone exterminated in the GULAG, as they did in the 30s. But they are still not totally immune to a system that might wish to behave in that way.
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via oD Russia by Ivan Krastev on 3/12/13
On paper, Russia’s political system is an impressive reproduction of Western representative democracy, while the Chinese system remains an unreconstructed autocracy. The reality of the situation is much more complex, says Ivan Krastev. ‘Though not quite representing an alternative to the age of democratisation, the Russian and Chinese systems are essentially adjustments to it: the Russians are faking democracy while the Chinese are faking Communism.’
The broader trends of democratisation and globalisation have not, however, passed either by. If in the past, monarchical power or ideology gave strong foundations to non-democratic regimes, today the only way to claim the right to govern is to claim popular backing. Coercion is no longer the central survival logic of either the Russian and Chinese regimes. A corollary of democratisation is the empowerment of people, and in particular the role of technology and communication within a globalising society. However hard they may try, non-democratic countries are still unable to prevent people from using the Internet, keeping cross-border connections, travelling or obtaining information about the wider world.
Added to these trends is another factor: financial crisis. At the onset of the difficulties, many analysts assumed that the changes would destabilise emerging democracies; others saw the crisis as a death sentence for authoritarian regimes. What seems to have happened is instead something more complex: a blurring of the border between democracy and authoritarianism. Though not quite representing an alternative to the age of democratisation, the Russian and Chinese systems have essentially become adjustments to it. Broadly speaking, the Russians are faking democracy while the Chinese are faking Communism.
A tale of two sophistries
At the juncture 1989-1991, both Communist leaderships — Soviet and Chinese — came to realise that Communism had become a dysfunctional type of system. But they had different understandings of what was wrong with it. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev decided that what was worth preserving were the socialist ideas, and what was bad was the Communist party and its inability to bring to mobilise the energy of the society. His idea of social transformation meant moving beyond the party rule, and developing a state which could be competitive in the Western paradigm. The Chinese communist party took a totally different view. They believed what was bad about communism were the Communist, socialist ideas, especially in an economic sense, and what was good about socialism was the Communist party and its capacity to keep control of society. So they did everything to keep the power infrastructure intact.‘If an alien with a degree in political science came from some other planet and landed in Russia, he would most probably think the country was a democracy. China, on the other hand, does not look like a democracy, not even to our alien friend.’
What do these regimes look like today? The Russian regime, observed from afar, certainly looks like a democracy. It enjoys a democratic constitution, runs elections, has a multiparty political system, has some free media and has not yet used tanks to crush massive public protests. If an alien with a degree in political science came from some other planet and landed in Russia, he would most probably think the country was a democracy. China, on the other hand, does not look like a democracy, not even to our alien friend. It is, instead, rather like a classic communist regime. As Richard McGregor observes in his book‘The Party’: ‘Beijing retains a surprising number of qualities that characterised communist regimes of the twentieth century. The Party in China has eradicated and emasculated political rivals, eliminated the autonomy of courts and press, restricted religion and civil society, established extensive network of security police, and dispatched dissidents to labour camps’.
On the level of institutional design not so much has changed in China since 1989, but almost everything has changed in Russia. The paradox, though, is that Russia’s imitation of democratic institutions has led to the establishment of an ineffective political regime deprived of political dynamism and characterised by low quality decision-making. The Chinese regime is generally accepted to be much more effective than the Russian one, and the quality of its decision-making is certainly much better. Moreover, it is arguably more democratic than Russia. Chinese regimes are much more capable for self-correction. They have succeeded in integrating key democratic elements while preserving the communist infrastructure of power.
Five Reasons why China is more democratic than Russia
Power RotationRussia clearly has elections, but no rotation of power. In the two post-communist decades, the president has not lost a single election: the role of the elections are not to secure the rotation of power, but to avoid it. In the case of China, clearly, the opposition doesn’t have a chance of winning either. Yet on the other hand, Chinese leaders do not stay in power for any more than ten years, after which a new party leader and president are automatically elected. In other words, in the Russian system elections are used as the way to legitimise the lack of rotation, while the Chinese Communist institutional structure has developed to allow an element of power rotation. Of course, we are still talking about two non-competitive regimes. But the Chinese understand that you need to change leadership, or you have a problem. The Chinese system, based on the principle of collective leadership, prevents the emergence of personalised authoritarianism and provides much more checks and balances. Unlike Russia, China is not haunted by the ghost of succession: the Party ensures a clear process of succession.
Listening to the People
By definition, non-democratic regimes have in-built hearing problems. Surveillance and polling can never replace the information that comes from people regularly taking place in free and competitive elections. Democratic elections are not only an option to elect leaders, but also a direct way to gauge where people stand.
You may go out in the streets, express your disagreement with politics and even insist that Putin should leave - but this does not mean your voice will be heard. Photo: (cc) Demotix/Alexey NikolaevWhen it comes to ‘hearing the people’, however, there is an important difference between China and Russia. This comes down to the fact that the Chinese government has not criminalised labour protest. Labour conflicts, ordinarily directed against regional leaders or company directors, are not considered dangerous for the party. So every year there are hundreds of thousands of strikes, and these have become an important source of reliable information. When people go on a direct protest, it is much better than pure polls —valuable not only because they are visible, but because they also offer an opportunity to contest the ability of the local leaders to settle conflicts. In Russia, the supposedly more democratic system, you don’t see strikes, because the price for protesting on labour issues is very high. Russia’s rigged elections are a much weaker test to judge the mood of the people and the ability of the regional leaders to deal with them.
