The Kremlin's New Deal
Vladimir Putin is offering the elite a new deal they can't refuse. And they don't like it.
The Kremlin's New Deal
Tsar Peter I once proposed to his prosecutor-general that corrupt officials be either exiled to Siberia or executed.
"But then who will be left?" the prosecutor responded, according to the oft-repeated historical anecdote. "We're all thieves."
President Vladimir Putin repeated this tale during his press conference in December to illustrate how difficult it is to combat corruption. He was, of course, painting himself as the good tsar who, regretfully, had to discipline his bad boyars.
But if Putin wanted to be more honest, he could have chosen a popular Soviet-era joke about a minor bureaucrat imprisoned for graft:
The second anecdote is more appropriate for the simple reason that it illustrates that official corruption is not a bug in Russia's operating system, but an essential feature. And it's a feature that Putin has used very effectively to keep the elite motivated and in line.
Putin's deal with the elite was always pretty straightforward: Steal (but not too much for your rank) and nobody will mess with you as long as you give unwavering loyalty to the national leader.
But now, one year after Putin won election to a third term in the Kremlin, he is rewriting the terms of the bargain. Putin's "New Deal" with the elite could turn out to be one of the riskiest and trickiest initiatives of his rule.
And it has nothing to do with fighting corruption. It's all about reestablishing control and ensuring loyalty -- both of which the Kremlin leader apparently believes are slipping.
This week, the State Duma is expected to pass the final version of legislation forbidding certain categories of officials from keeping their assets abroad. According to the daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta," the bill forbids officials from having a bank account abroad, keeping money in any foreign account, or holding bonds issued by any foreign entity. They will also be required to declare any foreign real-estate holdings.
The Russian media calls this the "re-nationalization" of the elite, and part of the logic behind it is the fear that Russian officials keeping assets abroad could turn out to be disloyal.
Such fears were redoubled by new legislation in the United States providing for visa bans and asset freezes against Russian officials who violate human rights. Some European countries are considering similar legislation, and Putin is clearly worried that this would give Western governments unacceptable leverage.
According to the respected political analyst Yevgeny Minchenko, Putin believes officials "should be completely independent of foreign countries and fully accountable to the president."
Additionally, the opposition's successful rebranding of the elite as "swindlers and thieves" has stuck in the public consciousness -- meaning the Kremlin will now need to more convincingly pretend to care about official graft. Some officials who thought they were untouchable will be vulnerable.
"This is a fundamentally new Putin with regard to the elite," political analyst Igor Bunin, director of the Center for Political Technologies, told the daily "Moskovsky komsomolets."
"Previously, he kept the balance between the interest groups; now he has decided to reformat the elite. It had lived comfortably in symbiosis with the regime, and suddenly it was told that it needed to be nationally oriented, and not have accounts abroad."
If Putin follows through with all this, it will change his relationship with the ruling elite pretty dramatically. Putin's elite support was largely based on two services he provided: He was the ultimate arbiter in disputes between warring factions and he was the protector of their wealth and privilege.
Both could now come under question.
"This law is about political, and not legal, control," Dmitry Gorovtsov, a Duma deputy from the center-left A Just Russia party, told "Nezavisimaya gazeta."
"It will be applied selectively and subjectively."
Putin, in essence, is asking the elite to give something up they had become accustomed to, while offering nothing in return. And this comes at a time when many of them are uncomfortable with the traditionalist and xenophobic line the Kremlin has recently adopted.
Whether this is an offer the elite can't refuse is still an open question. Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Carnegie Center told "The Washington Post" that Putin risks losing the support of key sectors of the ruling class, which could begin seeking ways to replace him.
Such fears may be the reason the Kremlin toned down an earlier, much stricter, version of the legislation now pending in the Duma.
Meanwhile, all this attention on the elite's property has been a godsend for oppositionists like anticorruption blogger Aleksei Navalny -- who appears to be delighting in stealing the Kremlin's thunder on the issue.
Navalny was instrumental in detailing and publicizing the undeclared real estate in Miami owned by lawmaker Vladimir Pekhtin, which was initially exposed by the Spain-based blogger Dr. Z.