Tolerance of opposition, tolerance of dissent
Democratic decision-making depends upon both diversity of views and the acceptability of disagreement, and here is where we uncover another point of divergence. If you compare Russia and China, you will see that in Russia there is certainly much more tolerance for organised opposition. The process is completely screwed up, but you can register a party, you can go on the street to protest, you can even ask Putin to resign. The Chinese regime is certainly much harsher and intolerant in this respect. But while the Kremlin broadly tolerates the opposition, it does not listen to it. It does not allow for dissent on policy matters and Government officials are careful not to advocate policies favoured by the opposition.
‘In the case of Chinese collective leadership, having different views is actually seen as legitimate. The loyalty test in China starts only once the Communist party has taken a decision. The loyalty test in Russia starts as soon as the president makes a proposal.’
Though the Chinese system is much more classically authoritarian and communist, its decision-making process is of a much better quality, more inclusive than the Russian one. In Russia, even when you have differences within the elite, most of the people explain them simply by economic differences. In the case of Chinese collective leadership, having different views is actually seen as legitimate. The loyalty test in China starts only once the Communist party has taken a decision. The loyalty test in Russia starts as soon as the president makes a proposal. A sense of general optimism and rising power also seems to have made China more tolerable to dissent on policy positions.
Recruitment of elites
Perhaps the most interesting comparison you can make between the two political systems is the way each of the countries goes about recruiting its elites. Where do people come from to occupy the most important positions in the state and leading industry? A studyconducted by Russkiy Reporter in the end of 2011 revealed a number of interesting facts on this front. First, the great majority of the Russian elites went to one of just two Universities. Second, none of those occupying the top 300 positions came from the Russian Far East. And, third, the most important factor influencing membership of this elite circle is to have known Mr Putin before he became president. In short, Russia is governed by a circle of friends. This is not a meritocratic system in any sense: most of these people have not had proper careers, but have simply ended in this ruling group.
This is not the way in which the Chinese Communist party works. It is doing its best to create different layers of society, and does try to make the system reasonably meritocratic. If you are cynical enough, if you want to do well, if you want to make money, the Communist Party is open for you. The Communist party serves as a vehicle to recruit and socialise the elites, and the Chinese leadership invests a lot in ensuring regional representation and providing its cadres with opportunity to get diverse experience.
Experimentation
My last point comparing these two systems is to emphasise the way in which the Chinese and Russians totally differ in their view of the experimental nature of politics. Chinese political and economic reforms are organised around the experimentation of different models in the different regions and try to figure out what works from the point of view of the leadership. This is emphatically not the case in Russia: experiment is, basically, a dirty word there. They are not experimenting in the process of trying to build a governable state.
What does it all mean?
In summary, while there was once a time that you measured democracy looking at institutions, now you need to also ask questions about how the institutions function. Do they look like democracies? Is it possible that the democracy is faked? Russia is a brilliant example that should force us to think. It has fashioned a democratic surface, but under this surface all types of non-democratic practices are flourishing. China is another country— authoritarian and severe undoubtedly. But because of the pressure of the system, the different ideas underlying its transformation, and the country’s involvement on the world stage, its political practices are much more open than its formal institutions may lead us to believe.
Between a faked democracy and a faked communism, the latter seems to be the more capable, governable and accountable regime. Photo: (cc) Flickr/openDemocracy
The nature of any political regime for self-correction is its major characteristic and it is the capacity of self-correction and public accountability that it is at the heart of any democratic advantage. There are now many in Kremlin who, on the contrary, think that excessive democratisation has been responsible for many of the problems that new country faces. Many envy ‘true’ Chinese authoritarianism. But the truth is that in many of its practices China is more democratic than Russia, and its decision-making is undoubtedly superior. Over the last two decades, when China was busy with capacity building, Russia seems to have been pre-occupied with incapacity hiding. When Western commentators try to make sense of the different performance of the new authoritarians, they would well advised to look beyond formal institutional design.
Ivan Krastev was talking to Darya Malyutina
Thumbnail: 'Politburo' by Maxim Kantor. All rights reserved
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via North Caucasus Analysis - The Jamestown Foundation on 3/1/13
Following the Kumyks, who held a rally in the city of Pyatigorsk on February 10 (http://www.chernovik.net/content/lenta-novostey/v-pyatigorske-proshyol-sezd-kumykskogo-naroda), Chechen residents of Dagestan have also come out into the streets to protest. The organizers of a rally held on February 23 to mark the 69th anniversary of the Chechen nation’s deportation to Kazakhstan and Central Asia decided to turn it into a permanent protest (http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2013/02/25/96434.shtml). Dagestan’s Chechens are demanding that the Dagestani government resettle them in the towns where they lived before the deportation. Chechens who have returned from exile have not been able to return to their own settlements for more than a half-century. After the Chechens were deported in February 1944, Dagestani Laks and Avars were resettled in their homes. The issue of the return of Chechen land and property has thus been a major issue in this part Dagestan for a long time.
Approximately 100,000 Chechens reside in Dagestan—3.22 percent of the republic’s population (www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/results2.html). However, the proximity of the 1.5 million Chechens in neighboring Chechnya certainly adds weight to the Dagestani Chechens’ claims. Chechnya closely watches the situation in Dagestan. So far, the Dagestani Chechens have made no political demands. Concentrated along the Aktash and Yaryk-Su rivers, the Chechens were involuntarily included in Dagestan in 1921, despite their wish to be included in the Chechen autonomous republic that existed at the time (Ed. Y.A. Aidaev, Chechens: History and Modernity, Moscow, 1996, pp. 196–198). The Chechens in Dagestan today reside in the Khasavyurt, Babayurt, Novolak and Kazbek districts in the northern part of the republic.