Pekhtin was forced to resign his seat in the Duma as a result. His departure was followed by the resignations of two more lawmakers with undeclared property issues, Anatoly Lomakin and Vasily Tolstopyatov.
And last week, Navalny turned his sights on Andrei Turchak, the governor of Pskov Oblast whose father was once Putin's judo partner. According to documents Navalny posted on his blog, Turchak is the proud owner of an undeclared villa, worth 1.27 million euros.
And as the whole thing plays out, a funk is settling in among the elite, according to Gleb Pavlovsky, a onetime Putin adviser.
"It seems that Vladimir Vladimirovich’s general idea is that only he should manage everyone, trusting no one. But this is impossible," Pavlovsky told "Moskovsky komsomolets."
"Officials at all levels perceive the president’s strange behavior as a signal: Remain silent, don't act, and don't stand out. Remain sitting, do not move, and be afraid. Stagnation is setting in."
-- Brian Whitmore
"But then who will be left?" the prosecutor responded, according to the oft-repeated historical anecdote. "We're all thieves."
President Vladimir Putin repeated this tale during his press conference in December to illustrate how difficult it is to combat corruption. He was, of course, painting himself as the good tsar who, regretfully, had to discipline his bad boyars.
But if Putin wanted to be more honest, he could have chosen a popular Soviet-era joke about a minor bureaucrat imprisoned for graft:
"The poor guy. Why'd they pick on him?" one colleague asked.
"He stole too much for someone of his rank," another answered.
"He stole too much for someone of his rank," another answered.
The second anecdote is more appropriate for the simple reason that it illustrates that official corruption is not a bug in Russia's operating system, but an essential feature. And it's a feature that Putin has used very effectively to keep the elite motivated and in line.
Putin's deal with the elite was always pretty straightforward: Steal (but not too much for your rank) and nobody will mess with you as long as you give unwavering loyalty to the national leader.
But now, one year after Putin won election to a third term in the Kremlin, he is rewriting the terms of the bargain. Putin's "New Deal" with the elite could turn out to be one of the riskiest and trickiest initiatives of his rule.
And it has nothing to do with fighting corruption. It's all about reestablishing control and ensuring loyalty -- both of which the Kremlin leader apparently believes are slipping.
This week, the State Duma is expected to pass the final version of legislation forbidding certain categories of officials from keeping their assets abroad. According to the daily "Nezavisimaya gazeta," the bill forbids officials from having a bank account abroad, keeping money in any foreign account, or holding bonds issued by any foreign entity. They will also be required to declare any foreign real-estate holdings.
The Russian media calls this the "re-nationalization" of the elite, and part of the logic behind it is the fear that Russian officials keeping assets abroad could turn out to be disloyal.
Such fears were redoubled by new legislation in the United States providing for visa bans and asset freezes against Russian officials who violate human rights. Some European countries are considering similar legislation, and Putin is clearly worried that this would give Western governments unacceptable leverage.
According to the respected political analyst Yevgeny Minchenko, Putin believes officials "should be completely independent of foreign countries and fully accountable to the president."
Additionally, the opposition's successful rebranding of the elite as "swindlers and thieves" has stuck in the public consciousness -- meaning the Kremlin will now need to more convincingly pretend to care about official graft. Some officials who thought they were untouchable will be vulnerable.
"This is a fundamentally new Putin with regard to the elite," political analyst Igor Bunin, director of the Center for Political Technologies, told the daily "Moskovsky komsomolets."
"Previously, he kept the balance between the interest groups; now he has decided to reformat the elite. It had lived comfortably in symbiosis with the regime, and suddenly it was told that it needed to be nationally oriented, and not have accounts abroad."
If Putin follows through with all this, it will change his relationship with the ruling elite pretty dramatically. Putin's elite support was largely based on two services he provided: He was the ultimate arbiter in disputes between warring factions and he was the protector of their wealth and privilege.
Both could now come under question.
"This law is about political, and not legal, control," Dmitry Gorovtsov, a Duma deputy from the center-left A Just Russia party, told "Nezavisimaya gazeta."
"It will be applied selectively and subjectively."