At some point after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Dagestani government heeded the constant demands of the Chechens and called on the Laks and Avars to relocate to the area near Makhachkala, thereby freeing up the area that belonged to the Chechen people. The Avar and Lak settlers were supposed to receive land and new homes from the government. A special republican program was created for the socio-economic development of the newly-founded settlements (Dagestani government decree, March 31, 2003, auh-inform.ru/index.php. However, the resettlement of the Laks has taken years and made the Chechens impatient. There are fewer and fewer Chechens left who were sent into exile in 1944 and were unable to return to their homes—a fact that exasperates the Chechen side. One of the best known Dagestani Chechens, three-time Olympic wrestling champion Buvaisar Saitiev, said in a recent interview that Chechens are embittered by the absence of progress on this issue (http://kavpolit.com/za-dagestan-bolno-no-byt-chinovnikom-ne-xochu/).
Several inter-ethnic conflicts already brew in the area to which the Chechens lay territorial claims—Chechen-Kumyk, Chechen-Lak, Chechen-Avar and Chechen-Cossack. Another spinoff from this conflict includes the tensions between Avars and Kumyks. Any serious disagreement on an individual level between members of different ethnic groups quickly turns into a larger-scale ethnic confrontation in this area (http://sitkin.narod.ru/etno.htm), which makes the region especially unpredictable and explosive. It is no wonder that this part of Dagestan is also one of the most deadly in terms of insurgency-related violence. The notion adopted by the armed resistance about Muslims having no nationality and therefore no reason to fight over land finds support among some young people. However, the authorities’ countervailing concept of peaceful coexistence of all people is not working in Dagestan, ethnically the most heterogeneous republic of the North Caucasus.
The new government of Dagestan, led by the republic’s acting president Ramazan Abdulatipov, is unlikely to be willing to become mired in this tangle of ethnic conflicts. Still, the Chechen protesters formed a special delegation to go to Makhachkala to deliver their message. Things could possibly have been resolved peacefully had the district authorities not ignored the protest and called in special police units. Even though the police did not try to disperse the aforementioned February 23 gathering, the authorities’ apparent intention to intimidate the protesters offended the rally’s young participants, who resolved to make their strike permanent. Rumors spread that the former president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, told a small circle of his associates that the promises to restore Chechens’ land would be postponed for another two years (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220642/). The authorities eventually managed to talk the demonstrators into suspending their protest and asked them for a two-month period in which to respond to their demands (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220694/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter). If the response is not favorable, the protesters said, they vow to stage a protest rally even larger than simply blocking a highway.
Could Abdulatipov’s hesitation to act on this issue be linked to his ignorance about the situation of the Dagestani Chechens? It is unlikely. During the period Abdulatipov was member of the Russian parliament and the minister for nationalities affairs, he was personally aware of this situation.
The Dagestani Chechen rally highlighted once again the multitude of issues that Dagestanis have faced during the past century. Officially, 14 large ethnic groups are recognized as indigenous groups in Dagestan (http://lawru.info/base89/part7/d89ru7364.htm). The Kumyks are demanding that other people stop settling on their lands and also want their historical district of Tarki to be restored near Makhachkala. The Nogais are demanding their own autonomous region. Problems also arise from the exodus of the ethnic Russians and Cossacks from northern Dagestan. The problem of divided peoples, such as the Lezgins as well as others, has not been resolved. The new president of Dagestan will have to dedicate much effort to determine his priorities—whether, for example, the government’s primary concern should be ethnic conflicts or the armed resistance.
Thus, Dagestan remains plagued by numerous problems that have never been solved. Against the background of a confrontation between ethnic clans and a Salafi armed rebellion, the addition of inter-ethnic problems could tear the republic apart. Moscow does not want a deterioration of the situation in the region that would threaten both the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 and the much advertised mountain and seaside resort development projects in Dagestan. Therefore, the local Dagestani authorities will likely soon be compelled to seriously address these problems, but it will undoubtedly be the federal authorities who will intervene more profoundly in the republic’s affairs.
Approximately 100,000 Chechens reside in Dagestan—3.22 percent of the republic’s population (www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/results2.html). However, the proximity of the 1.5 million Chechens in neighboring Chechnya certainly adds weight to the Dagestani Chechens’ claims. Chechnya closely watches the situation in Dagestan. So far, the Dagestani Chechens have made no political demands. Concentrated along the Aktash and Yaryk-Su rivers, the Chechens were involuntarily included in Dagestan in 1921, despite their wish to be included in the Chechen autonomous republic that existed at the time (Ed. Y.A. Aidaev, Chechens: History and Modernity, Moscow, 1996, pp. 196–198). The Chechens in Dagestan today reside in the Khasavyurt, Babayurt, Novolak and Kazbek districts in the northern part of the republic.
At some point after the demise of the Soviet Union, the Dagestani government heeded the constant demands of the Chechens and called on the Laks and Avars to relocate to the area near Makhachkala, thereby freeing up the area that belonged to the Chechen people. The Avar and Lak settlers were supposed to receive land and new homes from the government. A special republican program was created for the socio-economic development of the newly-founded settlements (Dagestani government decree, March 31, 2003, auh-inform.ru/index.php. However, the resettlement of the Laks has taken years and made the Chechens impatient. There are fewer and fewer Chechens left who were sent into exile in 1944 and were unable to return to their homes—a fact that exasperates the Chechen side. One of the best known Dagestani Chechens, three-time Olympic wrestling champion Buvaisar Saitiev, said in a recent interview that Chechens are embittered by the absence of progress on this issue (http://kavpolit.com/za-dagestan-bolno-no-byt-chinovnikom-ne-xochu/).
Several inter-ethnic conflicts already brew in the area to which the Chechens lay territorial claims—Chechen-Kumyk, Chechen-Lak, Chechen-Avar and Chechen-Cossack. Another spinoff from this conflict includes the tensions between Avars and Kumyks. Any serious disagreement on an individual level between members of different ethnic groups quickly turns into a larger-scale ethnic confrontation in this area (http://sitkin.narod.ru/etno.htm), which makes the region especially unpredictable and explosive. It is no wonder that this part of Dagestan is also one of the most deadly in terms of insurgency-related violence. The notion adopted by the armed resistance about Muslims having no nationality and therefore no reason to fight over land finds support among some young people. However, the authorities’ countervailing concept of peaceful coexistence of all people is not working in Dagestan, ethnically the most heterogeneous republic of the North Caucasus.
The new government of Dagestan, led by the republic’s acting president Ramazan Abdulatipov, is unlikely to be willing to become mired in this tangle of ethnic conflicts. Still, the Chechen protesters formed a special delegation to go to Makhachkala to deliver their message. Things could possibly have been resolved peacefully had the district authorities not ignored the protest and called in special police units. Even though the police did not try to disperse the aforementioned February 23 gathering, the authorities’ apparent intention to intimidate the protesters offended the rally’s young participants, who resolved to make their strike permanent. Rumors spread that the former president of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, told a small circle of his associates that the promises to restore Chechens’ land would be postponed for another two years (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220642/). The authorities eventually managed to talk the demonstrators into suspending their protest and asked them for a two-month period in which to respond to their demands (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/220694/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter). If the response is not favorable, the protesters said, they vow to stage a protest rally even larger than simply blocking a highway.
Could Abdulatipov’s hesitation to act on this issue be linked to his ignorance about the situation of the Dagestani Chechens? It is unlikely. During the period Abdulatipov was member of the Russian parliament and the minister for nationalities affairs, he was personally aware of this situation.
The Dagestani Chechen rally highlighted once again the multitude of issues that Dagestanis have faced during the past century. Officially, 14 large ethnic groups are recognized as indigenous groups in Dagestan (http://lawru.info/base89/part7/d89ru7364.htm). The Kumyks are demanding that other people stop settling on their lands and also want their historical district of Tarki to be restored near Makhachkala. The Nogais are demanding their own autonomous region. Problems also arise from the exodus of the ethnic Russians and Cossacks from northern Dagestan. The problem of divided peoples, such as the Lezgins as well as others, has not been resolved. The new president of Dagestan will have to dedicate much effort to determine his priorities—whether, for example, the government’s primary concern should be ethnic conflicts or the armed resistance.
Thus, Dagestan remains plagued by numerous problems that have never been solved. Against the background of a confrontation between ethnic clans and a Salafi armed rebellion, the addition of inter-ethnic problems could tear the republic apart. Moscow does not want a deterioration of the situation in the region that would threaten both the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014 and the much advertised mountain and seaside resort development projects in Dagestan. Therefore, the local Dagestani authorities will likely soon be compelled to seriously address these problems, but it will undoubtedly be the federal authorities who will intervene more profoundly in the republic’s affairs.
via Johnson's Russia List's Facebook Wall by Johnson's Russia List on 3/12/13
Russia Has Biggest Child Suicide Rate in Europe http://t.co/DhlXCcvuxJ #RUSSIA #CHILDREN #MENTAL #HEALTH #TEENS #YOUTHS #EUROPE
Russia Has Biggest Child Suicide Rate in Europe
russialist.org
MOSCOW. March 11 (Interfax) - Russia has the biggest child suicide rate in Europe, the Rospotrebnadzor website reported on Monday. "Russia has the highest suicide rate among children and teens in E...
Russia Has Biggest Child Suicide Rate in Europe
russialist.org
MOSCOW. March 11 (Interfax) - Russia has the biggest child suicide rate in Europe, the Rospotrebnadzor website reported on Monday. "Russia has the highest suicide rate among children and teens in E...
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Mike Nova's starred items
via Johnson's Russia List's Facebook Wall by Johnson's Russia List on 3/12/13
The Kremlin’s New Deal http://t.co/oufWEkfuy7 #RUSSIA #GOVERNMENT #CORRUPTION #PUTIN
The Kremlin's New Deal
russialist.org
(RFE/RL - rferl.org - Brian Whitmore - March 11, 2013) Tsar Peter I once proposed to his prosecutor-general that corrupt officials be either exiled to Siberia or executed. "But then who will be lef...
The Kremlin's New Deal
russialist.org
(RFE/RL - rferl.org - Brian Whitmore - March 11, 2013) Tsar Peter I once proposed to his prosecutor-general that corrupt officials be either exiled to Siberia or executed. "But then who will be lef...
via Johnson's Russia List's Facebook Wall by Johnson's Russia List on 3/12/13
Scandal Hits Duma Anti-Graft Chief http://t.co/RZGgcksJCF #RUSSIA #DUMA #CORRUPTION #POLITICS
Scandal Hits Duma Anti-Graft Chief
russialist.org
(Moscow Times - themoscowtimes.com - Jonathan Earle - March 12, 2013) Irina Yarovaya, head of the State Duma's powerful Anti-Corruption and Security Committee, on Monday became the latest United Ru...