Putin, in essence, is asking the elite to give something up they had become accustomed to, while offering nothing in return. And this comes at a time when many of them are uncomfortable with the traditionalist and xenophobic line the Kremlin has recently adopted.
Whether this is an offer the elite can't refuse is still an open question. Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Carnegie Center told "The Washington Post" that Putin risks losing the support of key sectors of the ruling class, which could begin seeking ways to replace him.
Such fears may be the reason the Kremlin toned down an earlier, much stricter, version of the legislation now pending in the Duma.
Meanwhile, all this attention on the elite's property has been a godsend for oppositionists like anticorruption blogger Aleksei Navalny -- who appears to be delighting in stealing the Kremlin's thunder on the issue.
Navalny was instrumental in detailing and publicizing the undeclared real estate in Miami owned by lawmaker Vladimir Pekhtin, which was initially exposed by the Spain-based blogger Dr. Z.
Pekhtin was forced to resign his seat in the Duma as a result. His departure was followed by the resignations of two more lawmakers with undeclared property issues, Anatoly Lomakin and Vasily Tolstopyatov.
And last week, Navalny turned his sights on Andrei Turchak, the governor of Pskov Oblast whose father was once Putin's judo partner. According to documents Navalny posted on his blog, Turchak is the proud owner of an undeclared villa, worth 1.27 million euros.
And as the whole thing plays out, a funk is settling in among the elite, according to Gleb Pavlovsky, a onetime Putin adviser.
"It seems that Vladimir Vladimirovich’s general idea is that only he should manage everyone, trusting no one. But this is impossible," Pavlovsky told "Moskovsky komsomolets."
"Officials at all levels perceive the president’s strange behavior as a signal: Remain silent, don't act, and don't stand out. Remain sitting, do not move, and be afraid. Stagnation is setting in."
-- Brian Whitmore
Scandal Hits Duma Anti-Graft Chief
Irina Yarovaya, head of the State Duma's powerful Anti-Corruption and Security Committee, on Monday became the latest United Russia deputy to face embarrassing allegations of ethics violations with the publication of a report accusing her of de facto owning a multimillion-dollar apartment.
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8:34 AM 3/12/2013 - Mike Nova's starred items
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Worldcrunch |
Will Russia's Cozy Relationship With Venezuela Die With Chavez?
Worldcrunch “No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington ... and more » |
Will Russia's Cozy Relationship With Venezuela Die With Chavez?
MOSCOW - When word first came out in 2011 that Hugo Chavez was suffering from a serious illness, a Russian military source predicted the consequences of the end of the Chavez era: not only could Moscow lose contracts already signed, but it might also never get paid for weapons it has already delivered to Caracas.
Russia has a lot to lose in Venezuela. In total, experts estimate that the projects that Moscow had inked with Chavez are worth no less than $30 billion. And now the guarantor is gone.
People started to expect an announcement regarding Chavez’s death on Tuesday, when his official successor Nicolas Maduro called an urgent meeting with the country’s leadership. But the vice-president only said that the president “was going through his worst hours since Dec. 11 (when Chavez underwent an operation for his cancer),” and used the opportunity to accuse Venezuela’s enemies of provoking Chavez’s illness.
Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.
Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.
Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.
“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”
The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions.”
Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.”
False friendships, mythical deals
Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”
According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”
“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were interested, anyway,” Semago explained.
In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,” explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.”
Russia has a lot to lose in Venezuela. In total, experts estimate that the projects that Moscow had inked with Chavez are worth no less than $30 billion. And now the guarantor is gone.
People started to expect an announcement regarding Chavez’s death on Tuesday, when his official successor Nicolas Maduro called an urgent meeting with the country’s leadership. But the vice-president only said that the president “was going through his worst hours since Dec. 11 (when Chavez underwent an operation for his cancer),” and used the opportunity to accuse Venezuela’s enemies of provoking Chavez’s illness.
Nicolas Maduro said that America’s military attaché, David Delmonaco, would be removed because he was destabilizing the country. A couple of hours later, the vice-president was on the TV again. “Commandante Hugo Chavez died at 4:25 p.m. local time,” he announced with a shaky voice, and called on Venezuelans to come together and wipe away their tears. “Viva Hugo Chavez,” he said, raising his fist in a symbol of victory.