Scandal Hits Duma Anti-Graft Chief
russialist.org
(Moscow Times - themoscowtimes.com - Jonathan Earle - March 12, 2013) Irina Yarovaya, head of the State Duma's powerful Anti-Corruption and Security Committee, on Monday became the latest United Ru...
via JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST by JRL Russia List on 3/12/13
(Bloomberg – bloomberg.com – Scott Rose – March 11, 2013) OAO Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas export monopoly, is thwarting efforts to boost oversight of its $28.9 billion in capital spending as the state seeks to improve investment, Deputy Economy Minister Sergei Belyakov said. “Despite the fact that it’s a state company, even we, to put it mildly, can’t always see where, how much, and why so much money is being
via JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST by JRL Russia List on 3/12/13
(Russia Beyond the Headlines – rbth.ru – Ben Aris, special to RBTH – March 11, 2013) Some $350 billion has fled Russia since the 2008 global crisis. But things aren’t as bad as they seem. Genuine capital flight is only half the official figure, according to a new study by Ernst & Young, together with the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Moscow State University’s Intelligent Reserve Center. Instead of $80
via JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST by JRL Russia List on 3/12/13
(Moscow Times – themoscowtimes.com – March 12, 2013) President Vladimir Putin has instructed major state companies to unofficially provide tax and financial authorities with information about their deals monthly in an effort to probe corruption. The Federal Tax Service and Federal Financial Monitoring Service receive the information in order to check whether corporate management is affiliated with any businesses, a government official said on condition of anonymity, Vedomosti reported. The
via Eurasia Daily Monitor - The Jamestown Foundation on 3/12/13
Moscow’s plans to reform and modernize its conventional Armed Forces have become encased in experiment, indecision, bureaucracy and secrecy. Since Army-General Sergei Shoigu was appointed as the defense minister in November 2012, the “reform” has officially stayed “on course,” while numerous instances of revision or quiet abandonment of many of the Anatoly Serdyukov and Nikolai Makarov–era initiatives ensued. Shoigu couches the aims and agenda of what he terms “capacity building” by referencing the “Defense Plan” to 2016 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 8). On the surface it may seem that Russian defense planning is now finally linked to a measureable and fixed agenda, yet the plan to which Shoigu refers is entirely secret, thus eliminating any trace of scrutiny of its formulation and implementation.
Nonetheless, two elements of Shoigu’s recent statements on defense planning over the next five years reflect continued uncertainty concerning military manpower and force structure; these are the intention to bolster the lightly armed Airborne Forces and boost overall numbers of serving contract personnel (kontraktniki). Such aims will face the same challenges that slowed and skewed the early 2008 reform agenda (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 1).
On March 6, the chief of the General Staff, Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov, addressed defense attaches in Moscow. Gerasimov stated that the defense ministry now intends to create a Special Operations command. “Having studied the practice of formation, training and the employment of Special Operations forces by the world’s leading states, the leadership of the ministry of defense too has set about creating one,” the chief of the General Staff noted, adding that the relevant command has been tentatively formed (Interfax, March 6). Earlier, Shoigu announced that Moscow will form rapid reaction forces on the basis of the elite Airborne Forces (Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska—VDV). The VDV will be used as a rapid reaction force in the event of crises on Russia’s periphery or within the country itself (RIA Novosti, February 28). However, although the details of the latest planning twist for the VDV are sketchy, they appear to rehash the aims declared in the fall of 2008 after the Serdyukov reform commenced; the earlier target to use the VDV as the basis for rapid reaction forces was later abandoned (Voyennoye Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October 22, 2008).
Shoigu also reiterates the Serdyukov-Makarov plan to reach a target of 425,000 kontraktniki by 2017, demanding an annual recruitment and retention of 50,000 contract personnel. Despite now referring to such future kontraktniki numbers, there is no apparent change to the recruitment system, as these contract soldiers will be drawn from the conscript pool. While some experiments in the combat training system center upon trying to improve the standards of professionalism and technical knowledge among the kontraktniki, there are underlying problems confronting such efforts and this stems from endemic corruption within the military system (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 8; Krasnaya Zvezda, March 5).
The Military Prosecutor Sergei Fridinskiy offers annual corruption figures for the Armed Forces. Although his 2012 figures take no account of the meta-corruption scandal surrounding the defense ministry–linked Oboronservis (see EDM, October 25, 2012; November 1, 2012), the trends are cause for concern. According to Fridinskiy, the share of crimes committed by officers in 2012 increased by 30 percent year-on-year, reaching its worst level in a decade. Interestingly, the share of crimes committed by kontraktniki increased by 14 percent since 2011. Of these crimes, which Fridinskiy linked to individual greed, 25 percent involved corruption amounting to losses of 7 billion rubles ($230 million). Bribery increased by one third, embezzlement and theft doubled and fraud rose by 20 percent—all indicating that despite the defense ministry reform campaigns, crime and corruption remain the booming industry of Russia’s Armed Forces (http://gvp.gov.ru/news/view/709/).
These corruption issues, which permeate the officer corps and the kontraktniki, are likely to mitigate any future plans to improve overall standards of discipline and professionalism in these key personnel areas. It is also tied to the vast waste of financial resources within the system, and the inability of the defense ministry to establish a transparent and accountable approach to the defense budget (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14627). Until the recruitment and promotion systems for officers and contract personnel are overhauled, these issues are likely to worsen (RIA Novosti, February 28). However, Shoigu depends on achieving higher contract personnel numbers without tackling deeper challenges. The defense ministry understands that kontraktniki will play an increasingly important role in the Armed Forces, especially as progress is made in introducing high-technology assets during the on-going modernization process. But it sees an organizational approach—rooted in using the VDV as a cutting edge driving force to establish new higher standards—as an answer to issues that cannot be solved in this manner.
By returning to an earlier idea to revamp the VDV as rapid reaction forces, vastly increasing contract service and adding for good measure the promise of a Special Operations command, it appears the current defense ministry leadership longs for a recipe to recast the old reform as alive and well. But the problem of military organizational structure, defense modernization, and the adoption of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) are all issues that will not go away. Sources in the presidential administration told Jamestown that the General Staff is currently studying force structure, and the Special Operations command is small-scale by comparison with their thinking on what will follow after 2015. Additional changes to the structure, command and organic shape of the Armed Forces will inevitably follow the introduction of C4ISR elements; this is preoccupying the General Staff, particularly the Ground Forces’ brigade structure.
The Russian political-military leadership has found a method through the secret “Defense Plan” to remove from the public domain what little objective measurement of reform or military modernization success that had existed. But what remains, based on the statements of leading officials and commanders, now rides on numerous experiments. These range from going back to copying Western approaches to Special Operations commands, to using the VDV to form a new rapid reaction capability. This depends, in turn, on the success of contract personnel recruitment and training. But even if there is limited progress in strengthening the VDV and other smaller forces, it will fail to answer the question as to which units would follow on from a “first-in” VDV response.
Nonetheless, two elements of Shoigu’s recent statements on defense planning over the next five years reflect continued uncertainty concerning military manpower and force structure; these are the intention to bolster the lightly armed Airborne Forces and boost overall numbers of serving contract personnel (kontraktniki). Such aims will face the same challenges that slowed and skewed the early 2008 reform agenda (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 1).
On March 6, the chief of the General Staff, Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov, addressed defense attaches in Moscow. Gerasimov stated that the defense ministry now intends to create a Special Operations command. “Having studied the practice of formation, training and the employment of Special Operations forces by the world’s leading states, the leadership of the ministry of defense too has set about creating one,” the chief of the General Staff noted, adding that the relevant command has been tentatively formed (Interfax, March 6). Earlier, Shoigu announced that Moscow will form rapid reaction forces on the basis of the elite Airborne Forces (Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska—VDV). The VDV will be used as a rapid reaction force in the event of crises on Russia’s periphery or within the country itself (RIA Novosti, February 28). However, although the details of the latest planning twist for the VDV are sketchy, they appear to rehash the aims declared in the fall of 2008 after the Serdyukov reform commenced; the earlier target to use the VDV as the basis for rapid reaction forces was later abandoned (Voyennoye Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October 22, 2008).
Shoigu also reiterates the Serdyukov-Makarov plan to reach a target of 425,000 kontraktniki by 2017, demanding an annual recruitment and retention of 50,000 contract personnel. Despite now referring to such future kontraktniki numbers, there is no apparent change to the recruitment system, as these contract soldiers will be drawn from the conscript pool. While some experiments in the combat training system center upon trying to improve the standards of professionalism and technical knowledge among the kontraktniki, there are underlying problems confronting such efforts and this stems from endemic corruption within the military system (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, March 8; Krasnaya Zvezda, March 5).
The Military Prosecutor Sergei Fridinskiy offers annual corruption figures for the Armed Forces. Although his 2012 figures take no account of the meta-corruption scandal surrounding the defense ministry–linked Oboronservis (see EDM, October 25, 2012; November 1, 2012), the trends are cause for concern. According to Fridinskiy, the share of crimes committed by officers in 2012 increased by 30 percent year-on-year, reaching its worst level in a decade. Interestingly, the share of crimes committed by kontraktniki increased by 14 percent since 2011. Of these crimes, which Fridinskiy linked to individual greed, 25 percent involved corruption amounting to losses of 7 billion rubles ($230 million). Bribery increased by one third, embezzlement and theft doubled and fraud rose by 20 percent—all indicating that despite the defense ministry reform campaigns, crime and corruption remain the booming industry of Russia’s Armed Forces (http://gvp.gov.ru/news/view/709/).
These corruption issues, which permeate the officer corps and the kontraktniki, are likely to mitigate any future plans to improve overall standards of discipline and professionalism in these key personnel areas. It is also tied to the vast waste of financial resources within the system, and the inability of the defense ministry to establish a transparent and accountable approach to the defense budget (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14627). Until the recruitment and promotion systems for officers and contract personnel are overhauled, these issues are likely to worsen (RIA Novosti, February 28). However, Shoigu depends on achieving higher contract personnel numbers without tackling deeper challenges. The defense ministry understands that kontraktniki will play an increasingly important role in the Armed Forces, especially as progress is made in introducing high-technology assets during the on-going modernization process. But it sees an organizational approach—rooted in using the VDV as a cutting edge driving force to establish new higher standards—as an answer to issues that cannot be solved in this manner.
By returning to an earlier idea to revamp the VDV as rapid reaction forces, vastly increasing contract service and adding for good measure the promise of a Special Operations command, it appears the current defense ministry leadership longs for a recipe to recast the old reform as alive and well. But the problem of military organizational structure, defense modernization, and the adoption of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) are all issues that will not go away. Sources in the presidential administration told Jamestown that the General Staff is currently studying force structure, and the Special Operations command is small-scale by comparison with their thinking on what will follow after 2015. Additional changes to the structure, command and organic shape of the Armed Forces will inevitably follow the introduction of C4ISR elements; this is preoccupying the General Staff, particularly the Ground Forces’ brigade structure.