Thousands of people filled the streets in Caracas, and Venezuela entered a weeklong national mourning. Chavez was buried on Friday, and Russia sent the head of Rosneft energy giant Igor Sechin, Minister of Industry Denis Manturov and the general director of Rostechnology.
Now Venezuela is preparing to elect a new president. No matter who wins, whether it is Chavez’s designated successor or the opposition candidate, experts say that there will likely be serious changes.
“No new government is going to continue the sharp anti-Americanism that Chavez governed with," explained Fedor Lukyanov, a representative of the Russian Council on Foreign Relations. "If Maduro wins, the relationship between Caracas and Washington will improve. If the opposition wins, then the country will totally reorient itself towards the United States.”
The Kremlin has expressed hope that “the positive and constructive Russian-Venezuelan relations will remain unchanged.” But Lukyanov is convinced to the contrary: “The 2000s were an anomaly, when Venezuela became one of Russia’s most important world trade partners, and that anomaly is unlikely to survive Chavez’s death, because it was connected to Chavez personally, to his personal political views and ambitions.”
Another experts says: “many of the agreements between Caracas and Moscow will remain, at least on paper, but others will likely be revisited.”
False friendships, mythical deals
Vladimir Semago, the vice-head of the Russian-Venezuelan Commerce Council is even more emphatic. “Now that Hugo Chavez is gone, all of this pretense of friendship with Venezuela will go, too,” he told Kommersant. “There was never any real partnership between our countries, there were only attempts to convince Russians that Moscow was colonizing Latin America, like it did in Africa during Soviet times.”
According to Semago, one of the most ambitious projects – the creation of an oil consortium that is a partnership between the Russian national companies and the Venezuelan oil company – is a “total myth.”
“The consortium was never allowed to do anything and never accomplished anything. There were only ever two Russian companies that were interested, anyway,” Semago explained.
[Chavez and Putin in 2004 - Photo: Kremlin]
There are even more questions about the future of Russian-Venezuelan military partnerships, because those deals were always intimately connected to Chavez himself. When Chavez visited Moscow in 2004, he signed the first two major military contracts, for over $550 million worth of military equipment. “The work was hard, but as soon as Chavez got involved, it was like there was suddenly understanding on both sides,” said a source familiar with the negotiations. “And in all of the subsequent weapons negotiations he took a very direct role.” In 2011, Chavez was able to get an agreement for Russia to extend a $4 billion dollar credit to Venezuela for weapons purchases. “Even though extending this credit was basically suicide, we still did it, because it was important for us to maintain a good relationship with Caracas,” explained a source in the Federal service for military partnerships. “But when it became clear that you couldn’t have a dialogue with anyone but Chavez himself, the other members of the Venezuelan delegation stopped making an effort to work with us.”
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/9/13
Chavez's 'Bolivarian revolution' was a regional bust
Globe and Mail Outside South America, Mr. Chavez was a polarizing figure: His outspoken anti-Americanism and alliances with the dictators of Iran, Libya and Iraq led him to be demonized by many as a Cold War-style threat. For others, he was a hero: a dark-skinned ... and more » |
Doug Saunders: Hugo Chavez had nothing to do with South America's real revolution
What ended this week, with the death of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, was a continent-wide experiment in the transformation of human life through politics.
Outside South America, Mr. Chavez was a polarizing figure: His outspoken anti-Americanism and alliances with the dictators of Iran, Libya and Iraq led him to be demonized by many as a Cold War-style threat. For others, he was a hero: a dark-skinned child of the slums who beat down rapacious corporations and gave his country’s oil money to the poor and championed the marginalized.
For the outside world, then, the legacy of his “Bolivarian revolution” is a contest of left and right. But within South America, something much more interesting took place during his 14 years in power – something that offers important lessons.
Mr. Chavez was far from the only leftist to govern a Latin American country in the 21st century: Within a decade of his 1999 election, left-wing leaders had come to office in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and El Salvador; they now govern about two-thirds of the region’s people.
But they’re not all the same. If the great divide in the 20th century was between pro-American right-wing strongmen and anti-American Marxist autocrats, after 1999, it was between two varieties of left-wing government.