The Russian political-military leadership has found a method through the secret “Defense Plan” to remove from the public domain what little objective measurement of reform or military modernization success that had existed. But what remains, based on the statements of leading officials and commanders, now rides on numerous experiments. These range from going back to copying Western approaches to Special Operations commands, to using the VDV to form a new rapid reaction capability. This depends, in turn, on the success of contract personnel recruitment and training. But even if there is limited progress in strengthening the VDV and other smaller forces, it will fail to answer the question as to which units would follow on from a “first-in” VDV response.
via Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia on 3/12/13
This is a transcript of a speech made by Irakli Alasania, Minister of Defence, Georgia, on 29 January 2013 at Chatham House. He outlined his government's vision for Georgia's future and explored how the new government can renew its relationship with its people and Georgia's relationship with its nearest neighbours. Event details and Q&A
via Chatham House - Russia and Eurasia on 3/13/13
Subscribe to the Chatham House Podcast in iTunes | via RSS Subscribe to Chatham House event audio in iTunes | via RSS Six identities of Vladimir Putin, introduced by Fiona Hill, Director, Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution; and author of Mr Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, on 12 March 2013 at Chatham House. Chair: Edward Lucas, International Section Editor, The Economist
via www.opendemocracy.net on 3/13/13
|
Grigorii Golosov is Professor of Political Science, Project Director, Center for Democracy and Human Rights Helix, St. Petersburg
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Mike Nova's starred items
via AEI.Org: Leon Aron on 3/5/13
The White House is trying to revive the "reset" with Vladimir Putin's Russia. It is likely to be a wasted effort.
via AEI.Org: Leon Aron on 3/11/13
As US President Barack Obama begins a second term, it is worth asking what Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy goals are and what US priorities toward Russia should be.
via AEI.Org: Leon Aron on 3/11/13
Although U.S. President Barack Obama has signaled lately that he will attempt to revive the "reset" with Russia, Washington's best option may well be a strategic pause: a much-scaled-down mode of interaction that reflects the growing disparity in values and objectives between the two countries yet preserves frank dialogue and even cooperation in a few select areas.
via AEI.Org: Leon Aron on 3/11/13
The Putin Doctrine leaves little room for compromise with the United States when Moscow believes that Washington is undermining Russia’s status as a great power.
via ЖЖ Марины Литвиновичon 2/20/13
На сайте Жириновского наткнулась на замечательную цитату:
"Многие считают, что если провести серьезное расследование, то последствия для многих российских чиновников и депутатов могут быть очень серьезные. Не секрет, что большие и не очень государственные люди, как правило, либо кандидаты, либо доктора наук. При этом большинство наблюдателей поражается, как они находят время еще и на написание научных трудов".
Да, да! Удивительно, как в точку! Прямо про самого Владимира Вольфовича с его "диссертацией" "Прошлое, настроящее и будущее русской нации", с которой можно ознакомиться по ссылке. Я, и вправду, ознакомилась. Всего лишь (!) 80 страниц самого текста + список литературы, сплошь состоящий из "трудов" самого Жириновского, типа его агитки "Последний бросок на юг".
Конечно, это никакая не диссертация доктора наук. Тут даже и на кандидата не тянет.
Для диссертационных работ есть четкие правила:
"Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора наук должна быть научной квалификационной работой, отвечающей одному из следующих трех пунктов, определяющих характер результатов диссертационной работы.
1. В диссертации должны быть разработаны теоретические положения, совокупность которых можно квалифицировать как новое крупное научное достижение.
2. В диссертационной работе должно быть осуществлено решение крупной научной проблемы, имеющей важное социально-культурное или хозяйственное значение.
3. В диссертационной работе должны быть изложены научно обоснованные технические, экономические или технологические решения, внедрение которых вносит значительный вклад в развитие экономики страны и повышение ее обороноспособности".
Текст "диссертации" Жирика - обычная компиляция, и никаких "крупных научных достижений" там, естественно, нет. И никакая крупная научная проблема там не решена. В отличие от разоблаченной коллегой
afrikanbo диссертации сына Жириновского, которая сплошь является плагитатом, у самого Вольфовича никакого плагиата нет. Просто там нет никакой науки! Это, по-моему, еще хуже, чем плагиат )
Самое интересное, что в настоящий момент действуют правила, по которым пересмотр присвоения степеней имеет срок давности - 3 года. Еще совсем недавно срок был другой - 10 лет. Сейчас Минобразования подготовил проект "Порядка рассмотрения вопроса о лишении (восстановлении) ученых степеней", в котором вообще отсутствуют какие-либо ограничительные сроки. Так что, если этот порядок примут, то вполне возможно, что с Жириновского снимут степень доктора наук.
А вы пока насладитесь знаменитой цитатой из одного из "научных источников" из списка литературы "диссертации" доктора философских наук В.В.Жириновского:
"И сегодня я говорю вaм, русские: "Великa Россия, но мы должны спуститься вниз нa юг, к Индийскому океaну, инaче мы не спaсем нaше Отечество, нaшу Россию". И долго потом еще будут стонaть нaши писaтели и интеллигенты: "Россия, которую мы потеряли", "Тaк жить нельзя". А тaк, кaк сейчaс, жить можно, господa? С кем вы, мaстерa культуры? Сколько можно проливaть бердяевские слезы? Дaвaйте жить тaк, кaк нaм зaвещaли нaши великие имперaторы, цaри русские, философы русские - Ивaн Алексaндрович Ильин. Дaвaйте действовaть тaк, кaк действовaли нaши премьер-министры - Витте, Столыпин. Мы пойдем нa юг кaк освободители, чтобы покончить с нaсилием, которое идет тaм сейчaс. Сотни нaродов в крови. Просыпaются и зaсыпaют под свист нуль. Взрывы. Живут в нaсилии, в мaродерстве. И все это остaновит русский солдaт, русскaя aрмия остaновит это нaсилие, нaдругaтельство нaд человеческой культурой. А сaми русские солдaты остaновятся нa берегу теплого Индийского океaнa, зaложив тaм новые зaстaвы, посты, поселки, бaзы отдыхa, и будут прожекторaми освещaть погрaничные воды Индийского океaнa". (Цитата из книжки "Последний бросок на юг")
"Многие считают, что если провести серьезное расследование, то последствия для многих российских чиновников и депутатов могут быть очень серьезные. Не секрет, что большие и не очень государственные люди, как правило, либо кандидаты, либо доктора наук. При этом большинство наблюдателей поражается, как они находят время еще и на написание научных трудов".