Some countries, notably Brazil and Chile, elected parties that embraced open trade and market economies and used the resulting tax revenues to build social programs and redistribute income. They are the social democrats. Others, notably Argentina and Venezuela, preferred to impose national control of key industries, block trade and foreign investment, control prices and give resource income directly to the poor. They tend to call themselves democratic socialists.
This showdown between social democrats and democratic socialists took place at a fortuitous moment: Oil and natural resource booms were boosting revenues; six decades of intense urbanization had ended in stable populations; and the U.S. had become less confrontational. As a result, poverty declined and the gap between rich and poor narrowed in almost all of these countries. But there was a big difference between the two systems.
A study by economists Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig found that, in Argentina and Venezuela, inequality was reduced back to early 1990s levels after peaking in the early 2000s. But in social democratic Brazil and Chile, smart policies cut inequality to record-low levels: “Though both regimes reduced inequality and poverty,” once you remove the inevitable effects of rising oil prices, “only the social democratic regimes appear to break with the past, reducing inequality to historic lows.”
The Chavez approach helped the poor by giving them some money and health care. This isn’t to be dismissed: It sharply reduced the worst forms of misery. But neighbouring countries did the same while also creating a sustainable future beyond poverty; they created the business opportunities and economic institutions that make it possible for the poor to enter the middle class.
In Brazil and Chile, according to research by the Washington-based Center for Global Development, the size of the middle class expanded, to a fifth and a third of the population. In Venezuela, during the first half of the Chavez years, it collapsed to 3 per cent from 21 per cent, as the private-sector economy crumbled, and doesn’t appear to have recovered.
Here’s where the difference between Venezuela and Brazil is not simply one of degree, but of a fundamental nature: The populist, highly nationalist socialism of Mr. Chavez did serious damage to the institutions that could give people a path out of poverty. His neighbours spent a decade strengthening them.
Because Mr. Chavez regulated food prices and discouraged commercial farming, slashing agricultural capacity, there are major food shortages and hours-long lineups at government-subsidized supermarkets. Electricity supplies are sporadic, schools teach thin propaganda in place of a curriculum, cities and roads are crumbling, and hospitals are among the worst on the continent. This petroleum superpower has not saved or invested anything. On the contrary, Venezuela has a 20-per-cent deficit and an inflation rate of 30 per cent a year.
The “Bolivarian revolution” was not new politics but rather a copy of Venezuela’s policies of the 1970s and early 1980s, with the same results. Then, it was followed by a post-oil collapse back into poverty. This time, there were other, smarter options. They still exist, just over the border.
Outside South America, Mr. Chavez was a polarizing figure: His outspoken anti-Americanism and alliances with the dictators of Iran, Libya and Iraq led him to be demonized by many as a Cold War-style threat. For others, he was a hero: a dark-skinned child of the slums who beat down rapacious corporations and gave his country’s oil money to the poor and championed the marginalized.
For the outside world, then, the legacy of his “Bolivarian revolution” is a contest of left and right. But within South America, something much more interesting took place during his 14 years in power – something that offers important lessons.
Mr. Chavez was far from the only leftist to govern a Latin American country in the 21st century: Within a decade of his 1999 election, left-wing leaders had come to office in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and El Salvador; they now govern about two-thirds of the region’s people.
But they’re not all the same. If the great divide in the 20th century was between pro-American right-wing strongmen and anti-American Marxist autocrats, after 1999, it was between two varieties of left-wing government.
Some countries, notably Brazil and Chile, elected parties that embraced open trade and market economies and used the resulting tax revenues to build social programs and redistribute income. They are the social democrats. Others, notably Argentina and Venezuela, preferred to impose national control of key industries, block trade and foreign investment, control prices and give resource income directly to the poor. They tend to call themselves democratic socialists.
This showdown between social democrats and democratic socialists took place at a fortuitous moment: Oil and natural resource booms were boosting revenues; six decades of intense urbanization had ended in stable populations; and the U.S. had become less confrontational. As a result, poverty declined and the gap between rich and poor narrowed in almost all of these countries. But there was a big difference between the two systems.
A study by economists Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig found that, in Argentina and Venezuela, inequality was reduced back to early 1990s levels after peaking in the early 2000s. But in social democratic Brazil and Chile, smart policies cut inequality to record-low levels: “Though both regimes reduced inequality and poverty,” once you remove the inevitable effects of rising oil prices, “only the social democratic regimes appear to break with the past, reducing inequality to historic lows.”
The Chavez approach helped the poor by giving them some money and health care. This isn’t to be dismissed: It sharply reduced the worst forms of misery. But neighbouring countries did the same while also creating a sustainable future beyond poverty; they created the business opportunities and economic institutions that make it possible for the poor to enter the middle class.
In Brazil and Chile, according to research by the Washington-based Center for Global Development, the size of the middle class expanded, to a fifth and a third of the population. In Venezuela, during the first half of the Chavez years, it collapsed to 3 per cent from 21 per cent, as the private-sector economy crumbled, and doesn’t appear to have recovered.
Here’s where the difference between Venezuela and Brazil is not simply one of degree, but of a fundamental nature: The populist, highly nationalist socialism of Mr. Chavez did serious damage to the institutions that could give people a path out of poverty. His neighbours spent a decade strengthening them.
Because Mr. Chavez regulated food prices and discouraged commercial farming, slashing agricultural capacity, there are major food shortages and hours-long lineups at government-subsidized supermarkets. Electricity supplies are sporadic, schools teach thin propaganda in place of a curriculum, cities and roads are crumbling, and hospitals are among the worst on the continent. This petroleum superpower has not saved or invested anything. On the contrary, Venezuela has a 20-per-cent deficit and an inflation rate of 30 per cent a year.
The “Bolivarian revolution” was not new politics but rather a copy of Venezuela’s policies of the 1970s and early 1980s, with the same results. Then, it was followed by a post-oil collapse back into poverty. This time, there were other, smarter options. They still exist, just over the border.
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/10/13
Doug Saunders: Hugo Chavez had nothing to do with South America's real ...
Globe and Mail Outside South America, Mr. Chavez was a polarizing figure: His outspoken anti-Americanism and alliances with the dictators of Iran, Libya and Iraq led him to be demonized by many as a Cold War-style threat. For others, he was a hero: a dark-skinned ... and more » |
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/11/13
Belarusians Had to Mourn Chavez for Three Days
Belarus Digest Anti-Americanism and “resistance to the single-polar world” rhetoric are the main uniting factors here. Such cooperation ... Lukashenka's regime often uses connections like that to show its autonomy from Russia and independence from the West. Also ... and more » |
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History News Network |
Hugo Chavez's Sullied Progressive Legacy in the Mideast
History News Network (He also seems not to have distinguished between anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism.) These considerations shaped his Middle East ... Libya was not a socialist country but a post-Soviet, Russian-style oligarchy. Ordinary Libyans, especially in the ... and more » |
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/11/13
Views and News from Norway |
Ex-minister's book made waves
Views and News from Norway “He lashes out with anti-Americanism that he claims is in the bone marrow of the left, like the Conservatives lash out at Russia and China,” Solheim claims. Solheim rather thinks the US is, “in an historic perspective, the most restrained world power ... |
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/11/13
As US fades, power vacuum fears rise
Bangkok Post This and the accompanying rise of anti-Americanism is important because it has undercut US soft power and thereby reduced Washington's ability to promote its interests overseas, and indeed those of its allies. ... For instance, in eight of 13 key ... |
via anti-americanism in russia - Google News on 3/12/13
Forbes |
A Completely Unrealistic Iran Grand Bargain Proposal
Forbes But from everything I've read about the internal mechanics of Pakistan, there is nothing that won't reinforce Pakistani paranoia about India and attendant anti-Americanism. Pakistan could react to this deal in two ways: a) support Taliban extremists ... |
via Russia - Google News on 3/10/13
The Voice of Russia |
Putin's Russia: Still an Empire, Still Evil
American Thinker Last week was the thirtieth anniversary of Ronald Reagan's "Evil Empire" speech before the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando Florida (on March 8, 1983). Today, Russia is just as evil, and has been governed for an extended period as the ... Russia is turning to the East while leaving the door open to the WestThe Voice of Russia all 9 news articles » |