Да, да! Удивительно, как в точку! Прямо про самого Владимира Вольфовича с его "диссертацией" "Прошлое, настроящее и будущее русской нации", с которой можно ознакомиться по ссылке. Я, и вправду, ознакомилась. Всего лишь (!) 80 страниц самого текста + список литературы, сплошь состоящий из "трудов" самого Жириновского, типа его агитки "Последний бросок на юг".
Конечно, это никакая не диссертация доктора наук. Тут даже и на кандидата не тянет.
Для диссертационных работ есть четкие правила:
"Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора наук должна быть научной квалификационной работой, отвечающей одному из следующих трех пунктов, определяющих характер результатов диссертационной работы.
1. В диссертации должны быть разработаны теоретические положения, совокупность которых можно квалифицировать как новое крупное научное достижение.
2. В диссертационной работе должно быть осуществлено решение крупной научной проблемы, имеющей важное социально-культурное или хозяйственное значение.
3. В диссертационной работе должны быть изложены научно обоснованные технические, экономические или технологические решения, внедрение которых вносит значительный вклад в развитие экономики страны и повышение ее обороноспособности".
Текст "диссертации" Жирика - обычная компиляция, и никаких "крупных научных достижений" там, естественно, нет. И никакая крупная научная проблема там не решена. В отличие от разоблаченной коллегой
afrikanbo диссертации сына Жириновского, которая сплошь является плагитатом, у самого Вольфовича никакого плагиата нет. Просто там нет никакой науки! Это, по-моему, еще хуже, чем плагиат )Самое интересное, что в настоящий момент действуют правила, по которым пересмотр присвоения степеней имеет срок давности - 3 года. Еще совсем недавно срок был другой - 10 лет. Сейчас Минобразования подготовил проект "Порядка рассмотрения вопроса о лишении (восстановлении) ученых степеней", в котором вообще отсутствуют какие-либо ограничительные сроки. Так что, если этот порядок примут, то вполне возможно, что с Жириновского снимут степень доктора наук.
А вы пока насладитесь знаменитой цитатой из одного из "научных источников" из списка литературы "диссертации" доктора философских наук В.В.Жириновского:
"И сегодня я говорю вaм, русские: "Великa Россия, но мы должны спуститься вниз нa юг, к Индийскому океaну, инaче мы не спaсем нaше Отечество, нaшу Россию". И долго потом еще будут стонaть нaши писaтели и интеллигенты: "Россия, которую мы потеряли", "Тaк жить нельзя". А тaк, кaк сейчaс, жить можно, господa? С кем вы, мaстерa культуры? Сколько можно проливaть бердяевские слезы? Дaвaйте жить тaк, кaк нaм зaвещaли нaши великие имперaторы, цaри русские, философы русские - Ивaн Алексaндрович Ильин. Дaвaйте действовaть тaк, кaк действовaли нaши премьер-министры - Витте, Столыпин. Мы пойдем нa юг кaк освободители, чтобы покончить с нaсилием, которое идет тaм сейчaс. Сотни нaродов в крови. Просыпaются и зaсыпaют под свист нуль. Взрывы. Живут в нaсилии, в мaродерстве. И все это остaновит русский солдaт, русскaя aрмия остaновит это нaсилие, нaдругaтельство нaд человеческой культурой. А сaми русские солдaты остaновятся нa берегу теплого Индийского океaнa, зaложив тaм новые зaстaвы, посты, поселки, бaзы отдыхa, и будут прожекторaми освещaть погрaничные воды Индийского океaнa". (Цитата из книжки "Последний бросок на юг")
via Kafkasya Forumu by CF_editor on 12/17/12
Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev says a second suspect in the murder of a television newscaster in Russia’s Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has been identified.
The men are suspected of shooting broadcaster Kazbek Gekkiyev as he was leaving work on the evening of December 5.
The spokesman for Russia’s Investigative Committee, Vladimir Markin, said in Moscow that the man was identified as a citizen of Kabardino-Balkaria, 27-year-old Inoyat Tabukhov.
Earlier this week, police identified 30-year-old Zeytun Baziev, also a resident of the Kabardino-Balkaria capital, Nalchik, as a suspect.
Both Baziev and Tabukhov are currently at-large.
The day after Gekkiyev’s murder, Russian President Vladimir Putin demanded that local law enforcement bring the journalist’s killer or killers to justice.
Courtesy of: RFE/RL
via Kafkasya Forumu by CF Admin on 2/2/13
Eleven suspected militants reportedly have been killed in Russia’s Chechen Republic in the North Caucasus.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov said the two most-wanted Islamic insurgent leaders — the brothers Muslim and Khusein Gakayev — were among those reported killed.
He said the special operation has been under way in the republic’s south since January 23.
In 2010, Kadyrov announced a 10 million ruble ($330,900) reward for information about the Gakayevs’ whereabouts after they allegedly led an attack against Kadyrov’s native village of Tsentoroi.
Violence between Islamic militants and police in Russia’s troubled North Caucasus region leaves scores of people dead and injured each year.
The region’s violence-plagued republics include Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.
Based on reporting by Interfax and svpress.ru
Courtesy of: Radio Free Europe
via Kafkasya Forumu by CF Admin on 2/10/13
Human Rights Watch has published a short documentary of people who suffer from Sochi 2014 Olimpic Games.
